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✭
This volume assesses the formation of Croatian national identity in
the 1990s. It develops a novel framework that calls both primordialist
and modernist approaches to nationalism and national identity into
question before applying that framework to Croatia. In doing so it not
only provides a new way of thinking about how national identity is
formed and why it is so important but also closely examines 1990s
Croatia in a unique way.
An explanation of how Croatian national identity was formed in an
abstract way by a historical narrative that traces centuries of yearning
for a national state is given. The book goes on to show how the
government, opposition parties, dissident intellectuals and diaspora
groups offered alternative accounts of this narrative in order to
legitimise contemporary political programmes based on different
visions of national identity. It then looks at how these debates were
manifested in social activities as diverse as football and religion,
economics and language.
This volume marks an important contribution to both the way we
study nationalism and national identity and our understanding of
post-Yugoslav politics and society.
Alex J. Bellamy is lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies
at the University of Queensland
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Language was an important political tool throughout former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
The choice of words and spellings in this book is not meant to reflect any political
orientation. The language used in contemporary Croatia is labelled ‘Croatian’ through-
out, except when ‘Serbo-Croatian’ is specifically referred to (to describe the official
language of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia). I use ‘Croatian’ simply
because that it what most people in Croatia call their language.
The choice of place names is also a political choice. Unless referring to the labels
used by specific writers, I use the modern Croatian names for places. Thus, the Dalmatian
hinterland that was occupied by Serb rebels between 1991 and 1995 is referred to as the
‘Lika’, which was the geographical expression for the area after the dissolution of the
Habsburg military frontier (Vojna Krajina) in the nineteenth century. However, when
referring to the political status of the territory held by the Serbs in the first half of the
1990s, I label it as the ‘so-called Krajina’, to intimate the name given to it by the Serbs
and the fact that this name was never legitimised either by the Croats or the international
community.
Most often, I simply reproduce words as found, as they can tell us things about the
person or group using them. This gets confusing with the use of the Croatian ‘œ/Œ’,
which is sometimes also expressed as ‘dj’. Following my basic rule, I use ‘œ’. In writing
people’s names I either follow the standard norm or adopt the spelling preferred by the
person referred to. Most foreign writers spell ‘Tuœman’ as ‘Tudjman’. I maintain the
original spelling in quotes, followed by [sic] to demonstrate that the spelling change is
deliberate. Again, I do not wish to make any political point with my choice of letters and
spellings.
Croatian is a phonetic language with each letter constituting a different sound. Thus:
A as in English a in father.
B as in b in bed.
C as in ts in cats.
Ç a sound between ch in reach and t in tune.
Ï as in ch in reach.
D as in d in dog.
D¥ as in j in John.
Dj as a sound between d in duke and dg in bridge.
Œ as Dj.
E as in e in let.
F as in f in full.
G as in g in good.
H as in Scottish ch in loch.
I as in English I in machine.
J as in y in yet.
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K as in k in kite.
L as in l in look.
Lj as in ll in million.
M as in m in man.
N as in n in net.
O as in o in not.
P as in p in pet.
R as in r in run, slightly rolled.
S as in ss in glass.
‡ as in sh in she.
T as in t in tap.
U as in u in rule.
V as in v in veil.
Z as in z in zebra.
™ as in S in pleasure.
(Pronunciation table based on J. R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a
Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. xix–xx.)
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What did it mean to be Croatian in the 1990s? As the Republic of Croatia enters
its second decade as an independent state, with a new president and a new
government for the first time, this book asks whether sentiments of Croatian
national identity have changed and, if so, how and why. General theories of
nations and nationalism are unhelpful when it comes to addressing particular
cases, principally because very few cases adhere to the accounts they offer. I do
not intend to rehearse these arguments here or to explore the relative merits of
different theories with regards to Croatia. Instead, I propose a multi-layered
approach to studying contemporary Croatian national identity. Adopting Paul
James’ theory of ‘abstract communities’, I argue that national identity is con-
stituted by the interaction of three levels of social abstraction. The first level is
an abstract level of ‘big stories’ that distinguish the nation from other nations.
In and of themselves, such stories have little meaning in contemporary contexts.
Therefore the second level looks at the political and intellectual elites who
attempt to make sense of these ‘big stories’ in order to legitimise particular
political programmes in the contemporary context. However, national identity
derives its power from being embedded in individual subjectivity. Thus the
narratives of national identity articulated by political and intellectual elites are
manifested and constantly reinterpreted in social practice. None of the three
levels can be prioritized because they are mutually constitutive. That is, social
practices within nations make no sense outside the narratives of the first and
second levels. The first, most abstract, level is politically meaningless without
contemporary interpretation. The power of national identity derives from its
existence at the nexus of all three levels. It is constituted by the first,
contextualised and mobilised by the second, and embedded by the third. This is
a constant process of contestation, without an end point, in which social
practices in the everyday inform revisions at the levels of abstraction above.
With regards to Croatia, I argue that at the most abstract level Croatian
national identity is constituted by the narrative of historical statehood (see
Chapter 3). During the 1990s competing political parties and intellectuals (the
second level) mobilised and reinterpreted narratives of historical statehood (the
first level) in order legitimise their political programmes. The ruling party (the
HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Croatian Democratic Union) made
use of the bureaucratic power of the state to enforce its particular under-
standing of Croatian national identity. Although such ideas enjoyed salience
during the wars of 1991–95 there were always sites of resistance to this
dominant account of national identity. As the 1990s passed, disjunctures
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developed between what the government said being Croatian meant and many
people’s experiences of actually being Croatian. This prompted the construc-
tion of sites of resistence where alternative conceptions of national identity were
articulated and practised. By the end of the 1990s, there were so many
disjuntures and contradictions that the HDZ’s perspective became untenable,
even though it was backed by the bureaucratic power of the state. This
provoked something of a paradigm shift in the 1999–2000 elections in which
new, more Western and European, conceptions of Croatian national identity
came to the fore.
My approach to understanding the formation of Croatian national identity
in the 1990s is therefore broken into three parts. At the first and most abstract
level are the ‘big stories’ of national identity that permeate the longue durée.
These are the narratives and events that distinguish the Croatian nation from all
other nations, ethnic groups and other types of social formation. I argue that in
the case of Croatia these ‘big stories’ derived from the Croatian historical
narrative and in particular from the claim to historic statehood. This is the
claim that Croatia was formed as a nation by centuries of continuous statehood.
Such a claim was made frequently in the past as well as in contemporary
Croatia. These claims are explored in Chapter 3, which outlines the historical
statehood narrative. Chapter 3 does not attempt to provide a ‘history’ of Croatia,
its national identity,1 or a discussion of its national historiography.2 Instead, it
attempts only to identify a narrative of Croatian historical statehood and briefly
to demonstrate how it influenced earlier conceptions of Croatian national
identity. The primary purpose of Chapter 3, therefore, is to identify abstract
conceptions of national identity that were interpreted and articulated by actors
in the 1990s to legitimise their political programmes.
The second level draws on Radcliffe and Westwood’s investigation of the
‘internalisation’ of national narratives, which is discussed in Chapter 2. It
contends that in order to become salient in the present, the abstract claims and
ideas that constitute the first level have to be made intelligible and relevant to
the community that comprises the nation. National identities are not simply
sets of abstract ideas but are also embedded in the material day-to-day lived
experience of people. Thus the second level of analysis focuses on the explana-
tions of national identity that were articulated by politicians, intellectuals and
others in the 1990s. These explanations attempted either to mobilise the
community around a particular political programme (be it a nationalist pro-
gramme or not) or, as in the case of the dissident intellectuals attempted to
challenge those programmes or deconstruct the ‘big stories’ of national identity.
To that end, Chapter 4 focuses on competing ideas of national identity
articulated in 1990s Croatia by the government and its supporters, opposition
parties and dissident intellectuals.
The third level of analysis considers the ways that the ideas articulated in
the first two levels were manifested and reinterpreted in social activity. Focusing
on six case studies, the study at this level identifies contests about the meaning
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of national identity. It looks at how conceptions of national identity shape
social practices and emphasises the complex, overlapping and contradictory
nature of national identity. It shows how the ideas discussed in the first two
levels are often rejected when subjects perceive a disjuncture between ideas and
lived experience. This level focuses on attempts to enforce a narrow under-
standing of Croatian national identity and the many sites of opposition that it
produced. Chapters 5 and 6 therefore consider six areas of social practice in
order to provide a series of snapshots showing the way that competing concep-
tions of national identity were embedded in areas as diverse as regionalism,
religion and sport.
In Croatia’s first democratic elections, on 22 April 1990, the Communist
Party was defeated by the nationally oriented HDZ. Although the HDZ did not
campaign for independence, its main slogan ‘it is for us to decide’ left few in
much doubt about its orientation. Once it assumed power in Yugoslav Croatia,
the new government – while being overtly Croat-centric – did much to appease
the central authorities in Belgrade. The Croatian territorial defence forces that
had been created by Tito were partially disarmed at the bequest of the JNA
(Jugoslavenski Narodna Armija – Yugoslav People’s Army) and along with
Slovenia the new government proposed a revised constitution that envisaged a
confederal Yugoslavia. The President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan
Milo°eviç, rejected these plans. On 18 May 1991 Croatia held a referendum for
independence and the result was an overwhelming endorsement of secession,
though the country’s 600,000 Serbs boycotted the vote. Almost simultaneously,
on 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia announced their disassociation from the
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). However, both states had to
wait another six months for recognition by the European Community. Finally,
on 15 January 1992 they were recognised along with the Republic of Bosnia and
Hercegovina and the Republic of Macedonia.3 By this time, one third of the
territory of the Republic of Croatia had been captured by a combination of
rebel Croatian Serbs fearful of the nationalist overtones of the HDZ and the
JNA. The Croatian cities of Osijek, Vukovar and Borovo Selo had been flattened
and the historic cities of Zadar and Dubrovnik severely damaged.4
The war in Croatia abated somewhat in 1992 with the deployment of the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the creation of a neutral
zone between Croatia and rebel Serb territories (United Nations Protected
Areas – UNPAS). The problems remained unresolved while world attention
turned to the horrors of the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Although the
agreement that allowed UNPROFOR to create the UNPAS in Croatia demanded
that the rebel Serbs disarm and that weaponry and men belonging to the JNA be
withdrawn to Serbia, neither happened. By 1995 the Croatian Army had signi-
ficantly improved its strength and capability and launched a series of offensives
to regain territories held by rebel Serbs. The largest of these offensives,
Operation Storm (Oluja), began on 4 August 1995 and finished a few days later
with the Croats having taken virtually all the territory previously occupied by
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rebel Serbs. A piece of territory along the Croatian-Serbian border remained in
Serbian hands, but Milo°eviç agreed to return this territory (Eastern Slavonia)
at the Dayton peace conference in November 1995. The United Nations
Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) successfully managed
this transition in 1997.5
Having twice won re-election, President Franjo Tuœman died on 10
December 1999. Less than a month later, his party (HDZ) was resoundingly
defeated by an opposition coalition in parliamentary elections. A few weeks
later, Stipe Mesiç won the presidential elections. Mesiç had been the last titular
President of the SFRY and as a senior HDZ member had abandoned Tuœman’s
party in 1993 in protest against the Croatian government’s support for the
Bosnian Croat para-state of ‘Herceg-Bosna’ and the subsequent war between
the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government. After a decade of attempting
to answer the question of what it meant to be a Croat, the HDZ’s control of the
Croatian state unravelled in a matter of weeks.
To understand the formation of Croatian national identity in the 1990s we
need to locate the discussion within wider concerns about the nature and
origins of nationalism and national identity. This issue is addressed in Chapter
1 where I expose a number of problems with traditional approaches to the
subject that have been shaped by the so-called ‘great divide’. ‘Nationalism
studies’ have been dominated by the ‘Warwick debate’ between Ernest Gellner
and Anthony Smith, which was held at Warwick University on 24 October
1995. This debate formalised the ‘great divide’ between primordialists and
modernists. On the one hand there are so-called primordialists (or ‘ethno-
symbolists’ to use Smith’s self-description) such as Anthony Smith who contend
that nations can trace a lineage into antiquity. Different writers award different
qualities to these histories. Smith, for example, suggests that the lineage need
only be subjective, while others such as Clifford Geertz insist that it is physical
and genealogical. The other side of the ‘great divide’ is populated by writers
such as Ernest Gellner who insist that the nation was an entirely novel and
revolutionary form of political community, one that claims an ancient heritage
but which is actually a wholly modern construction. These approaches have
received labels such as modernism, constructionism and instrumentalism and
are as divergent as the labels suggest.
Aware of the problems with both positions in the aftermath of the Warwick
debate, Anthony Smith and John Breuilly attempted to merge these paradigms
into a synthesis. However, this ‘re-imagining’ of the nation ultimately failed
because both sides continued to cling on to their own axioms and truisms and
thereby continued to talk past each other. This led writers such as Partha
Chatterjee, Michael Billig and Paul James to bring new concerns to the field and
point the debate in new directions: Chatterjee exposed the conceptual collusion
between primordialism and modernism; Billig exposed the nation in everyday
social activities and James insisted that the nation has to be understood as being
located on several layers of social abstraction. This new thinking is incorporated
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here by developing Paul James’ notion of ‘abstract communities’ and adapting
three research questions outlined by Katherine Verdery. They are:
• How do people become national? (Adapted to be, how do people become
Croats?)
• How is the nation symbolised? (Adapted to be, how is Croatian national
identity expressed in contemporary symbolism and rhetoric?)
• How can we understand the intersection of the nation with other social
operators? (Adapted to be, how are competing ideas about Croatian
national identity manifested in different areas of social activity?)
The study of Croatian national identity begins by posing the question ‘how
do people become Croats?’ and considering the Croatian historical narrative.
Most contemporary Croatian politicians and intellectuals agree that Croatian
national identity was shaped by the history of the Croats and in particular the
tradition of statehood that Croatia ostensibly enjoyed, albeit in many guises.
Although most commentators do not go as far as Franjo Tuœman and suggest
that Croats shared a ‘centuries-old dream’ to have their own national state,
there is widespread agreement that people became Croats primarily through a
shared history and occupancy of a common state.
The book goes on to address the question of how Croatian national identity
was represented and reinterpreted by symbols and rhetoric in the 1990s. It
focuses on the ways in which politicians, intellectuals and others attempted to
render abstract ideas of Croatian national identity more intelligible in order to
win legitimacy for their political programmes. It begins by considering the
dominant approach, which was the explanation of the meaning of Croatian
national identity articulated by Franjo Tuœman and the HDZ. The concept of
‘Franjoism’ is introduced to explain the way in which abstract historical inter-
pretation and public policy were married in an attempt to produce ‘good
Croats’ in the mould of the President himself. However, Franjoism failed to
monopolise the national imagination and there were alternative visions of what
it meant to be Croatian. Other political parties understood national identity
differently, as did dissident Croatian intellectuals such as Ivo Banac and
Slavenka Drakuliç. Throughout the 1990s, different interpretations of the
Croatian historical narrative were articulated in order to mobilise ‘the nation’
behind one or other political programme or to challenge that mobilisation.
To address my third level of analysis, six case studies are then offered to
consider how the process of internalisation brought national identity into
contact with other social operators and forms of identity. Each study is of an
area of social practice in Croatia. Each is primarily interested in the way that
different ideas of national identity competed to be internalised in social practice
and how they were challenged and reinterpreted during that process. The six
case studies – of the national economy, football, the region of Istria, education,
the Roman Catholic Church and the Croatian language – reveal the ways in
which national identity has a material day-to-day quality as well as an abstract
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content. National identity becomes embedded in the lived experiences of
national subjects. Although ideas about the nation can be seen in each of these
areas, the meaning of what it was to be Croatian was constantly reinterpreted.
Thus Chapters 5 and 6 identify many accounts of national identity that are laced
with inconsistencies and discrepancies.
By considering national identity at different levels of abstraction it is
possible to see processes of perpetual contest and (re)interpretation at work. It
is also possible to identify ways in which ideas about identity have a practical
and material resonance. Franjo Tuœman and the HDZ attempted, and failed, to
resolve the meaning of Croatian national identity. Evidence for this is provided
by the numerous alternative accounts that permeate this study and the crushing
defeat of the HDZ in the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections.
Notes
1 For a study of the socio-economic aspects of nation-building in Croatia see M. Gross,
Poïeci moderne Hrvatske. Neoapsolutizam u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1850–1860
(Zagreb: Globus, 1985).
2 Croatian national historiography has been characterised by swings between radical and
conservative polemics. See M. Gross, Suvremena Historiografija: Korijeni, Postignuaïa,
Traganja (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 1993).
3 Because the Greek government opposed the appropriation of the name Macedonia,
which they claim is Greek, Macedonia was recognised as the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia’ or FYROM. Turkey recognises Macedonia by its constitutional name.
4 For an overview of these events see C. Cviiç, An Awful Warning: The War in Ex-
Yugoslavia (London: Centre for Policy Studies No. 139, 1994).
5 See J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War
(London: C. Hurst and Co., 1997), p. 283.
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National identity and the ‘great divide’
According to Tom Nairn, ‘the reason why the dispute between modernists and
primordialists is not resolved is because it is irresolvable’.1 This is because the
two approaches place different emphases on different aspects of identity
formation. Nairn described the so-called ‘Warwick debate’, between Anthony
Smith and Ernest Gellner, as a ‘courteous difference of emphasis’.2 He insisted
that the debate provided an inadequate set of approaches to the problem of
nation formation and that there appeared to be little prospect of progress.
Hence, ‘the old presuppositions of modernism are losing their hold; but no one
is quite sure what new ones will replace them’.3 The ‘great debate’ in nation-
alism studies, captured at Warwick, is one between so-called ‘primordialists’
and ‘modernists’. Put simply, primordialists argue that the nation derives
directly from a priori ethnic groups and is based on kinship ties and ancient
heritage. For their part, modernists insist that the nation is an entirely novel
form of identity and political organisation, which owes nothing to ethnic
heritage and everything to the modern dynamics of industrial capitalism. This
chapter provides a brief overview of the two positions but concludes that
primordialism and modernism, and the scope of the debate between them, fail
to offer a satisfactory account of the formation of national identity.
Primordialist approaches to national identity
The intellectual link that joins primordialists is the assertion that there was a
‘pre-nationalist’ period in which political, economic and cultural relationships
were not well enough defined, regulated or homogenised to be conducive to the
formation of national identity. Primordialists claim that the nation was not
therefore ‘imagined’ or constructed outside prior forms of social community
and neither was it a revolutionary or completely novel product of the march
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towards modernity. Instead, they argue that national identity is based directly
on previous forms of group identity and draws upon the myths, languages and
social practices of these pre-national groups.
Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz are often cited as the ‘fathers’ of the
primordialist school, though primrodialist thinking can be traced back to
Herder, Rousseau, and Weber. Shils and Geertz argued that ethnic groups were
the direct antecedents of nations. Edward Shils suggested that modern society
‘is held together by an infinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in
concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, individual ambition,
primordial affinities and a civil sense which is low in many, high in some, and
moderate in most persons’.4 Shils focused on immediate family groups and
tried to understand how primary group ties were bound together into larger
structures.5 He argued that large social groups are constituted by face-to-face
interaction. From here, they continue to expand through the enlargement and
joining together of primary groups to form ethnicities. The nation comes about
as a result of the amalgamation of ethnicities, which in turn, therefore, are the
amalgamation of family groups. Clifford Geertz shared Shils’ perspective to a
large extent, arguing that a primordial attachment is one that is based upon
social ‘givens’ such as language, religion, or particular social practices.6 Geertz
identified six forms of primordial tie which, when present, convert loose social
groups into nations. They were: assumed blood ties, race, language, region,
religion and custom.
Such approaches claimed parsimony but did so at the expense of accuracy.
They drew three criticisms from Anthony Smith. First, Smith asked how are we
to know who is genetically related when they are outside our own family?
Second, Smith insisted that this simplistic primordialist approach could not
account for the way that national identity unites distant strangers. Finally, he
argued, they failed to discriminate between social phenomena with differing
degrees of power, inclusiveness and complexity, and thus completely disregarded
epochal change.7
John Armstrong, Adrian Hastings and Joshua Fishman offered alternative
primordialist accounts. These writers all rejected the modernist claim that
nations were new, novel and revolutionary.8 They argued that nations and
national identities had existed in diverse times and places before the supposed
‘birth of nations’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus they insisted
that national identity existed before nationalism rather than being constructed
by it as modernists claim. They used historical study to show that pre-modern
social groups shared traits associated with national identity such as a vernacular
language and social rituals. The main problem with such an approach, however,
is that it is tempocentric. That is, such approaches create an illusion ‘in which
the “naturalized” and “reified” present is extrapolated backwards in time to
present all historical systems as “isomorphic”’.9
Anthony Smith and Walker Connor offered a more sophisticated brand of
primordialism. These writers often refer to themselves as ‘ethno-symbolists’
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rather than primordialists. Connor insisted that the important point that is
often overlooked when studying the nation is that it is not what is that is
important but rather what people believe it to be.10 It is important that subjects
believe there to be kinship ties between themselves and fellow members of the
same nation, and it is this emotional and non-rational belief that makes
national identity so important and nationalism such a potent political force.
The idea that national identity is a form of non-rational subjectivity that
defies empirical and historical debunking lies at the heart of Connor’s work.11
He makes the primordialist account of nation formation more sophisticated by
asserting that nations do not necessarily have a tangible essence that transcends
historical epochs.12 Connor used many examples to demonstrate cases where
the supposed tangible essences of nations, such as language or religion, have
changed, but the nation itself and the communal ties within it have persisted.
He argued that nations were held together by a ‘sense of kinship’, so that the
nation should be understood as ‘a group of people who feel that they are
ancestrally related’.13 Although he identifies a direct link between the nation and
an a priori social group, the relationship is understood as subjective rather than
necessarily actual.14
Like Connor, Anthony Smith argued that nations are predicated on an
ethnic core, which he labelled ethnie. He concurred with the idea that ethnies
were largely subjective social entities. However, Smith attempted to draw limits
on the extent to which the ethnie could be understood as being subjective. For
instance, in his consideration of Ernest Renan’s insight that a nation is ‘an
everyday plebiscite’, he observed that the idea that a nation was wholly
subjective could lead to any social group being described as a nation.15 The
cornerstone of Smith’s so-called ‘ethno-symbolist’ approach is a critique of the
modernist approach to national identity formation.16 Smith’s central argument
is that national identity derives from an ethnic core. This core has six character-
istics. They are: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared
historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture,
an association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant
sectors of the population.17 He argued that the most important of these are the
ones that refer to a shared historical memory, because ethnies are perpetuated
not by lines of physical descent but by a sense of continuity, shared history and
common destiny.18 For Smith, as for Connor, the durability of the ethnie lies not
in the cultural traits of the group but in the sharing of a historical memory that
is made all the more potent by being related to a specific territory. The shift
from ethnie to nation occurred with the perpetuation of three revolutions –
administrative, economic, and cultural. The local intelligentsia played a role in
mobilising a formerly passive community into a vernacular community that
acted as the main focus for the polity.19 As such, the nation is understood to be
both modern (in that the revolutions generally occurred in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries) and ‘deep-rooted’ (in that it is predicated upon a prior
ethnic core).
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Primordialist accounts of national identity formation therefore tend to take
one of three approaches:
• Nations are directly derived from prior social groups, which themselves
derive from family groups.
• Nations existed in pre-modern times and are therefore neither recent nor
novel.
• Nations are based on a well-rooted subjective belief of a shared history and
common destiny.
The limits of primordialism
The turn towards a greater focus on the subjective nature of national identity by
writers such as Connor and Smith saves the primordialist approach from
straightforward empirical debunking. Nevertheless, primordialism has been
attacked on many grounds. Benedict Anderson observed that it tended to
overlook the sharp historical discontinuities, discrepancies and contingencies
that lay hidden beneath dominant historical discourses about the continuity of
nations.20 History, he argued, is not characterised by continuity and progress
but by perpetual political struggle. John Breuilly challenged the idea that there
was even a subjective relationship between the nation and an a priori ethnic
group. He argued that national identity was initially a minority pastime
pursued by the intelligentsia and linguists that was ignored by the majority
peasantry.21 Moreover, he pointed out that national identity is a peculiar and
exclusionary form of identity that excludes the possibility of alternative and
overlapping identities, which according to Breuilly were a feature of pre-
national group identities. Within the Holy Roman Empire, for instance, it was
possible to be Catholic, German and Austrian without any conflict of identity.22
This goes against the focus on the development of a single identity that is at the
heart of primordialism. Likewise, far from being historically sensitive, primor-
dialism is based on tempocentrism because it utilises modern conceptions of
the nation and tries to find historical justifications for them, applying modern
concepts to the very different contexts of the past.23
A further set of criticisms focus on Smith and Connor’s insistence that the
links between nations and prior ethnic groups are subjective. First, neither
Smith nor Connor discusses how this subjectivity is formed and maintained.
For example, Smith argued that the modernist school is flawed because men
and women would surely not be prepared to die for a social construct. He failed
to explain, however, why men and women would be willing to die for an
(apparently) equally constructed and entirely modern form of subjectivity.
Second, primordialist methodology is overtly positivist. The histories of ethnic
groups are presumed to be ‘out there’ waiting to be studied, either to credit or
discredit the claims made by nationalists. Is it not rather the case that the
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histories are created by the historian’s own beliefs about the past? If the
historian looks for nations and national lineages in the historical record, they
are likely to be found. Finally, even primordialists who claim that the links
between past and present are subjective, tend wherever possible to draw
supposed ‘actual’ direct linkages between ethnic groups and nations.
Modernist approaches
According to Anthony Smith, the modernist account allows no room for the
nation in antiquity, since ‘for modernists, nations and nationalisms are the
products of the novel conditions of modernity’.24 Elie Kedourie coined the
defining phrase for modernists when he noted that ‘nationalism is a doctrine
invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century’.25 Kedourie’s
work focused on the generation and dissemination of the idea of the nation. For
Kedourie, this was a necessary and direct precursor to social groups taking on
the characteristics of a nation and behaving as if they were national groups. He
argued that the nation came into being once ideas of national identity and
enlightened self-determination were brought into public politics by the French
Revolution and spread across Europe by Napoleon’s army. The mobilisation of
national identity represented a sharp break from tribalism and opened up an
entirely novel process of social organisation.
The central strength of Kedourie’s thesis is that it relates to the history of
ideas, tracing the development of the idea of the nation in political philosophy.
However, this strength is also a weakness because Kedourie did not reveal
precisely how these ideas were mobilised. For example, he failed to explain why
the rhetoric of the French Revolution was more about the nation than, for
example, economic liberty, and why some ideas were mobilised while others
were not. Kedourie has also been criticised for locating the emergence of the
nation within a relatively narrow timeframe. Anthony Smith, for instance, argued
that Kedourie’s account ‘omits the much longer period of the gestation of
nationalism as language-and-symbolism, and as consciousness-and-aspiration’.26
Furthermore, Adrian Hastings detected a ‘derogatory’ approach to nationalism
and national identity. According to Hastings, Kedourie tended to ‘leave out a
central line of meaning and even to misunderstand or denigrate much of what
is most valuable in the European cultural and political achievement’.27 Finally,
Kedourie’s approach can be accused of being Eurocentric, a point underscored
by his opening assertion that nations were invented in Europe, which ignores
the development of national identities in places such as Japan.
Another group of modernists argue that rather than the idea of the nation
constituting the possibility of thinking about the modern, bureaucratic and
sovereign territorial state, the nation was itself constituted by the emergence of
the modern state. For instance, John Breuilly argued that ‘nationalism is a form
of politics’.28 He suggested that nationalist discourses are actually political
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movements through which people seek to attain state power.29 For Breuilly,
nationalism is meaningless if it is considered in isolation from the state, because
the modern state shaped the nationalist agenda and provided it with an
overarching objective – the possession of statehood.30
The closest Breuilly came to outlining an account of the emergence of a
national ‘order of things’ was a brief discussion of the transfer of political power
from monarchs to an enlarged political community. He suggested that the
driving force behind this transfer was the need to defend the monarch’s territory
against the rise of similar states, though this tautology is unconvincing.31 He
argued that political necessity dictated that the feudal system be replaced by a
system based upon nation-states. As such, the idea of the nation was directly
related to the institutions of state that sustained the monarchy. However, the
new political community eventually turned the nation against the monarch. So,
‘in this way the process which created the modern idea of the state in its earliest
form also gave rise to the political concept of the nation’.32 As the monarchy
began to penetrate more and more aspects of social life, the scope for conflict
increased and the idea of the nation began to mobilise the masses.
Breuilly’s most important insight was that the nation and the political
ideology of nationalism were constructed to fulfil the needs of political com-
munities who opposed the expanding role of the monarchy (the emerging
middle class). Paul Brass offered a similar account of the emergence of national
identity.33 Brass viewed national identity as the result of a process whereby elites
mobilised aspects of a social group’s culture or behaviour and attached new
meanings to them.34 They then used them as symbols to mobilise the group,
defend its interests and compete with other groups. For Breuilly and Brass,
therefore, the process of national identity formation should be seen as an
inherently political one.
The most consistently state-centric of the thinkers who insist that the
emergence of the nation was a direct consequence of the emergence of the
bureaucratic state is Anthony Giddens. Giddens based his analysis on Max
Weber’s notion that it is not possible to speak of the ‘nation’ as distinct from the
state because the two are necessary cohabitants in the political and social
organisations produced by modernity.35 Contrasting the nation-state with other
polities, Giddens argued that the contemporary state attempts to construct a
bordered homogeneity over its territory, which it is able to do by utilising the
extensive bureaucratic power that came with the industrial advances of early
modernity. He traced the emergence of the nation-state to three developments,
each related to the military. These were the technological development of arma-
ments, the amplification of military administrative power and the importance
of naval power in interconnecting the world.36 Giddens suggested that the nation
emerged out of the centralisation of bureaucratic power by the modern state,
which produced a homogenous education system, economic system and social
rituals, naturalising vernacular languages and producing forms of high culture
that legitimised the bureaucratic state and allowed it to function efficiently.37
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Paul James made two criticisms of Giddens’ approach, which could be
extended to the other modernists who focus on the role of the state.38 First, he
argued that this approach is both Eurocentric and historically contentious.
According to James, Giddens repeatedly argued that the increasing political
salience of national identity was caused by the administrative power of the
absolutist European state. However, James pointed to the example of Tokinawa’s
Japan, which exerted a high level of administrative control within a clearly
bordered entity prior to such developments in Europe. Second, he argued that
this account of national identity formation is too restrictive. It reduces the
nation to the product of a particular structure of political and military power.
An additional problem with Breuilly, Brass and (to a lesser extent) Giddens is
that they each failed to account for the changes in political or bureaucratic
power upon which, they claimed, the nation was predicated. A major tauto-
logical claim is used to explain the emergence and spread of the modern state
(the modern state developed because other modern states were developing).
A final group of modernist thinkers agree that the rise of the nation was
interdependent with the rise of the modern state. However, they account for
these political and social changes by reference to the social and economic
demands created by the industrial revolution. Benedict Anderson’s pioneering
work showed how the nation came to be ‘imagined’ and the strong ties of
sentimentality that were generated by this imagination. He began by arguing
that national identities emerged as a result of complex social interactions with
varying degrees of ‘self-consciousness’.39 Anderson understood the nation as an
imagined community, because ‘the members of even the smallest nation will
never know most of their fellow members … yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion’.40 To say that the nation is imagined is not to say
that it is ‘false’, ‘fabricated’ or ‘invented’. Rather, it is imagined in three ways.
First, it is imagined as limited because all nations have limits and none aspires to
incorporate mankind. Second, because the concept of the nation emerged
during the Enlightenment, the nation is imagined as being sovereign. Finally,
the nation is imagined as being a community able to command the highest levels
of commitment across the boundaries of socio-economic class. Not surprisingly,
Anderson’s thesis has been criticised by Anthony Smith.41 For Smith, Anderson’s
focus on literary texts, which emerged from his interest in print-capitalism,
meant that his thesis lacked a solid historiographical grounding and failed to
account for how particular nations emerged in specific times and places.
Within the same tradition of enquiry, the social and economic historian
Eric Hobsbawm offered an account of national identity formation, which held
that ‘the nation was one of many traditions “invented” by political elites in
order to legitimise their power in a century of revolution and democra-
tisation’.42 By an ‘invented tradition’ Hobsbawm meant:
A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a
ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In
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fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable
historic past.43
Hobsbawm’s ‘invented traditions’ are therefore considerably different from
Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’. Whereas Anderson was often at pains to
point out that to imagine is not necessarily to fabricate, Hobsbawm insisted that
an invented tradition ‘is largely fictitious’.44 Such traditions attempt to
legitimise themselves by appearing to be historically continuous and ‘ancient’,
when in fact they are anything but. As Hobsbawm pointed out in a rebuke to the
primordialists, ‘novelty is no less novel for being able to dress up easily as
antiquity’.45 The nation should therefore be seen as an invented tradition that
emerged as a response to the upheavals caused by modernity and the industrial
revolution.46
Hobsbawm began his account by identifying the problems encountered by
objective and subjective accounts. Objective accounts, which claim that a nation
is constituted by the existence of certain objective elements such as shared
language or shared cultural practices, are problematic because ‘only some
members of the large class of entities which fit such definitions can at any time
be described as “nations”’.47 On the other hand, subjective accounts, which
define nations by their members’ self-consciousness, are tautological according
to Hobsbawm. They could lead us to believe that any entity claiming to be a
nation could become one. As such, Hobsbawm insisted that both objective and
subjective accounts were potentially misleading. Following Ernest Gellner, he
argued that national identity and nationalism are inherently political terms and
that the nation is constructed through nationalism, rather than the other way
round.48 Alongside Anderson, Hobsbawm argued that the development of
industrial modes of communication (print-capitalism) made thinking about
the nation a viable popular activity, and from his own historical writings he
noted that it was impossible to speak of the nation outside the historical context
in which it emerged. All this meant that, for Hobsbawm, the key feature of the
nation was its modernity.
Hobsbawm argued that the principal factor driving the march towards a
‘national order of things’ was the imperative of economic transformation.49
Intellectuals in the nineteenth century and earlier extolled the virtues of large
states, and the idea of the nation came to be tied to the general expansion of
social groups that was necessitated by the technological transformations of that
period.50 However, the main problem that confronted Hobsbawm was that,
because he describes the nation as a fabrication, it is very difficult (if not impos-
sible) for him to explain why it is that the nation took such a hold on the
modern political imagination of the common people.
Ernest Gellner attempted to address this problem by offering a more
sophisticated and all-encompassing account of the emergence of the nation. For
Gellner, the nation is an idea that underpins the modern social imagination to
the extent that it is not possible to think of individuals existing outside the
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nation without strongly challenging the modern imagination.51 This is not an
inherent attribute of humanity. Rather, it is a contingency derived from the
socio-political demands of the industrial revolution. However, this contingency
presents itself as ‘natural’ or ‘obvious’, establishing what others may call a
reified ‘national order of things’.
Whereas for Kedourie the idea of the nation promoted homogenisation, for
Gellner ‘a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperatives [those of
modern industrial society] eventually appears on the surface in the form of
nationalism’.52 He argued that there were five stages of nationalism, the first
three of which accounted for the shift from pre-national social organisation to
the reification of the ‘national order of things’. The first stage was the dissolu-
tion of the medieval system and the replacement of the universal eschatological
order with a structure comprised of sovereign states, though in this early stage
there was no national relationship between ruler and ruled.53 During the second
stage, the functions of the state began to shift, with two new imperatives coming
to form an international moral order. The first imperative was the solidification
of the sovereign state. The second was the emerging ideas of the Enlightenment,
whereby the ‘people’ came to be seen as the ultimate repository of moral
authority. The third epoch saw the idea and practice of the ‘nation’ spread from
intellectual and political elites to the lower classes. This process was a direct
result of the urbanisation, spread of universal education and capitalist division
of labour that were made necessary by the industrial revolution. The demands
for occupational mobility and the increased technical sophistication of methods
of production required the use of common languages, codes and symbols.
The economic imperative was what led Gellner to argue that the nation did
not create social homogeneity but that instead it itself evolved from largely
economic demands for social homogeneity. Gellner emphasised the idea that
the nation and the modern state developed as responses to economic change.54
Viewed this way, the nation must be seen as a consequence of the social
ordering made necessary by the industrial revolution. This social order was
legitimised by what Gellner described as the predominance of ‘high cultures’.
Gellner’s discussion of ‘high cultures’ was important because it offered an
explanation of how the nation came to establish its own ‘order of things’. The
nation was constituted by both the will of the people and the dissemination of
‘high culture’ throughout the whole of society. In the pre-modern period, ‘high
culture’ was only accessible through certain mediums that were generally only
available to social elites. With the construction of the nation, ‘high culture’
began to pervade entire societies via vernacular languages and histories that
were accessed through new forms of education. The nation was formed through
the ‘fusion of will, culture and polity’, a fusion necessitated by the advent of
industrialism.55
Although Gellner offered a more sophisticated and multi-layered account
than Anderson and Hobsbawm who were tied to an essentially Marxist outlook,
several points of criticism have been made. First, Paul James argued that
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Gellner’s discussion of pre-agrarian society produced an ‘ethnocentric, elitist,
teleological, functionalist, idealist version of the great divide’.56 Second, Hobs-
bawm argued that Gellner’s analysis was inherently elite-centric and ‘top-down’.57
Third, although theoretically appealing, Gellner’s long historical sweep made
many parts of the study empirically problematic. For example, Miroslav Hroch
has created problems for the whole modernist school because he has convinc-
ingly argued that ideas about the nation and practices of nationalism actually
emerged in areas where industrialisation and modernisation were not taking
hold.58
Beyond the ‘great divide’
Primordialists argue that the nation is predicated on either actual ties or a
subjective belief in an a priori ethnic community. Modernists, however, insist
that the nation is an entirely novel form of social organisation, constructed
during the dramatic social transformations of the industrial revolution. Both
approaches offer unsatisfactory accounts. Primordialism fails to account for the
ways that nations arose within the wider sociological, religious, political and
economic transformations that accompanied the advent of industrialism and
modernity. It can also be criticised on empirical grounds because there are very
few direct historical connections between the ethnie and the nation. Primordial-
ists are only able to sustain their argument because they employ a problematic
teleological and tempocentric historiography. Their approach to history empha-
sises continuity over change and tends to overlook the radical transformations
that characterised the early modern period. They also tend to take contemporary
ideas about social formation and look for them in antiquity. Finally, primor-
dialists do not adequately address the question of how local identities are
transcribed on to the macro-level to form nations or why nations and
nationalism became the dominant mode of social organisation when they did.
The modernist side of the ‘great divide’ is also problematic. The argument
that national identity is entirely novel means that modernists need to amplify
the extent to which the national order of things is unprecedented. This,
however, leads them towards a teleological account as well, because they need to
account for why national identity as opposed to other forms of identity (such as
class) became predominant. Moreover, modernists fail to address the question
of how it was that something modern, socially constructed and – some argue –
fabricated was able to constitute the limit of political imagination to the extent
that the nation has done in modern times. This is particularly problematic given
that most modernists tend to place the emergence of nations within a short
timeframe of a century or so. Finally, modernism also employs shaky historio-
graphy. It is decidedly ethnocentric, ignoring pre-national Asian ‘nationalisms’
and the agrarian nationalism of non-industrial states.
The central problem with accounts that emerge from the ‘great divide’ is
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that they are mutually exclusive. Primordialists retain a degree of objectivity in
their ‘nation’, while for modernists the nation is wholly subjective. Primordialists
emphasise the role of continuity-over-change in history, while modernists
insist that history is better characterised as change-over-continuity. Neither of
these polemics offers an account that appreciates the complexities, discrepancies
and peculiarities of nation formation. It is because of this problem that recent
literature on the question has tended to move away from this debate and offer
accounts that are more nuanced and specific. The following chapter therefore
begins by considering alternative ways of thinking about the formation of
national identity that do not follow the terms of the ‘great debate’. It is from this
literature, I argue, that a useful framework for understanding the formation of
Croatian national identity in the 1990s can be developed.
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Re-imagining the nation
Some years before the ‘Warwick debate’, the journal Millennium held a
symposium entitled ‘re-imagining the nation’.1 In his introduction to the
volume, Adam Lerner suggested that ‘[t]he nation exists as much in people’s
minds as it does in the world’.2 By this, he seemed to be suggesting that the
nation could be viewed as real and constructed, primordial and modern. The
contributors to this collection agreed that the ‘great divide’ offered unsatis-
factory ways of understanding the formation of national identity and shared a
desire to ‘re-imagine’ the nation in ways that could build on the insights offered
by both sides of the divide. This chapter considers some of these new
approaches to the study of national identity formation and assesses how they
can be used to study the formation of Croatian national identity in the 1990s.
New approaches to national identity formation
Reflecting the growing dissatisfaction with earlier approaches to national
identity, Liisa Mallki, Michael Billig, Sarah Radcliffe and Sally Westwood have
offered alternative ways of thinking about nation formation that expose how
nations are continually produced and reproduced in human subjectivity. These
works reveal that the nation operates in ways that are often ‘unseen’ by grand
theories that tend to see nation formation as a process that culminates with the
creation of nation-state rather than as an on-going project that is reproduced
on a daily basis.
Liisa Malkki’s ‘ethnography of displacement in the national order of things’
is interesting because it combined a modernist view of the social world with an
approach that emphasises the importance of historical memory.3 As Malkki
explained, ‘the construction of a national past is a construction of history of a
particular kind; it is one that claims moral attachments to specific territories,
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motherlands or homelands, and posits time-honored links between people,
polity and territory’.4 Much of Malkki’s study is concerned with the experiences
of refugees in Tanzania and how two groups in particular mediated their
problematic position in the ‘national order of things’. By referring to the
‘national order of things’, Malkki suggested that something that is quite recent
(the idea that human polities should be organised according to national
taxonomies) has been reified to the extent that it appears natural and ancient.
Malkki viewed the nation as the floor of a Foucauldian ‘regime of truth’. She
noted that the nation acts as ‘a powerful regime of classification’, an ‘apparently
commonsensical system of ordering and sorting people into national kinds and
types’.5 For Malkki, the nation operates as an absolute differentiator, which
makes certain collusions of people and territory appear natural and others
incommensurable.6
Malkki offered an interesting new insight into the nature of the nation’s
historical memory. Rather than seeing it as an emancipatory mode of social
action, Malkki argued that the historical memory of the nation operates in such
a way as to constrain social action by locating particularist and absolute
identities within particular and absolute social and spatial locations.7 The rest of
Malkki’s argument, which forms the backbone of her work, is an explanation of
how these narratives (‘mythico-histories’) are articulated as a response to parti-
cular sets of social circumstances and reproduced on a daily basis to produce
certain meanings on which people base their actions.8
In similar vein, Michael Billig’s study of ‘banal nationalism’ considered
how the nation is produced and reproduced by daily social practices.9 His
opening contention is that nationalism and the active reproduction of national
identity occurs constantly within all nation-states. His study focused on the
ways that polities are reproduced as national and their citizens as nationals.10
Billig sees nationalism as being far from an intermittent mood in established
nations or something exotic that exists on the periphery. Instead, it is ‘the
endemic condition’.11 His central question is, ‘why do people not forget their
nationality?’ He attempted to answer this question by insisting that ‘[I]n estab-
lished nations there is a continual “flagging”/“reminding” of nationhood.
Nationhood provides a continual background for political discourse, for cultural
products and even the structuring of newspapers’.12 Moreover, Billig identified
the ways in which political discourse assumes the existence of a ‘national’
audience.
Billig argued that much of the ‘flagging’ of the nation occurs in ways that go
unseen because the process of being reminded is so familiar. This constant
reminding is situated in the so-called ‘habits of social life’, which include
processes of thought and communication.13 The concept of banal nationalism is
exemplified by the difference between the waved and the unwaved flag. The
‘unwaved flag’ is so deeply embedded in subjective consciousness that it is both
seen and unseen. It goes unnoticed because it is so familiar. However, it remains
as important as the memorable activities of flag waving. Thus Billig focused on
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the mundane, taken-for-granted, day-to-day and forgotten level of social practice
where ideas of national identity are given material resonance.
Billig suggested that it is inappropriate to consider national identity as
merely one identity among many. Instead, he argued that it operates as a kind of
‘ideological consciousness’ that constitutes nations, national identities and
homelands, and reifies them in such a way as to make them appear ‘natural and
ancient’.14 This assertion, and the similar one made by Malkki, raised an
obvious objection from Anthony Smith. That is, how can the nation become
reified and operate as a powerful regime of truth if its ethnic heritage is denied?
Malkki’s study located these processes of reification within the specific social
setting of ‘refugeeness’ in Tanzania, and did not draw general conclusions
about the reification of the nation and its ‘order of things’. Billig, however, did
draw general insights, arguing that the practice of imagining the nation ‘must
be habitual or unimaginatively accomplished’.15 The process of imagining the
nation is not seen as one that exists externally to subjectivity or one that occurs
only in the process of forming the nation. Instead, it is something that is
constantly reproduced in all forms of social discourse on a daily basis and local
level. To support these claims, Billig detailed the ways in which assumptions
about the nation underlay popular, political and bureaucratic discourses to
reveal that ‘notions of nationhood are deeply embedded in contemporary ways
of thinking’.16
Billig called for students of national identity to ‘look and see the constant
flaggings of nationhood … often unnoticed, these flaggings are not hidden’.17
These flaggings do not exist in the grand narratives of intellectuals. Instead, they
reify the nation exactly because they operate within the local, day-to-day
experiences of people. However, Billig does not explain whether the constant
flagging of the nation is a conscious or subconscious activity. If it is a conscious
activity, then he needs to explain which social groups do the flagging, why, and
how it becomes reified in the imaginations of the (presumably) non-national
masses. If it is a subconscious process, Billig again has to suggest reasons why
the flagging takes place and how it becomes embedded in the popular imagina-
tion. Also, Billig does not explain how national identity came to be such a
fundamental form of identity that often appears to transcend local identities.
Sarah Radcliffe and Sally Westwood addressed the problem of the
relationship between the ‘big stories’ of national identity and the ‘small stories’
through which the nation is made apparent in local situations.18 They argued
that the process of nation formation has four components: imagining the
nation, embodying the nation, living in the nation and placing the nation. Only
once these four aspects are in place is it possible to reify the nation in the lived
experiences of individual subjects.
Radcliffe and Westwood argued that in newly forming nations the national
imagining ‘is the result of complex relationships between representations,
subjects, the media and identity’.19 Recalling Benedict Anderson’s focus on
‘print-capitalism’, they argued that in some situations literature can offer a
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‘gallery of representations’ that provides the nation with a history and
geography. The general relates to the local in the way that (national) represen-
tations come to be seen as common sense and enable the individual subject to
be located within a general schema of history and geography. This relationship
is not one-way, however. Instead, it can be understood as dialectic, as these
subjective interpretations of the nation are in turn transmitted from the parti-
cular back to the general. What is important is that abstract ideas of national
identity are ‘internalised’ in the day-to-day practices of subjects. It is in this way
that nations are given physical shape, though conversely it is also through these
processes that the meanings of national identity are constantly challenged and
reinterpreted.
The embodying of the nation is the process of reifying and substantiating
the idea of the nation within the imagination of individual subjects. Radcliffe
and Westwood noted that most studies of national identity locate this process
within the modern bureaucratic state because, ‘[A]s a modern regime of power,
the state utilizes a series of mechanisms of normalization that come to rest on
the body and through which power relations are produced and channeled.
Individual subjects are then constituted in and through the relations of power
and the discourses produced by it.’20 The state comes to be seen as the embodi-
ment of the imagined nation in such a way that the technologies of power it
utilises actually creates national subjectivity at the local level. Departing from
Malkki and Billig, Radcliffe and Westwood argued that bureaucratic attempts
to ‘fix’ subjective national identities come up against competing forms of
experiences and identity and that in the locale there are ‘cross-cutting identities’
that succeed in subverting the national imagination.21 This suggests that studies
of national identity formation should consider the ‘multi-dimensional agency
and self-consciousness’ of subjects.22 The importance of the small story of the
nation emerges because ‘a nation is thus a component in each individual’s self-
and other- awareness’.23 The nation comes to mean many things, depending on
how national imagery and discourses are translated, the other forms of identity
with which it intersects, and the social settings in which these processes take
place.
Building on this idea, Radcliffe and Westwood suggested that the ‘living
nation’ should be seen as a wide and multi-dimensional category, since ‘national
identities can mean different things to different people even within the same
nation’.24 They raised the question of what constitutes the nation and suggested
that it is essentially a relationship between a people and a territory, though the
exact nature of that relationship is open to interpretation.25 Finally, therefore,
the question of place and nation is raised. The people–place nexus permits the
drawing of the national limit (the sovereign nation) that is so important to
Benedict Anderson’s theory. Furthermore, this nexus enables the transition of
the nation from the discursive to the material in local and specific circum-
stances. Thus, ‘everyday practices produce and reproduce national identities in
a variety of sites from the home and neighbourhood to the workplace and
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public sphere. Rather than being merely narrations, national identities and
nations are embedded in the material and imaginative spatialities of collective
and individual subjects.’26
This quote neatly summarises these new approaches to national identity
formation. National identity is not about ancient ethnic re-awakening or the
construction of grand narratives of nationalism designed to suit the instru-
mental needs of capital. Instead, it should be seen as a complex relationship
between different factors that are manifested at a local level and impact upon
individual subjects. In these new approaches to national identity formation, the
nation is viewed as constantly reproduced, ‘flagged’ and translated in ways that
often go unseen.
There is therefore a growing disquiet with approaches that emerge from the
‘great divide’. There is a widespread view that general theories of nation
formation tell us little about specific cases because of their generality. As David
McCrone pointed out, this means that, ‘no single universal theory of nation-
alism is possible’, because, ‘as the historical record is so diverse, so too must be
our concepts’.27 There is also a widespread view that primordialism and
modernism are historically naive because neither fully appreciates the extent to
which continuity and discontinuity overlap. There is therefore a substantial
middle ground between these two positions that has been identified by recent
literature. To say, as Smith does, that nations emerged from prior ethnies is not
necessarily to deny the importance of the transformative changes of modernity.
Likewise, to argue that a nation is a socially constructed product of modernity is
not necessarily to argue that it is an ‘invented tradition’ that marks a sharp
break from the past. Finally, there is a concern that approaches to nationalism
and national identity operate at too high a level of abstraction and thus fail to
account for the nation as an integral part of the local, day-to-day, material
experiences of people. The pertinence of national identity in the modern social
imagination can only be accounted for by locating it at the nexus of the abstract
and the everyday.
The approaches spawned by this disquiet reveal broader ways of under-
standing nation formation. What becomes apparent is that there is no one
particular account of nationalism and national identity that either explains
specific instances or helps us understand the phenomenon of nation-ness itself.
Instead, as David McCrone and Paul James pointed out, the nation is constituted
at the intersection of many competing discourses and material factors. The
nation is not perpetuated at levels of high social abstraction, but in the ways that
‘big stories’ are manifested in the meanings given to local, particular and
contingent actions that occur at the day-to-day level. This view of the nation is
altogether more complex than the other accounts, and the contradictions
within these ‘re-imagined’ accounts only serve to highlight the contradictions
in national identity itself.
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Towards a theory of abstract community
Paul James has carried out perhaps the most substantive ‘re-imagining’ of the
nation in the recent times.28 He attempted to overcome the ‘great divide’ by
insisting that primordialist and modernist accounts could be synthesised.
Underlying his consideration of writers from Marx and Weber, to Gellner and
Giddens is the view that ‘nation-states in general depend for their nationalized,
concrete awesomeness upon intersecting levels of integration, framed by the
most abstract level but never in a way that can resolve the contradictions of that
intersection’.29
James sees the formation of national identity as resulting from a number of
intersections at different levels. He argued that traditional approaches to nation
formation are guilty of ‘treating social life as if it were constituted on one plane’.30
He uses this idea to claim that other theories of national identity formation
reduce complex processes of social formation to a single dominant ontology.
The result of such ontological reductionism is that:
There may still be recognition by those same theorists that social life is conducted
along different time–space extensions, from face-to-face interactions to more dis-
embodied interactions mediated through the electronic media, but the actuality of
constitutively different human natures formed across different societies, and the
possibility of contradictory subjectivities formed within the same society or the
same person, are often either disregarded or relegated to the realm of psycho-
analysis.31
Thus, accounts that emerge from the ‘great divide’ operate at only one of many
possible levels. Furthermore, they negate the very possibility of talking about
ontological plurality by constructing such rigid theoretical schema.
James argued that the ‘great divide’ debate ought to be treated as a problem
in itself by students of nation formation. The problem is one of understanding
the emergence of nationality as the central focus of political organisation and
imagination without awarding ontological priority to its historiography. It is
important to avoid ontological prioritisation because although modernism has
successfully exposed the weaknesses of primordialism, this has led to a tendency
to lose sight ‘of the way in which social forms constitutive of the nation have
long-run continuities such as are exemplified in the medieval natio’.32 For
example, in criticising Nairn, Gellner and Giddens, James argued that they
failed to appreciate that prior to the nation-state there were ‘materially grounded
subjectivities’, which were able to take on the functions of an ‘imagined com-
munity’ by providing connections between strangers.33 James suggested that
historical or literary research reveals occasions of imagined attachment prior to
the advent of nations to a greater extent than modernists are willing to admit.34
Paul James introduced two new concepts to the study of nationalism and
national identity. The first is the concept of ‘continuity-in-discontinuity’.
According to James, this idea represents an attempt to find a ‘third way’
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between primordialism and modernism. It distinguishes between levels of
continuity and discontinuity and thus avoids the perception that they must be
mutually exclusive. Continuity-in-discontinuity is supported by the view that
there is no single ontology of the nation but rather that the nation is constituted
at a number of levels of abstraction. At the most material, or locale, level it is
possible to see a great deal of discontinuity, dislocation and change in the
meanings given to the political community. Viewing national identity forma-
tion from this level, the dominant theme appears to be that of constant change.
However, using another more abstract ontology makes it possible to ‘see’
historical continuities in processes of social formation.35 The relationship between
the different levels of abstraction and continuity-in-discontinuity is understood
by James as being one in which ‘both communities, drawing upon practices
constituted at a disembodied level of abstraction, “call upon” less abstract levels
to give their association a depth of meaning. Both communities connect strangers
in terms of affiliations expressed through a continuing but subordinate level of
face-to-face integration.’36
Within imagined communities there are simultaneous social processes that
are both continuous and changing, depending upon the level of abstraction
used. The greater the level of abstraction, the more the picture is one of
continuity-over-change. For James, the nation is constituted at the most
abstract level but is constantly reproduced, represented and reinterpreted at the
most local level in ways that cause cross-level contradictions. Other approaches
to national identity formation have attempted to reconcile these contradictions
by awarding ontological priority to one of the levels, causing the problems
outlined above. James argued that it is not necessary to reconcile these contra-
dictions. Instead, locating and understanding the contradictions is an essential
part of the study of national identity formation.
The idea that the nation results from a variety of social contradictions is
expressed in the oxymoronic concept of ‘abstract community’. According to
James, ‘the nation is an abstract community which only becomes possible
within a social formation constituted through the emerging dominance of rela-
tions of disembodied extension’.37 He moves from ‘imagination’ to ‘abstraction’
in order to emphasise that the processes he is describing are both material and
ideational, unlike Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ which are essentially
constituted in the realm of ideas. The oxymoron is completed with ‘community’,
implying ‘direct relations of mutuality’, something which in turn implies spatial
presence in contradiction to the processes of abstraction that seek to move away
from such presence.38 James deliberately married ‘abstract’ and ‘community’ in
order to emphasise the contradictions of ‘continuity-in-discontinuity’ and the
ways that subjectivity both constitutes and is constituted by the abstract, and
therefore the way in which identities can appear to persist or change depending
on the ontology employed to study them.
Paul James explicitly argued that his insights do not constitute a new
research agenda for the study of national identity formation. Indeed, he argued
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that he should consider writing a second volume that is more richly historical in
nature.39 Although he raised many themes that enable us to move beyond the
‘great divide’, he did not suggest how these themes can be operationalised. If we
are to use James’ account of the formation of abstract communities to study
contemporary Croatian national identity, it is necessary therefore to elaborate
on these themes. For this, we need the work of Katherine Verdery.
Verdery accepted many of James’ insights, such as the problematisation of
the ‘great divide’, and offers a series of research questions that combine the
themes of continuity and change that are embedded in James’ work. All too
often, Verdery suggested, national identity is reified so that it appears no longer
to interact, compete, mould and be moulded by other forms of identity and
different social settings.40 Furthermore, even after the complex processes of its
formation, the nation continues to exist at more than one ontological level.
Verdery pointed out that ‘nations, like individuals, are thought to have identities,
often based in so-called national characters. National identity thus exists at two
levels: the individual’s sense of self as national, and the identity of the collective
whole in relation to others of the kind.’41 Verdery outlined three ways in which
previous accounts of national identity formation were fundamentally flawed
before briefly suggesting a series of research questions that can overcome the
problems and incorporate the ontological pluralism envisaged by James. The
first problem is that students of national identity should ‘explore which sense of
nation is apt to the context in question, rather than imposing a modern sense
on a medieval reality’.42 Second, a study of national identity should appreciate
that the nation can have multiple meanings. These divergences of meaning
occur not only when different social ontologies are employed but also when the
processes through which abstract ideas are internalised in the material experi-
ences of individual subjects. The third pitfall is that the nation should be seen as
both an ontological and epistemological problem. Verdery argued that scholars
who are interested in national identity should not ‘treat nations as actually
defined, for example, by culture, or descent, or history’.43 Instead, the student
should constantly question what function these terms are fulfilling and in what
context they are operating.
Verdery built upon these general criticisms to pose five questions that can
be used to inform a study of national identity formation. These are:
• What underlies the notion of identity?
• How do people become national?
• How variously is the nation symbolised?
• How can we understand the intersection of the nation with other social
operators?
• How does the dissolution of the nation-state affect the viability and
deployment of nation as a legitimating symbol in politics?44
We can discard the first and last of these questions because they are not
appropriate for this study. The first questions the notion of identity – an issue
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that was addressed in the previous chapter and above, and feeds into the
research questions that are explored in the following chapters. The last question
locates the nation within the dissolving late-modern nation-state, an issue that
is hardly appropriate for a study considering the formation of a new nation-
state like Croatia.
Croatia as an abstract community
What are the processes through which abstract ideas about the national
community become manifest in day-to-day social practices? This process is
described by Radcliffe and Westwood as ‘internalisation’. What are internalised
are the various narratives that nations tell themselves about who they are and
who others are.45 Paul James views nations as entities that are both abstract (in
terms of their size and the fact that most of its components will never know
most of its other components) and communities (in terms of the community-
like shared sentiment between national subjects). To understand how these
processes work within a contemporary case study it is first necessary to translate
James’ insights into a series of research questions.
The first question is, how do people become national? This question directs
us towards the ‘big stories’ of national histories that appear to permeate the
historical record by asking the questions that are addressed by innumerable
nationalists: where do we come from, and how do we differ from them? These
big stories mark one group out from others and make it possible to draw
boundaries between different nations. Moreover, they provide a set of frames
for national discourses. That is, these big stories or ‘frames’ shape what are
considered to be appropriate statements or claims about a particular nation and
provide a framework for the evaluation of such knowledge claims by the
broader society.46 Thus, claims about Croatian national identity in the 1990s
tended to be made and judged by reference to the frames provided by abstract
stories of national identity. Political entrepreneurs seek legitimacy and create
social resonance for their programmes by offering interpretations of these
abstract narratives, which of course over time change the frames themselves.
However, by themselves they tell us very little about what a nation is like and
how it is evolving.
The second question is, how is the nation symbolised? Another way of
understanding this question is to ask how intellectuals, politicians and others
attempt to give contemporary and material meaning to abstract ideas about
national identity. This question frames the nation as something ‘whose meaning
is never stable but shifts with the changing balance of social forces’.47 It raises the
issue of how national symbolism and rhetoric renders some things visible and
others invisible.48 It is through the rhetoric of the national self, as distinct from
another, that intellectuals, politicians and others attempt to provide the nation
with material meaning in contemporary contexts. This question highlights the
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competing claims that attempt to be internalised and suggests that for abstract
ideas about national identity to be properly internalised by individual subjects
they have to be first made intelligible and relevant to the contemporary context.
The third question addresses the context in which internalisation takes
place. It asks, how can we understand the intersection of the nation with other
social operators?49 It is based on the premise that the nation does not operate
within a social vacuum. Recalling Radcliffe and Westwood’s insights once
again, the nation is manifested in a host of identities and social situations, and
national and non-national identities are not mutually exclusive. National identity
forms at the intersection of a number of identities. While interpretations of
national identity impact upon and transform other identities and social practices,
these in turn impact upon understandings of the nation. It is therefore impor-
tant to locate national identity within a matrix that appreciates its relationship
with other social operators.
These other forms of identity, be they regional, linguistic, gender, or others,
affect the way that the nation is internalised by individual subjects and the
meanings given to national identity in everyday practices. The way that contem-
porary symbols and rhetoric are understood by subjects depends upon the
other identities, interests and loyalties that they hold. Furthermore, individual
subjects also hold their own interpretations of the abstract ideas of national
identity highlighted by Verdery’s first question. These interpretations are affected
by other non-national, transnational, and sub-national identities held by
subjects. This complex picture of the intersection of numerous identities at the
level of individual subjectivity is one of rapid change, conflict and disjuncture.
This is somewhat different to the picture of continuity discovered when
studying the abstract accounts of national identity covered by the first question.
These three questions suggest a way of approaching national identity that
incorporates Paul James’ complex ontology.50 The first of these is, how do
people become national? The second is, how is the nation symbolised? Finally,
how can we understand the intersection of the nation with other social operators?
In responding to each of these questions, Katherine Verdery suggested different
research agendas informed by different levels of analysis. What is important is
that this approach is interested in the intersections between these three levels of
abstraction and the ways that they relate to each other. It rejects outright the
idea that one level, such as day-to-day practice, should be prioritised. The
studies on Croatia that follow over the next four chapters are shaped by this
research agenda.
Chapter 3 poses the question, how do people become Croats? It is suggested
in this chapter that Croats understand themselves to be constituted by a
continuous history of shared statehood that can be traced back to the medieval
‘Triune Kingdom’ of Croatia. This chapter articulates the Croatian historical
narrative that is outlined in countless texts on the subject and shows how that
narrative has been used at different times to substantiate alternative concep-
tions of Croatian national identity. Later chapters ask how intellectuals and
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politicians make this historical narrative intelligible in contemporary Croatia.
As such, Chapter 4 asks, how is Croatian national identity expressed in
contemporary symbolism and rhetoric? This chapter considers four different
groups of accounts that were articulated in the 1990s and attempted either to
furnish abstract ideas of national identity with ideational, political and material
salience to secure support for particular nationalist or non-nationalist political
programmes, or (in the case of the dissident intellectuals) to expose the frailties
and inconsistencies of such programmes. Thus, these first two questions address
the way in which different ideas about national identity compete to be
internalised into the subjectivity of individuals. The final two chapters address
Verdery’s third question. They ask, how are competing ideas about Croatian
national identity manifested in different areas of social activity? They consider
how the processes of internalising national identity are affected by the social
contexts in which they take place. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on six areas of social
practice and consider the intersection of national identities with other social
practices, institutions and identities.
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The Croatian historical statehood narrative
In his 1998 state of the nation address, the Croatian President Franjo Tuœman
noted that with the restoration of the Croatian Danube region including
Vukovar ‘to our homeland’, ‘[t]he centuries-old dream of the Croatian people
has thereby been completely fulfilled’.1 Similarly, the new constitution promul-
gated shortly after independence proclaimed ‘the millennial national identity of
the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the
course of its entire historical experience in various statal forms and by the
perpetuation and growth of the idea of one’s own state, based on the Croatian
nation’s historical right to full sovereignty’.2
This chapter explores these abstract claims to historical identity. At the
most abstract level, Croatian national identity in the 1990s was constituted by
perceptions of a common history and in particular a shared state that can claim
ancient roots. Ivo Banac, for instance, noted that ‘Croat national apologetics
were lopsidedly historicist. The Croats never felt safe enough with strictly
national – linguistic and cultural – arguments in favor of their autonomy and
statehood.’3 This chapter will focus on historical claims to self-rule and the ways
that Croatian historians and historical narratives have tended to focus on
questions of elite politics and sovereignty rather than the ethnic and linguistic
claims expected by primordialists and articulated by sections of the contem-
porary Croatian nationalist movement.4 I am not arguing that contemporary
Croatian national identity is primarily constituted by reference to claims to
historical statehood. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the three levels of
analysis are mutually constitutive, with none more important than the others.
Neither is this chapter an attempt to chart processes of national integration in
other historical epochs in a way akin to Mirjana Gross’ study of the socio-
economic foundations of integration in 1850s Civil Croatia.5 Instead, it
demonstrates that abstract accounts of national identity draw upon a common
stock of narrative about historical statehood. These accounts provide the
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‘frames’ of reference used by competing politicians, intellectuals and others in
the 1990s to legitimise particular political programmes. Such frames combine
the real and the representational. On the one hand, representations that are
wildly at odds with established knowledge tend to be disregarded. The historical
statehood narrative could not be sustained and would not be resonant were it a
complete fiction. On the other hand, knowledge about what is real is mediated
through representation.
 The search for ethnic origins
Although from time to time Croatian nationalists have attempted to articulate
an ethnic account of national identity, these have tended to flounder on the
impossibility of locating ethnic antecedents.6 The one thing that all historians
agree on is that the Croats were not the earliest inhabitants of the lands that
make up present day Croatia. Key questions for those interested in articulating
an ancient ethnic origin for Croatian national identity therefore include
whether or not the Croats were Slavs and, if so, how closely they were related to
other Slavic groups. Also, such writers need to address how the Croats came to
occupy the Roman lands of Pannonia and Dalmatia.
Ivo Banac’s understanding of the migration of Slavs into the region is that
they came to the Balkans as permanent largely agrarian settlers whose advent
can be divided into several stages. In the first decades of the sixth century they
aided numerous invaders such as the Avars and Huns in attacks over the
borders of the Byzantine Empire. Unlike some other writers, Banac does not
believe that these Slavs were sub-divided into pre-national groupings such as
Slovenes, Serbs and Croats.7
Other writers, however, contend that it is possible to distinguish the Croats
from other Slavic groups and, as we shall see later, this is vital to accounts that
attempt to trace Croatian national identity back to a prior ethnic group. Marcus
Tanner used texts ascribed to Emperor Heraclius to suggest that the Croats
began inhabiting the provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia after the sack of Split
by the Avars in  614. According to Tanner, the Emperor claimed that the
Croats were distinguished by being Aryans and heretics until their incorpor-
ation into mainstream Christianity in the middle of the seventh century.8
Stephen Gazi supported the view that the Croats were a distinguishable group
who settled in Pannonia and Dalmatia around the sixth and seventh centuries.9
The most popular explanation is that the Slavs were a diverse and disunited
group and that there were indeed recognisable differences between different
Slavic groups. According to Emperley, the Slavic tribes were scattered and
numerous and recognised no external authority. Furthermore, the Slavs were
‘split up into several distinct groups which are approximately those of today’.10
This view was supported by Roger Portal who argued that ‘[t]here is at the
present time no specifically Slav civilization, common to all the Slavs … and in
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all probability there never has been’.11 Furthermore, Portal insisted that other
than sharing linguistic characteristics the Slavs exhibited more differences than
similarities.12 The view that the Slavs migrated from one particular area is also
dismissed, as George Hoffman suggested that Slavic tribes descended on the
Balkans from every conceivable direction, adding to the difficulty of speaking of
the Slavs as a common ethnie. What can be determined is that it was in this
milieu of migration and conflict that a group (or groups) that came to be
known as ‘Croats’ settled in the territories that make up present day Croatia.
One of the most basic statements concerning the Croats is that they are
ethnically Slav, though as we have seen it is probably problematic to consider
the Slavs as an ethnie. Simon Vladovich contended that most sources agree that
the Croats were a Slavic group of tribes who lived northeast of the Carpathian
Mountains between the Dnieper and Dniester rivers.13 They then journeyed to
north-central Europe where they created the state of White Croatia before
migrating southwards in the seventh century.14 However, there are some discre-
pancies with this account. Stanko Guldescu pointed out that in the Book of
Annals, written by Alfred the Great of England (871–901), there is mention of a
state known as White Croatia with its seat in the Polish city of Krakow – some
150 years after the Croats were supposed to have taken Pannonia and Dalmatia.15
Roger Portal agreed that the Slavs probably originated from the Carpathian
region but did not give any credence to the idea that separate groups took
different routes to the Balkans.16 However, Ferdinand Schevill offered an entirely
different geographical starting point for the Slavs – the marshes of Ukraine.17
Given these disagreements, we cannot simply accept that the Croats were either
an indistinguishable Slavic group intermingled with the rest or (if we accept
Vladovich’s account) an identifiable group that took an alternative route to the
Balkans. Furthermore, several ethnic nationalist historians have questioned
whether the Croats were Slavs at all.
There are several historical anomalies that support the view that the Croats
were not a Slavic group. For example, some writers argued that the name
‘Croat’ suggested an Iranian origin.18 The claim that Croats originally resided in
Iranian lands is based on an interpretation of what the word ‘Croat’ means.
According to Constantine Porphrygenitus, the Croats were simply ‘the people
with many lands’, while Jan Safaryk argued that the idea of Carpathian roots is
substantiated in the name.19 Some Croatian scholars opted for this theory, argu-
ing that Greek accounts of a community called Horvatos or Horoatos, which
occupied a region of Iran, reveal the first evidence of the existence of the
Croats.20 The Russian historians, Pogodin and Miler, who discovered Iranian
inscriptions bearing the name Horuatus, also supported this view.21 However,
there is a major problem with this theory. The reason for the Slavic migration
appears to have been the search for better land and an escape from the
Carpathian mountains and marshes. 22 To locate the Croats in fertile Iran,
therefore, makes their migration inexplicable.
After the Napoleonic Wars, several Croatian intellectuals conceived the
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idea that the Croats were in fact descendants of Illyrians, the first known
inhabitants of the Balkan Adriatic coast.23 This account can be easily dismissed.
Although it is not fully known what became of the Illyrians, there is substantial
evidence that they were expelled by the Avars and Croats. Other theories des-
cribe the Croats as an Aryan Gothic group, Samartian,24 and Ukrainian.25 There
is archaeological evidence that seems to support a non-Slavic theory of Croatian
ethnicity. Most notably, helmets were found in the eighth-century graves of
Croats, while it is generally thought that the early Slavs did not wear helmets.26
This brief survey indicates that it has proven impossible to point to an
ethnic predecessor to Croatian nationhood, even though many writers have
tried to do so. It is difficult to tell who the Croats were prior to the first Croatian
kingdom. This suggests that rather than being a single ethnic group they were a
collection of tribes, a mixture made all the more confusing by their interaction
with the earliest inhabitants of Pannonia and Dalmatia. It is only with the
advent of a Croatian state that it is possible to speak about Croats with any
clarity. As such, it is difficult to make the case for the existence of an ancient
ethnic antecedent to Croatian national identity because such an antecedent is
impossible to find and is not acknowledged by all but the most extreme of
Croatian nationalist intellectuals. This could begin to explain why it is that
Croatian claims to national sovereignty in the 1990s were made by reference to
a discourse of historical statehood rather than in the ethnic terms that Serbs
used to justify their rule over Kosovo.27 The Croatian narrative of historical
statehood, the abstract story of national identity, is therefore primarily con-
cerned with constitutional arrangements and political programmes.
The Croatian claim to statehood
The narrative of the historic claim to statehood begins at the start of the
‘centuries-old dream’ in the form of the medieval Croatian state. The Croatian
constitution recalls ‘the formation of Croatian principalities in the seventh
century’, ‘the independent medieval state of Croatia founded in the ninth
century’ and ‘the Kingdom of Croats established in the tenth century’.28 It is on
the basis of the medieval state that the Croats make their historic claim to
national sovereignty, tracing a continual line of political independence from the
time of King Tomislav to the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes in 1918. The central debates in Croatia’s national historiography are
not ones of ethnicity or religion, but ones of national governance and
sovereignty. Such debates include the exact nature of the coming together of the
Hungarian–Croatian union in 1102, the status of Croatia within that union,
and the question of whether the Croatian parliament (Sabor) agreed to Croatia
joining the South Slav state that was formed at the end of the First World War.
According to most, if not all, Balkan historians, Croatia became a unified
kingdom in 924 when Tomislav assumed the title of King of Croatia and
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Dalmatia.29 The coronation was recognised by the Pope and thus Croatia began
a period of just under 200 years of rule by Croatian kings.30 The geographical
extent of Tomislav’s Croatian state is not fully known and is widely disputed.
Tanner suggested that it comprised most of modern Croatia, Bosnia and Herce-
govina, and the coastline of modern Montenegro.31 Roger Lampe, however,
argued that the Croatian state did not penetrate as far south as Dubrovnik, let
alone Montenegro, and that Istria was also not included in this state. This view
is supported by many Croatian scholars, who argue that the medieval Croatian
state extended to the whole region south of the Drava River to the Drina and
Neretva Rivers (north of Dubrovnik).32 However, the Byzantine chronicler,
Porphyrogenitus argued that the Croatian state extended to the entire coastline
from Istria to the River Cetina (in Montenegro – south of Dubrovnik).33
Importantly, though, most agree that Tomislav was able to unite Pannonian
(northern) Croatia with coastal Dalmatia, a union that formed a major part of
the so-called national dream of the Croats.34
Many of the symbols used by the contemporary Croatian state trace their
heritage back to the medieval kingdom. The chequerboard coat of arms, the
Sahovnica, is widely thought to have been created in the tenth century by one of
Tomislav’s predecessors, Stjepan Dr¥islav.35 Similarly, the Kuna was developed
as a form of currency during this period, its first known use being on the Island
of Cres.36 The Kuna reappeared as the currency in the 1990s when the Yugoslav
Dinar was abandoned.37
Along with Tomislav, one of the most significant ancient Croatian kings
was Kre°imir Petar (1058–74). Kre°imir reportedly consolidated the kingdom by
unifying the lands into a single kingdom, calling it the Triune Kingdom (Croatia-
Slavonia-Dalmatia).38 Kre°imir’s death left the throne vacant, leading to many
years of plot and counter-plot among the nobles. Eventually, in 1102, the nobles
decided that Croatia should enter into a personal union with Hungary whereby
the Hungarian king would be crowned separately as the King of Croatia.
The narrative therefore tells us that Croatia’s brief period of statehood
came to an end amidst the intrigues of the nobles. The events surrounding the
union of Croatia and Hungary are the source of a major historical controversy.
Its importance derives from the fact that the historical statehood narrative
depends upon the establishment of a continuous line of statehood. Intellectuals
and politicians have not tended to concern themselves with the identity of the
people who were ruled by the Croatian nobles, only with asserting that there
was a continuous line of statehood. According to Croatian historians, then, the
nobles gave the throne to Hungary but never lost their independence or sover-
eignty. Magyar historians, however, claim that Hungary conquered Croatia.
The significance of the debate lies in the Croatian claim to an unbroken heritage
of historical statehood, which is clearly compromised by the Magyar claim. Per-
ceptions about the exact nature of the union are therefore vital to establishing
an abstract idea of Croatian national identity that is based on a continuous line
of statehood.
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It is argued that in 1102 the Croatian nobles signed an agreement – the
Pacta Conventa – with Koloman, King of Hungary. This agreement confirmed
the legitimacy of Koloman’s succession to the Croatian throne in return for
which Koloman agreed to respect the laws and customs of Croatia.39 The exact
nature of the agreement, and even its existence, is impossible to determine as
historians believe that a transcript of the Pacta Conventa preserved in the city of
Trogir is actually a fourteenth-century fake.40 There are two competing accounts
of the nature of the union, one emerging predominantly from Croat historians
and the other from Magyar and Serbian historians. The Croats argue that the
union was a personal one in the form of a shared king, while the Magyars and
Serbs insist that Croatia was conquered.
The Croatian position was recorded by Despalatoviç in her work on the
nineteenth-century Illyrianist nationalist Ljudevit Gaj. Gaj insisted, ‘let it be
known to Your Majesty that no ruler has ever subjugated Croatia by force.
Rather, after the death of our last king, Zvonimir, we of our free will attached
ourselves to the crown of the Hungarian kingdom, as we at this time join
ourselves to Your Majesty.’41 The claim made by Croatian historians is that a
continual line of independent statehood can still be traced through the period
of the union with Hungary because it was a voluntary union freely entered into
by the Croatian nobles. This view of events has a wide circle of support. Ivo
Banac contended that, with the death of the last Croatian king, the crown
simply passed into royal Hungarian hands as the nearest blood relation to the
Croatian Trpimir dynasty.42 The existence of such an agreement, and the accur-
acy of these Croatian claims, is partially supported by evidence of early practices
in the ‘union’. First, during the first two centuries of the union there were
separate crowning ceremonies, one ceremony for the crowning of the King of
Hungary and one for the crowning of the King of Croatia.43 Second, there is
evidence that the Croats continued to make their own laws in their own parlia-
ment (Sabor), under their own leaders (Bans), who convened the Sabors and
promulgated laws without the King’s sanction.44 Third, compared to the other
‘conquerors’ of Croatian lands (principally the Venetians and Ottomans) there
are hardly any archaeological reminders of Croatia’s union with Hungary,
suggesting that the Magyars did not forcibly impose themselves on the Croats.45
Finally, prior to 1526 the dukes and Bans of Croatia produced their own
currency in Zagreb. These items of currency were engraved with the Croatian
coat of arms and the symbols of Croatia and Dalmatia that form part of the
present day Croatian flag.46
There is, however, an alternative account of events leading up the union of
1102. Whereas many Croatian historians and politicians are determined to
trace an unbroken line of sovereign statehood, several Magyar and Serbian
historians have been equally determined to undermine these claims. According
to Branimir Jankoviç, the Magyars ‘swept’ into Pannonian Croatia.47 He insists
that ‘[a]fter armed resistance, the Croatian nobility had to yield to superior
Hungarian might’.48 According to this view, Koloman seized Croatia by force of
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arms, discrediting Croatian claims to continual statehood.49 However, there are
a couple of points that need to be made about this thesis. Firstly, Magyar claims
were not made until the middle of the nineteenth century and formed part of
the Hungarian national reawakening under Kossuth (of course, much the same
argument could also be levelled about the idea of a personal union first arti-
culated in the fourteenth century).50 Second:
[T]he idea that Koloman and his Magyars conquered Croatia by force rests upon
the supposition that there was a counter king whom he had to overthrow to accom-
plish his ends. There is no real evidence that there was any organized opposition at
all to his invasions, if it can be called that of the Croatian lands. It should be
remembered that there probably was no fixed border between Hungary and
Croatia in the eleventh century … when the House of Trpimir disappeared … the
frontier disappeared too.51
It is not the exact nature of the relationship between Croatia and Hungary from
1102 that is of interest to us here but the importance attached to defending the
idea of a personal union that is central. The historical statehood narrative insists
that it is possible to trace a long history of parliamentary declarations reasser-
ting the Croatian view of events in 1102. For instance, in the early eighteenth
century the Sabor declared that ‘Croatia as a kingdom was joined with Hungary,
but without establishing common citizenship. We were not compelled by force
to join Hungary. We accepted only her king and not the kingdom … we are free
citizens and subjects to no one.’52
This view of history is enshrined in the contemporary Croatian constitu-
tion, which asserts the ‘preservation of the subjectivity of the Croatian state in
the Croatian-Hungarian personal union’.53 The union of 1102 therefore repre-
sents Croatia’s second claim in the historical statehood thesis: the medieval
state of Croatia was not demolished but was retained under a personal union
between Hungary and Croatia. The actual nature of the relationship is probably
most accurately described as being inexplicable in modern terms because it
varied from time to time. Sometimes Croatia acted as an independent agent and
at other times as a vassal of Hungary. However, throughout this period, ‘she
[Croatia] retained a large degree of internal independence’.54
The next ‘signpost’ of the Croatian historical statehood narrative is 1526
and the defeat of Hungary by the Ottoman Turks, which prompted Croatia’s
entry into the Habsburg Empire. Again, the Croatian historical narrative insists
that the decision to join the Habsburg Empire was the result of a free choice
made by the Sabor. On 29 August 1526, the Ottoman Turks defeated the Hun-
garian army at the battle of Mohacs.55 The battle was particularly devastating for
the Hungarians because the last male of the ruling family, Louis Jagellon, was
killed, leaving the thrones of Hungary and Croatia without an heir.56 According
to the Croatian narrative of historical statehood, the Sabor decided to remedy
the problem by electing the Habsburg king, Ferdinand, to the Croatian throne.
Thus, according to many Croat historians, ‘the nobility, entirely of their own
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accord and free from foreign influence, elected Ferdinand … King of Croatia’.57
The Sabor took the opportunity to reassert its autonomy from Hungary by re-
affirming the events of 1102. It reputedly declared that, ‘after the death of
Zvonimir, our last king of fond memory, we joined the holy crown of Hungary
by our own free will, just as we do now, the rule of Your Majesty’.58 Croatian
historians also argue that the struggle for ascendancy to the Habsburg throne at
this time provides evidence of Croatia’s political autonomy. Guldescu, for
instance, argued that evidence suggesting that Ferdinand’s rival, Zapolya, had
to abandon his claim to the throne of Croatia-Slavonia demonstrates Croatia’s
separate political identity.59 Other historians suggest that the Sabor attached
conditions to the offer of the crown, such as maintenance of Croatian auto-
nomy and assistance in the defence against Ottoman attack.60 Unlike Magyar
historians, the Austrians never claimed that they conquered Croatia by force
and there appears to be little reason to doubt Croatian claims about the events
of 1526.
The incorporation of Croatian lands into the Habsburg Empire further
complicates attempts to trace a continual history of Croatian statehood, because
the Sabor became enmeshed in a political framework with two other powers:
Austria and Hungary. One of the central debates within Croatian national
politics up to the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in
1918 was the question of whether to align with Vienna or Budapest.61 As a result,
the lands of the medieval kingdom became even more divided in this period.
Slavonia was separated from Croatia proper, while what was left of Croatia was
separated into the military frontier (Vojna Krajina), which was administered
directly by the Emperor, and Civil Croatia, administered by the Sabor.62 The
lands comprising present-day Croatia were divided into five entities. Three of
them (Civil Croatia, Slavonia and Vojna Krajina) fell under the rule of the
Habsburgs, and the other two (Dalmatia and Istria) were ruled by the Vene-
tians.63 It is important to note that northern Croatia and Dalmatia were ruled
separately throughout this period and remained so until the formation of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First World War. This creates
further problems for the narrative of historical statehood because after the
dissolution (voluntary or otherwise) of the medieval kingdom as many people
identified as Croats by their inhabitance of the medieval kingdom lived outside
Habsburg Croatia as within it. By the time Dalmatia came under Habsburg rule
after the fall of Napoleon the empire was split into the dual Austro-Hungarian
monarchy, with Vienna ruling Dalmatia and Budapest ruling Slavonia and
Croatia proper. From 1526 onwards, therefore, the historical statehood narra-
tive also has to trace a history of political activism aimed at unifying the
disparate lands of the medieval kingdom.
One of the most significant legacies bequeathed by the Habsburgs was the
military frontier (Vojna Krajina), which was established on the border of the
Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Groups residing in the Vojna Krajina came
under the direct authority of the Habsburg Emperor, creating further divisions
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in the Croatian polity.64 In return for military service in the Habsburg armies,
the frontiersmen were exempt feudal dues and were loaned land by the
Emperor.65 They were also awarded special religious exemptions, which were
important for the accommodation of Orthodox Serbs and Vlachs migrating
from the Ottoman Empire.66 In return for concessions and exemptions, the
Emperor secured a cheap source of manpower with which to garrison the
frontier.67 As a result of numerous wars with the Ottomans and the constant
cross-frontier raiding, the Vojna Krajina became depopulated and hence more
vulnerable to Ottoman incursion. The Habsburgs therefore encouraged the
settlement of Orthodox Christian Serbs and Vlachs who were migrating from
Ottoman-held territory.68 The historical statehood narrative recalls that the
Vojna Krajina galvanised Croatian national sentiment by providing a focus for
political mobilisation. From its establishment until its reincorporation with so-
called Civil Croatia in the nineteenth century, the Sabor constantly demanded
that Zagreb be allowed to exert its authority over Vojna Krajina and effectively
reunite the lands of today’s northern Croatia.69
 The national awakening
The campaign for uniting the different entities that had comprised the medieval
kingdom lay at the heart of the national movement when Croatian national
identity started to be more clearly articulated during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The growth and development of Risorgimento-type
nationalism in Croatia has often been attributed to the brief period of occu-
pation by Napoleonic France at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
However, the precise nature of the French legacy and its relationship to the
historical statehood narrative is contested. On one hand, many nationalists
attribute the birth of the national movement to the ideas of self-determination
articulated by the French. On the other hand, communist historians argue that
all forms of imperialism must be pernicious. Moreover, some Croatian nation-
alist historians agreed with the communists because they wanted to emphasise
the positive links between Croatia and Austria as a way of challenging pan-
Slavism and denying the significance of subjugation to the French, which could
potentially challenge the idea of continuous statehood.70
During the Napoleonic War, the Croatian army fought on the side of the
Habsburg Empire against the French.71 Under the 1797 Treaty of Campoformio,
most of the territory comprising present-day Croatia and Slovenia (including
Dubrovnik) was transferred to French control. Napoleon decided to resurrect
the ancient name of Illyria as a geographical and administrative term for his
new acquisitions, a change that was apparently welcomed by Italian-educated
Croatian intellectuals, who understood the liberal and potentially revolutionary
implications of the name.72 In 1810 Marshal Marmont arrived in the province
with the task of incorporating it into the French Empire. Although short-lived,
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Marmont’s reforms were extensive. He introduced the Code Napoleon, which
formed the basis of French law and provided for the abolition of serfdom,
equality before the law, and an independent judiciary. He also attempted to
introduce free trade, something that had been suppressed by previous imperial
overlords. Most crucial for the development of Croatian nationalism, however,
were the linguistic and educational reforms. A quasi-universal school system
was introduced, which began teaching the ‡tokavian dialect of the Croatian
language. This dialect also became the official administrative language of Croatia
for the first time since the medieval kingdom. Marmont encouraged writing
and printing in the Croatian language and allowed Vincenze Dandolo to
produce the first ever periodical in the Croatian language – Kraglski Dalmatin.73
The place of Marmont’s reforms in the historical narrative is disputed. One
view is that the French occupation was of immense significance to the develop-
ment of Croatian national identity. Napoleon integrated most of the Croatian
lands (including Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria, Vojna Krajina and Dubrovnik, but
omitting Zagreb) into the Illyrian province, making them a single entity for the
first time since the venerated Triune Kingdom. The abolition of serfdom broke
down the legal distinction between nobles and peasants and created the
possibility for the development of a larger urban middle class. Moreover, by
promoting the use of the Croatian language and the idea of universal compul-
sory education, Marmont’s reforms facilitated the development of a national
literature.74 As Kann argued, ‘probably the Illyrian peoples perceived the basis of
their brief prosperity not so much in the enlightened spirit of the reforms
introduced by a foreign conqueror as in the fact that under the French regime
they had been united for the first time in many centuries’.75
However, many nationalist writers opposed the idea that the French
occupation may have contributed to national developments seeing in it instead
a further challenge to the idea of continuous statehood. As Guldescu put it, ‘it is
altogether erroneous to hold that the Croatians ever welcomed or were satisfied
with the change in sovereignty’.76 He pointed to the bitterness caused by the
abolition of the Dubrovnik Republic and the fact that Croatian troops fought
for Austria rather than France as indicative of the absence of co-operation
between the French and Croats that is implied in the other accounts. He also
pointed out that the French regime increased taxes, causing further resentment
among Croatian peasants. It is also likely that the illiterate peasants would not
have understood Marmont’s enlightened reforms and that the significance of
the union of Dalmatia with Croatia would have been lost on them.77 After
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, the Illyrian provinces were restored to the
Habsburg Empire and Marmont’s reforms were swiftly revoked. Following the
Napoleonic Wars, Croatian intellectuals and politicians came to regard Austria
as a potential ally against the threat of Magyarisation produced by the
development of nationalism in Hungary. According to many contemporaries,
closer union with Austria would allow a reassertion of Croatia’s historic state-
right that had been eroded by the Magyars.
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The primary threat to the development of an independent Croatian poli-
tical identity within the Habsburg Empire is widely understood to have been the
emergence of the Magyar nationalist leader, Kossuth. This new nationalist
movement attempted to establish a single centralised Kingdom of Hungary
stretching from the Carpathian Mountains in the north to the Dalmatian
Adriatic Sea in the south.78 The idea of such a kingdom threatened to eradicate
any semblance of Croatian political autonomy. Between the end of the Napole-
onic Wars and the liberal revolutions of 1848, the Magyar nationalists em-
barked on a Magyarisation programme in Croatia. For example, they insisted
that the Magyar language be taught in schools and used for all official purposes.
Dalmatia was spared this process, however, because under the terms of the 1815
Versailles Treaty it came under the direct authority of Austria.
By the mid-nineteenth century, therefore, the historical statehood narra-
tive confronts two challenges: the battle against the Magyar nationalists and the
fact that the Croatian lands were divided. These two factors make it potentially
very difficult to trace a continual line of statehood, prompting historians to
look instead for evidence of Croatian political actors fighting against Magyar
nationalism in the cause of Croatian unification. These circumstances helped
produce one of the heroes of the Croatian historical narrative, Ban Josip Jelaïiç.
It is perhaps odd that one of the heroes of Croatian nationalism should be a
servant of Vienna, but this veneration only serves to emphasise the political and
historical rather than ethnic base of abstract conceptions of Croatian national
identity. Indeed, one of the first acts of the new Croatian government at the
beginning of the 1990s was to restore a statue of Jelaïiç that had been removed
by the communists. Ironically, that statue – a symbol of Croatia’s national
history given pride of place in Zagreb’s central square – was first built and
erected by Austria not Croatia.
Jelaïiç gained ‘tragic hero’ status for his successful campaign that defended
the Vienna Habsburgs against Kossuth’s nationalist Hungarian army. He hoped
that through his loyalty to the Empire he would persuade the Habsburgs to
unite the Croatian lands in a sovereign and autonomous state that would share
the same status as Hungary.79 In 1848 Magyar nationalists revolted against the
Austrians, aiming to create an exclusively Hungarian empire. Jelaïiç led the
Croatian army in a successful war against the Magyars. Indeed, it was the
Croatian army that prevented the Magyars taking Vienna before the Russians
intervened and suppressed Kossuth and his followers. Despite his loyalty to
Vienna, Jelaïiç’s efforts failed to secure greater autonomy for Croatia. A cruel
but accurate joke that was frequently recited opined that following the events of
1848–49 Croatia received as a reward from the Habsburgs what the Magyars
received as a punishment.80 Communist historiography branded Jelaïiç a react-
ionary, but he was venerated by nationalists, despite the fact that his loyalty
ultimately lay in Vienna rather than Zagreb.
Twenty subsequent years of constitutional bickering between the Sabor and
the Hungarians produced the Nagodba (compromise), which tried to define
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Croatia’s status and in doing so marked an important justificatory landmark for
the historical statehood narrative. The Nagodba recognised that Croatia was ‘a
political nation possessing a special territory of its own’.81 It also provided for
provincial autonomy under the Sabor in Zagreb and established Croatian as the
official language for all autonomous and common affairs pertaining to the
Croatian territory. Finally, it provided for the eventual return of the Vojna
Krajina to the civil administration of Croatia.82 As with most aspects of the
historical narrative there is strong debate about the meaning of the Nagodba. In
particular, nationalist historians point out that it recognised Croatia’s historic
right to statehood, while others have pointed to the great disappointment felt by
Croatian politicians and intellectuals.83 Grievances centred on the constraints
placed upon the autonomy of the Sabor. All important decisions regarding the
Croatian economy and transportation were to be taken in Budapest, and the
head of the autonomous government, the Ban, would be appointed by the
Hungarians and would still be answerable to the Hungarian Diet rather than to
the Sabor. Dalmatia remained under Austrian authority, despite pledges to
unite it into the Triune Kingdom, and Hungary annexed parts of Slavonia.84 On
the one hand, the Nagodba offered succour for proponents of the historical
statehood narrative by acknowledging that Croatia was separate from Hungary.
On the other hand, it re-emphasised the separation of the lands of the medieval
kingdom, which made the historic statehood claim more problematic.
Competing national ideologies
Although the historic statehood thesis claims that Croatian national identity is
based on the idea of shared history and statehood, the first nationalist move-
ments that developed in the second half of the nineteenth century put many
different ideas forward about what Croatian national identity was and where it
came from. These competing ideologies had two important consequences for
the historical statehood narrative. First, for the first time different national
ideologies were developed that made use of competing interpretations of the
historical statehood narrative. Second, these different national ideologies pro-
duced different political ideologies in the twentieth century. One of the tasks
that confronted Tuœman in his attempt to enforce a particular understanding of
national identity in the 1990s was to unite these different national ideologies.
We will see how he tried to do this in the following chapter, but it is worth
noting here that these different understandings of national identity ultimately
proved impossible to unite, although they all made use of the frames provided
by the historical statehood narrative.
The first and most prominent of the nineteenth-century national move-
ments was the Illyrian movement. In the early and mid-nineteenth century
many members of the Croatian intelligentsia believed that the best way to
combat Magyarisation was to embark on a counter-Magyar national programme.
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This programme, which also articulated a linguistic alternative to Hungarian
and Latin, began in the 1830s and 1840s and became known as the Illyrian
movement.85 Initially, Illyrianism was a cultural movement inspired by the poetry
of Ljudevit Gaj and Janko Draskoviç, but after 1841 it became the dominant
political and national ideology among intellectuals and the bourgeois strata of
Croatian society under the tutelage of Bishop Josip Strossmayer.
Ljudevit Gaj was a student of law at the universities of Graz and Budapest,
where he was influenced by the Slovak nationalist Jan Safaryk. Gaj proposed the
introduction of diacritic signs for the Latin alphabet as a way of spelling
Croatian words. Underlying Gaj’s work was an attempt to establish a common
identity for all Croatian peoples through the creation of a common literary
language and the claim that those who shared this linguistic identity had the
right to determine the nation’s future.86 Gaj reintroduced the term ‘Illyria’ in
order to transcend the national differences between Croats, Serbs and Slovenes,
and he argued that the Southern Slavs were direct descendants of the Illyrians.87
Gaj argued that the establishment of a common literary language was essential
for the development of an Illyrian national consciousness and he attempted to
bring together the three main dialects used by the Southern Slavs – ‡tokavian,
Ïakavian and Kajkavian – into a single literary language.88 For Gaj, it was only
through the establishment and dissemination of such a language that Croatia
could withstand the onslaught of Magyarisation. In 1827 he wrote that ‘in an
illiterate land such as ours, it seems important, yes, most necessary to bring all
powers to bear upon awakening an effective and noble cultural patriotism …
The story of our fatherland has already taught me how much it deserves to be
lifted out of the miserable Magyar darkness.’89 For Gaj, Illyrianism was about
establishing a Southern Slavic or Croatian high culture through which a national
identity could be established as a means of challenging Magyar nationalism. He
established a Croatian newspaper written in the ‡tokavian dialect that was
closest to the Serbian language, and encouraged the establishment of reading
rooms and political clubs.90 Gaj was also involved in the founding of Matica
Hrvatska, a patriotic society that published and disseminated books in the
Croatian language.91
Illyrianism later became more political than cultural and eventually gave
birth to a political party. As it did so, its proponents began to make use of the
historical statehood narrative. These initiatives were led by Bishop Josip Stross-
mayer, who is often accredited with being the ‘first Yugoslav’.92 Strossmayer
believed that the term ‘Illyrian’ was an artificial and foreign word, so he
replaced it with ‘Yugoslav’ (South Slav).93 He was disillusioned with both the
Habsburgs and the Hungarians and sought an alternative path by building
upon Gaj’s attempts to establish a common literary language for all Southern
Slavs. Strossmayer established the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in
Zagreb, which he hoped would give the new nation its own intellectual life to
parallel the Magyar, Austrian and Italian intellectual establishments. Stross-
mayer also took the issue of Serb–Croat unity a stage further by working on a
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programme to transcend the differences between Orthodox and Catholic
Christianity, which he believed hampered possibilities for a Serb–Croat union.94
His interest in reconciliation with the Orthodox churches was not reciprocated
in Serbia, where he was regarded as a cunning spokesperson for Rome.95 This
recalcitrance caused Strossmayer’s eventual disillusionment with the Yugoslav
project.96
The cause of Serb–Croat unity articulated by these Croatian intellectuals
was never received well in Serbia. According to Ivo Banac, the principal reason
for this was that Strossmayer refused to rule out Croatia’s claims to historic
statehood. Although the Illyrianists sought to unite the Southern Slav people,
they still maintained the principle of Croatia’s right to statehood.97 This was
unacceptable to the Serbs, who envisaged a possible Yugoslav state as more akin
to a ‘Greater Serbia’ than the loose federation envisaged by the Illyrianists.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1840s the movement became a fully
fledged political party whose programme consisted of the establishment of
‡tokavian as a literary language for the southern Slavs, the unification of all
Croatian lands within the Habsburg Monarchy, and the attainment of closer
ties with Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia and Bulgaria.98
Although Illyrianism is the most widely discussed nineteenth-century
national ideology, it was by no means the only one. According to Mirjana
Gross, it is possible to identify five different national ideologies that developed
in Croatia during this period.99 These she described as: Illyrism (Illyrianism),
Yugoslavism, the Party of Right, the peasant movement and social democrats.
Gross outlines a typology in which Illyrianism, Yugoslavism and the social
democrats stand juxtaposed to the others, who articulated exclusive Croatian
nationalism. Within this typology, though, there is a clear distinction between
the Illyrianism of Strossmayer and Gaj, which envisaged some form of loose
union between the Southern Slavs including the Bulgarians, and the unitary
Yugoslavism of Trumbiç and Supilo that informed the work of the Yugoslav
Committee in London during the First World War.100 Outside the intelligentsia,
the Party of Right and the Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS) were the most popular.
Interestingly, although these ideologies spanned the political spectrum, they all
made use of particular interpretations of the historical statehood narrative.
The Party of Right (HSP) was founded in the 1860s by Ante Starïeviç and
Eugen Kvaternik. The old Croatian constitution provided the foundation for
their political programme and they believed that the only power that the Croats
should deal was that of the King of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia – the
Emperor of Austria.101 Starïeviç was one of the leading critics of the Nagodba,
which he believed negated Croatia’s right to statehood. The cornerstone of
Starïeviç’s ideology was the maintenance of this perceived historical right to
statehood.102 He demanded the creation of a ‘great Croatia’, encompassing
Croatia, Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, and Bosnia and Hercegovina.103
More troubling was the fact that Starïeviç downplayed the religious differences
between Croats and Serbs by arguing that the Serbs of Bosnia and Vojna Krajina
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were merely Orthodox Croats, who, like the Bosnian Muslims, would voluntarily
acknowledge their tie to the historic Croatian nation once it was shown to
them.104 The national ideology of the Party of Right was thus firmly rooted in
the idea of the Croats as a ‘political people’ who had a historic right to statehood
enjoyed since the ninth century. This ‘primary acquisition’ established ‘the
eternal and natural Croat right to ownership of the land’.105
The only political movement to command substantial support outside the
economic and intellectual elite was Stjepan Radiç’s Croatian Peasant Party,
which competed its first election in 1905.106 Radiç was convinced that the future
belonged to the Croatian peasantry and espoused both the doctrine of Croatia’s
state-right and the continuation of the Habsburg Monarchy, albeit a reformed
Monarchy that would be both democratic and federal.107 Under Radiç’s pro-
gramme, the Kingdom of Croatia would be a federal state in which the Croats,
Slovenes and Serbs who lived in the Habsburg Empire would organise their own
affairs, leaving those who lived outside the Monarchy to organise themselves
into a separate Yugoslav state if they so desired.108 On culture and language, the
Radiç favoured the establishment of a folk–peasant culture that would trans-
cend the traditional divisions of nation and religion, allowing Serbs and
Muslims to participate in the movement. However, it proved problematic to
equate peasant republicanism, Croatian exclusivism (keeping Croatia out of
Yugoslavia) and a commitment to the Monarchy, prompting Radiç regularly to
contradict himself.109 Hence, it was only after the formation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that the Peasants’ Party (HSS) became the leading
party in Croatia and Radiç’s vision assumed some degree of consistency.
The range of national ideologies in Croatia in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries therefore included Yugoslavism, Croatian exclusivism and
Austrianism. Importantly, despite the variety of political programmes put for-
ward by these ideologies, they all shared three common traits. First, they all
demanded the unification of Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia and Istria. Second,
they were democratic to some extent and wanted to see the Sabor exert more
control over Croatia. Finally, they called for a constitution that acknowledged
Croatia’s historic right to statehood.110 Each of these ideas draws upon the
historical statehood narrative, suggesting that it provided a powerful frame for
Croatian political rhetoric and activism. With the dissolution of the Habsburg
Empire at the end of the First World War, the Croatian elite was presented with
a threefold dilemma about the direction it could take. The options were: remain
inside Austria, declare national unification and independence in a revived
Triune Kingdom, or enter into a union with the Serbs and Slovenes. Most
Croatian historians argue that while the majority of Croats favoured either the
first or second option, the elite (which consisted of a high proportion of Serbs)
opted for the third without consulting the will of the people or the Sabor. Thus
the events of 1918 should be ranked alongside 1102 and 1526 as a defining and
controversial moment in the historical statehood narrative.
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Croatia and Yugoslavia
These different ideologies remained after Croatia entered the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The question now though was not one of how
Croatia should relate to Hungary but how it should relate to Serbia. The first
forty years of the twentieth century also added two new national ideologies that
made the task of unifying them in the 1990s all the more problematic. These
were the powerful and diametrically opposed ideologies of fascism and com-
munism. Despite these developments, the main debates about Croatian
national identity in the early twentieth century, and the core claims put forward
by the growing number of nationalists, were still more concerned with the
veracity of the historic statehood narrative than they were with the supposed
ethnic heritage of Croats.
While the First World War raged, with Croats fighting with the Austro-
Hungarians against the Serbs, the Yugoslavists set up the Yugoslav Committee
in London under the leadership of Supilo and Trumbiç.111 The Yugoslav Com-
mittee advocated a federal Yugoslav state and lobbied for the creation of a unified
Yugoslavia based on the principle of self-determination later enunciated by
Woodrow Wilson in his ‘fourteen points’. The reality of the first Yugoslav state,
known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was somewhat different.
In place of federalism was monarchical centralism and in place of self-
determination was the rule of law of the Kingdom of Serbia. The Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was to be ruled by the Serb Royal family, under King
Aleksander.112
There is some evidence that Croats welcomed the Yugoslav idea, despite the
fact that it constituted a major rupture to the historic statehood narrative. The
Habsburg commander in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Ekmeïiç, noted that although
loyalty to the Empire remained strong in Slavonia until the end of the war, the
war’s ending brought a slight majority in favour of Yugoslavism in the rest of
the country. Furthermore, Ekmeïiç noted that the level of support for the
Yugoslav idea was greater in Dalmatia.113 Leroy King, an American dispatched
to Zagreb to gather intelligence at the end of the war, reached a similar con-
clusion. In 1919 King wrote that, ‘[t]he vast majority of the Croatians are
strongly supporting a united Jugoslavia [sic]’.114 Croatian historians tended to
dispute this point fiercely. They argued that there may have been a brief period
after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire where the Serb alternative was
preferable to a feared Italian conquest. However, they argued that by 1919,
when it was apparent that the Yugoslav state would be a Serb-dominated entity,
there was a great deal of opposition in Croatia to the now mutated idea of
Yugoslavia. Stephen Gazi pointed to Stjepan Radiç’s opposition as indicative of
a general Croatian hostility towards the Yugoslav project.115 Radiç declared that
Croats who supported the Yugoslav Committee were acting like ‘drunken geese
in the fog’.116 Croatian opposition tended to draw an unhappy comparison
between the new Yugoslavism and Croatia’s position in the Habsburg Empire.
MUP_Bellamy_04_Ch3 9/3/03, 9:2347
T   C  48
Typical of this was a statement by Miroslav Krle¥a, one of Croatia’s most
prominent writers, who asserted that:
As a nation, within the framework of the 1918 unification, the Croats have lost all
the attributes of their statehood. These attributes, to be sure, were falsely
decorative, but nevertheless, in spite of centuries, they were preserved as relics and
symbols of a certain liberty, which, through a negation of every democratic liberty,
was not entirely devoid of political reality: the crown as the mark of sovereignty,
banners, arms, army, autonomy. From any current Croat conservative aspect, it
cannot be proved to the Croats that in Austria they did not live in the Kingdom of
Croatia, and that they are today not a satrapy, ruled by the most anonymous chiefs
of government.117
The argument follows that the new state was accepted by Croats made
weary by a long war that had left many impoverished. While there was no great
mass support for the Yugoslav idea, there was initially a resigned acceptance of
the new state, exemplified by the position taken by the Catholic Church, which
viewed the state as ‘an irreversible development’.118 However, because the new
kingdom did not reaffirm Croatia’s historic statehood, it constituted a major
problem for the historic statehood narrative. Croatian nationalist writers there-
fore tended to make three points to challenge the legitimacy of the new
kingdom. First, they argued that most Croats did not support the creation of the
new state. Because Croatia was not a democracy and opinion polls were not
much used there is no way of testing this claim and Yugoslavist counter-claims.
Second, many writers argued that Yugoslavists in Croatia and abroad were
hoodwinked by the Serbs. They argued that this ought to render the kingdom
illegitimate. Prior to and during the war, R. W. Seton-Watson had been a
leading proponent of the Yugoslav idea. He worked closely with the Yugoslav
Committee in London and had secured a considerable amount of access to the
British government for them. In a letter to Herbert Fisher in 1918, Seton-
Watson argued that the Croats were becoming more pro-Yugoslav: ‘[As]
indication of feeling in Croatia, I may mention that a secret meeting was held
last year in Fiume [Rijeka] at which a number of priests, Capuchins and
Franciscans, representatives of clerical parties and even of the Archbishop of
Zagreb himself were present, and means were found to convey to the Jugoslav
[sic] committee their approval of its propaganda’.119 This positive view changed
after the Vidovdan (St Vitus day – the day of ratification) Constitution was
promulgated in 1921. In 1921 Seton-Watson lamented that ‘the situation in
Jugoslavia [sic] reduces me to despair’, and stated that, ‘I have no confidence in
the new constitution, with its absurd centralism’.120 According to Seton-Watson
the situation continued to deteriorate. In 1923 he wrote that ‘the political
situation … is utterly deplorable, for all the most honest and progressive politi-
cians in the country are pare terre and all the scoundrels oben and there is the
most complete disorientation and dissatisfaction everywhere’.121 The disenchant-
ment of the Croat Yugoslavists is perhaps best captured by Ante Trumbiç, one
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of the leading Yugoslavists who, in conversation with the French writer Henri
Pozzi, declared that ‘the dream of a unified south Slavdom has withered and
died in less than sixteen years, and now its corruption stinks across the length
and breadth of Europe’.122
Third, many writers argued that Croatia’s entry into the new kingdom had
no legal basis because neither the Croatian Sabor nor the Croatian people gave
their consent. The decision to join the kingdom was taken by a special com-
mittee rather than by the Sabor as a whole, in sharp distinction to the decisions
in 1102 and 1526 it was contended. This line of argument points to the fact that
when given the chance to vote, Croats tended to support Croatian nationalist
parties rather than pan-Yugoslav parties. In the first elections in 1920, Radiç’s
Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS) swept the board in Croatia, winning nearly 40
per cent of the vote and becoming Croatia’s largest party.123 Radiç changed his
manifesto and advocated a federation in which Serbia and Croatia would have a
relationship similar to the relationship between Austria and Hungary in the old
empire. However, under the new constitution, Belgrade had the right to
appoint regional governors and the state apparatus was placed firmly in the
hands of the centre. Radiç and the HSS responded by withdrawing from the
‡kupstina (the parliament in Belgrade) and declaring their determination to
oppose the constitution.
Between 1920 and the end of the decade, disputes between the kingdom’s
different nations increased. Croatian historians argued that the illegitimate
kingdom was ruining the Croatian economy by restricting its trade with Central
Europe and forcing it to pay substantial dues to Belgrade. Typical of this
argument is Gazi’s calculation that Croatia paid 686 million Dinars more in tax
than Serbia did, despite Serbia having a population more than double Croatia’s.124
The situation worsened still further when, on 14 June 1928, the newspaper
Jedinstvo (Unity), which was close to the government, published an open invita-
tion for Radiç to be assassinated.125 Six days later, Puni°a Raïiç, a Ïetnik war
veteran,126 crossed the house of the ‡kupstina and fired a revolver at the group of
HSS representatives. Pavle Radiç, Stjepan’s nephew, was killed instantly and
although Stjepan appeared to be recovering from his wounds, he too died on 8
August.127 The Archbishop of Zagreb tolled the great bell of Zagreb cathedral – a
dignity only normally accorded to deceased bishops – and throughout Croatia
the bells of parish churches tolled in mourning.128 Radiç was buried in Zagreb
on 12 August at a funeral that was described as ‘resembling more the funeral of
a great monarch than of a one-time republican politician’, as more than 100,000
people took part in the funeral procession through Zagreb.129 The extent of the
crisis in Croatia and the threat of civil war prompted the King to summon the
new leader of the HSS, Vladko Maïek, for talks on the possibility of a peaceful
dissolution of the kingdom.130
At the beginning of 1929 King Aleksander dissolved the parliament and
decreed that he would rule his kingdom directly. Radiç’s successor, Vladko
Maïek, initially welcomed this because it signalled the end of the hated Vidovdan
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Constitution, which he had described as a ‘badly buttoned vest’.131 Maïek hoped
that the King would accord greater autonomy to Croatia by releasing it from
rule by Serbian politicians and he optimistically noted that ‘there is no longer a
constitution, only a king and a people’.132 However, the King banned all non-
Yugoslav political parties (including the HSS), imprisoned their leaders, changed
the name of the kingdom to ‘The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’, introduced harsh
censorship of the press and tolerated no political dissent.133 Most critically for
the historical statehood narrative, he abolished the former constituent entities
(Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Serbia) and introduced nine
regional Banovine, which bore the names of rivers. The name Croatia was
removed from official use for the first time since it was established in the
medieval Triune Kingdom. To rub salt into the wounds, Croatia and Dalmatia
were again split into two entities. The political situation in Croatia became so
bad that it attracted external attention. In 1931 Albert Einstein and Heinrich
Mann called upon the rest of Europe to defend the Croats, stating ‘all countries
are duty bound to shield the small, peaceful and civilised nation of Croatia’.134
The political crisis was worsened by the collapse of the European banking
system, which impacted heavily on Zagreb because of its close links with Austria
and was exacerbated by a series of bad harvests. This prompted a trend towards
extremism in Croatian politics and the emergence of both fascist and commun-
ist political movements. There was also a marked increase in terrorist activity.
The Yugoslav League of Communists (KPJ), the Internal Macedonian Revolu-
tionary Organisation (VMRO) and the infamous fascist Usta°a, though small in
size, participated in many acts of bombing and assassination in the 1930s. In
1934, while on a visit to France, King Aleksander was assassinated by a member
of VMRO who was aided by the Usta°a.135 Fascist Italy was incriminated in the
murder, resulting in a Yugoslav–Italian pact in 1937 in which Mussolini agreed
to stop supporting the fascist Usta°a (Mussolini had provided it with arms and
training camps in Italy) and intern Ante Paveliç, its leader.
By the second half of the 1930s, the HSS had become even more popular
under Maïek’s leadership. Not only did the peasant movement attract the sup-
port of its traditional supporters, it also secured a substantial level of support
among the Croatian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Indeed, by 1935 40 per cent
of the party’s representatives were from the middle class. Despite these changes,
the party retained its traditional focus as Maïek was keen to ensure that the HSS
remained a parliamentary movement. It also strongly resisted the Usta°a’s
violent methods and its membership dwarfed that of the fascists.136
The increasing level of support for the HSS and the increasing instability of
the international arena prompted the government to reach an agreement with
the Croats. In 1939 Maïek and the Belgrade government reached a sporazum
(agreement) that reorganised the Yugoslav state, awarding substantial auto-
nomy to Croatia. The sporazum created an autonomous Croatian Banovina,
which encompassed about 30 per cent of the entire kingdom – including Croatia,
Slavonia, Dalmatia, Hercegovina and parts of northeastern Bosnia (Brïko).
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Croatia was to have a separate Ban and the Sabor was to be reinstated. Only
foreign policy, transportation and other pan-kingdom areas of administration
were to remain in Belgrade and the Sabor would decide everything else.137 Some
historians believed that the sporazum had the potential to solve the Serb–Croat
conflict that had dogged the kingdom since its creation. However, the Axis
invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941 meant that its potential was never fulfilled.138
Nevertheless, for Croatian historians intent on tracing a continuous line of
statehood, the sporazum reasserted the existence of the Croatian state through
the reincarnation of the institutions of the Ban and Sabor.
 The age of extremes
Having concluded the sporazum, Prince Paul tried to secure Yugoslavia against
the perceived threat from Italy by finally succumbing to German demands for
Yugoslavia to join the Axis tripartite pact.139 Within Serbia, news of Yugoslavia’s
agreement with Germany was greeted with mass demonstrations, which pro-
vided the signal for those in the army who were opposed to the sporazum to
launch a coup against the King.140 Winston Churchill commented that Yugo-
slavia had found its soul and delighted at the creation of a new front against the
Germans.141 The new front lasted ten days and cost only 166 German troops.142
The German occupation ushered in four years of bloodletting in Yugoslavia and
drove Croats into one of two extremist movements: the fascist Usta°a led by
Ante Paveliç and the communist Partisans led by Tito.
The self-proclaimed leader of the Usta°a,143 Ante Paveliç, was a Hercego-
vinian Croat, the son of a building contractor. He believed that he was following
in the footsteps of Ante Starïeviç and the Party of Rights movement. He was the
first prominent Croatian nationalist to base his nationalism on ethnic grounds,
despite the fact that earlier and contemporary ethnic genealogists had failed to
outline a convincing ethnic heritage. Paveliç viewed the Jews and Serbs who had
settled in Croatia as agents of Magyarisation who should not have the same
rights as Croats. Having studied law at Zagreb University, he was elected muni-
cipal councillor in Zagreb. He represented Zagreb in the ‡kupstina, before
founding the Usta°a. Paveliç organised the illegal Usta°a on military lines and
advocated an armed struggle for Croatian independence. Until 1937, he received
a great deal of support from Mussolini, whose territorial designs on the Dalma-
tian coast were well known. The Usta°a was based in Italy, from where it
launched terrorist attacks in Yugoslavia. However, after the 1937 Yugoslav–
Italian treaty, it was imprisoned in Italy until 1941 when Mussolini installed it
as the Croatian government. It is important to note that the Usta°a did not have
popular support. Avakumoviç argues that this was because of its association
with Italy and because the HSS was more representative of Croatian opinion.144
However, this did not prevent it unleashing an era of terror upon Croatia and
Bosnia and Hercegovina.
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Shortly after the German invasion, the infamous Nezavisna Dr¥ava Hrvatska
(Independent State of Croatia – NDH) led by Ante Paveliç was created. The
historical controversy of this period is of vital importance to understanding
competing claims about the historical statehood narrative in the 1990s. Until
the advent of ‘Franjoism’ in the 1990s (outlined in the following chapter), the
narrative tended to avoid the subject of the Usta°a regime altogether. Its partial
reinclusion in the 1990s as a legitimate expression of Croatian statehood was a
major source of contention between Croats in the 1990s.145
The new fascist government issued its first decrees on 17 April 1941. The
death penalty was introduced for a range of offences such as abortion. On 26
April the use of Cyrillic (the alphabet used by Serbs) was forbidden and in June
and October a whole range of anti-Semitic legislation was passed. The system-
atic murder of Jews, Serbs, Gypsies and Croatian opponents began immedi-
ately. In October 1941 Vladko Maïek was arrested and sent to Jasenovac, where
a brick factory had been converted into a Croatian Auschwitz.146 Maïek recalled
that:
The camp had previously been a brick-yard and was situated on the embankment
of the Sava river. In the middle of the camp stood a two-storey house, originally
erected for the offices of the enterprise … The screams and wails of despair and
extreme suffering, the tortured outcries of the victims, broken by intermittent
shooting, accompanied all my waking hours and followed me into sleep at night.147
Vladimir Dedijer compiled a chilling collection of witness accounts of Usta°a
atrocities committed by the NDH regime. One such act was committed at
Karitska Jama Gorge, in Bosnia and Hercegovina, which was described by a
survivor, Milija Bjelica:
They tried to kill us not with wooden hammers, but shot us by using only two
bullets for each group of three. The henchmen placed us in threes, tied back to back
at the edge of the gorge … The shots, which came from close up, were fired into the
temples of the ones standing at the sides, and hit the back of the head of the one
facing the gorge. Apparently the henchmen did not check to see whether all three
were mortally wounded each time, but instead just immediately threw them into
the twenty meter deep gorge, causing anyone who was not dead to perish there in
torment.148
There are many similar, and many more horrific, testimonies of Usta°a atrocities.
Under the policy declared by Education Minister, Mile Budak, of deporting a
third [of Serbs], converting a third [to Catholicism] and killing a third, the Usta°a
terror reached such proportions that some Italian and German fascists com-
plained about the barbarity of the Croats. An observer in the German army noted
that, ‘even among the Croatians nobody can feel safe in this land anymore …
The Croatian revolution is by far the harshest and most brutal of all the different
revolutions that I have been through at more or less close hand since 1918’.149
One of the greatest controversies of the Usta°a period was the apparently
eager compliance of the Catholic Church. Serbian and communist historians
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tend to argue that the papal regime actively supported the massacre of Orthodox
Serbs and provide evidence of priests and Franciscans who actively participated
in atrocities. Furthermore, Dedijer argued that Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije
Stepinac – beatified by the Pope in 1998 – actively supported the Paveliç regime.150
The role of Stepinac has become a focal point for different nationalist interpre-
tations of what happened in Croatia between 1941 and 1945. Contrary to the
argument that Stepinac actively supported the genocide, many Croatian writers
believe that although he supported the cause of Croatian statehood he abhorred
the Paveliç regime and helped many people to escape from it.
After the German invasion and the creation of the NDH, Stepinac spoke
approvingly of the new regime and in particular of Croatian independence, and
met with Paveliç and his deputy, Kvaternik, on 16 April 1941.151 However, the
wholesale deportation of Jews and Serbs seriously worried him. In a letter to the
poglavnik (the leader of the Usta°a) he wrote that:
I am convinced that these things have been happening without your knowledge and
that others may not dare to tell you about them … I hear from many sides that
there are instances of inhumane and brutal treatment of non-Aryans during the
deportations and at the camps, and even worse that neither old people, children or
the sick are spared … the measures which have been undertaken would have their
full effect if they were carried out in a more humane and considerate way, seeing in
human beings the image of god.152
Stepinac also forwarded to Paveliç a communiqué he had received from Bishop
Mi°iç of Mostar. Mi°iç’s report read:
A reign of terror has come to pass … men are captured like animals. They are
slaughtered, murdered; living men are thrown off cliffs … From Mostar and
Ïapljina a train took six carloads of mothers, young girls and children ten years old
to the station at Surmanci … they were led up the mountains and mothers together
with their children were thrown alive off precipices.153
Marcus Tanner argued that what prevented Stepinac from openly opposing Paveliç
was not sympathy for the regime but political naivety. Tanner recorded an
instance where Stepinac enquired whether or not the leader knew of the reports
of the killing of Serbs. When he was told that, of course, Paveliç knew everything,
Stepinac broke down in tears.154 However, Stepinac never made a public state-
ment disavowing the NDH, even when he was put on trial by Tito in 1946.155
The omission of the Usta°a period from the historical statehood narrative
meant that not only have Croatian historians failed to disavow the NDH until
recently (and then only partially), they have also – with the exception of Franjo
Tuœman (see Chapter 4) – failed to reveal the extent of the opposition to the
NDH within Croatia. Because the imprisoned Maïek clung on to the pacifist
tradition of the HSS, most Croatian opponents of the Usta°a turned to the com-
munist Partisans under Tito’s leadership. By the end of 1943, Croats made up
over 30 per cent of a total number of Partisans that exceeded 100,000, meaning
that there were more Croatian Partisans than there were Usta°a militia.156
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Controversies about the Second World War are vitally important to the
historical statehood narrative. Discussion was severely restricted during the
years of Tito’s Yugoslavia (1945–1980), and when discussion was permitted this
period of history became a highly politicised area of contention. Numbers and
culpability play a big part in these debates. It is estimated that the Usta°a killed
around 300,000 Serbs, most of Croatia’s 36,000 Jews and a large portion of the
200,000 Croats that were killed in the war. These figures were highly contested
in the 1990s and these political contests were related directly to different
interpretations of the historical statehood narrative.
There are three key areas of debate about the Second World War. The first
is the question of whether the NDH was a legitimate expression of Croatian
statehood. It is very difficult to say that it was, while denying that expressions of
Croatian national identity have fascist connotations. On the other hand,
denying its legitimacy brings the claim of continual statehood into question.
Second, there is the question of the level of support enjoyed by the Usta°a. Was
Usta°a fascism supported by Croats and their social institutions (the Catholic
Church) or was there widespread resistance? Third, did the Usta°a commit
genocide against the Serbs or was the killing more indiscriminate and a con-
sequence of the on-going civil war? Of these, the first two questions in parti-
cular posed problems in the 1990s when Tuœman tried to unite the different
strands of national thinking into a single national movement, as we will see in
the following chapter.
Tito’s Yugoslavia
As part of their attempt to eradicate completely all forms of political opposition,
the communists hosted a series of show trials similar to those held during the
Stalinist purges. The most famous of these show trials were of the Ïetnik leader,
Dra¥a Mihailoviç, and the Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac. Mihailoviç
was found guilty of collaboration and was shot in 1946. In the same year,
Stepinac was put on trial for colluding with the Usta°a and was sentenced to 16
years in prison.157 Throughout Croatia and Serbia anyone suspected of having
colluded with either the Ïetniks or the Usta°a was either imprisoned or executed.
In the first twenty years after the end of the Second World War there was
very little by way of a Croatian national movement and no attempt to legitimise
the new socialist Yugoslav state in terms of the historical statehood thesis (by
arguing that socialist Yugoslavia’s federal constitution recognised the sover-
eignty of the Croatian nation). Instead, the narrative tells us that Croatia had
communism imposed on it and finally lost its statehood. Rather than pointing
towards continuity, the narrative focuses instead on national opposition to the
second Yugoslavia. Maïek fled abroad in fear of the communists and never
returned to Croatia.158 Although Stepinac was released from prison in 1951, he
was held in a form of house arrest well away from Zagreb until his death in
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1960.159 By the mid-1960s, however, Croats within the League of Communists
began to reassess Croatia’s position and began to raise the issue of the need to
assert Croatia’s historic right to statehood within the Yugoslav federation. In
the mid-1960s Croatian communists adopted a strategy of opposing everything
that was centralist and Yugoslav.160 The main targets for these new Croatian
communist leaders were the constitution – which they deemed to be too
centralist; democratic centralism – which they believed contradicted the idea of
republican democracy; old Partisan communists; and the continuing federal
control over foreign currency – the majority of which was earned by Croatia.161
These new leaders began to pose as defenders of the Croatian nation against the
exploitation of the centre (Belgrade), which was accused of draining off Croat-
ian currency to fund inefficient programmes in the less-developed republics
and provinces (southern Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro). From
the mid-1960s onwards, all economic and political issues within the Croatian
League of Communists became subsumed within the national question.162
The revival of Croatian national consciousness began among intellectuals,
with the resuscitation of concern for the cultural questions posed by earlier
nationalists. They began questioning the 1954 Novi Sad language agreement,
which established a common Serbo-Croatian and equally Croato-Serbian
language.163 Their opposition took the form of a declaration in 1967, which
argued that the Croatian language had been downgraded into a local dialect.164
They demanded that Croatian be established as Croatia’s official and be used in
schools and the state media.165 An important centre for this new movement was
the reinvigorated Matica Hrvatska. Matica Hrvatska focused on the perceived
denigration of Croatian culture. Its journal, Kritika, caricatured Belgrade as a
metaphor for the ruthless, bourgeois, backward Serbs who were oppressing the
more advanced Croats. Intellectuals argued that this was the only reason why
Croatia was not as prosperous as the small nations of Western Europe.166 In
April 1971 this movement was joined by fascist groups that operated among the
large Croatia gasterbeiter (overseas workers) who murdered the Yugoslav
ambassador in Stockholm and held a celebration in Munich to celebrate the
thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the NDH.167
The federal government adopted a dual response to the problem of increas-
ing Croatian intransigence. Matica Hrvatska was closed down and many
nationalists, including Franjo Tuœman, were jailed. Liberal and nationally
minded leaders of the Croatian League of Communists, such as Miko Tripalo
and Savko Dabïeviç-Kuïar, were removed from office and replaced by loyal
ultra-conservatives such as Stipe ‡uvar. Every rank of the party was subjected to
the purge and thousands of Croats were expelled, increasing the already dispro-
portionately high relative number of Serbs within the party. The purge, which
came to be known as the ‘Croatian Spring’, crushed every form of political
opposition in Croatia.168 Hence, for the next twenty years, until the first demo-
cratic elections of 1990, Croatia was known as the ‘silent republic’ because its
communist leadership avoided all forms of confrontation at a time in which the
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Slovene party in particular was becoming increasingly liberal, progressive, and
nationally minded.169
Following Tito’s death in 1980, the last ten years of Croatia’s membership
of Yugoslavia were years of economic and political collapse. More than at any
other time in the historical statehood narrative, the discourse was intimately
linked with events in Serbia, the rise of Slobodan Milo°eviç in Serbia, the Kosovo
question, and anti-Croat propaganda emanating from Belgrade.170 In the mid-
1980s the economy worsened as the national debt increased. In 1986 the Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) released its now infamous Memor-
andum, which insisted that the Serb nation was threatened by an anti-Serb
conspiracy that was being hatched in Croatia, and concluded ominously that
‘[b]ut for the period of the existence of the NDH, Serbs in Croatia have never
been as threatened as they are now’.171 In 1987 Slobodan Milo°eviç came to the
fore in a visit to the Serbs in Kosovo. He told the Kosovan Serbs that ‘no one has
the right to beat the [Serb] people’ and used nationalist rhetoric to seize control
of the Serbian presidency.
On 19 November of the same year, Milo°eviç implied that war would break
out if the Serbs in Kosovo did not get their own way.172 By the late 1980s, the
Serbian nationalist propaganda machine had turned its attentions towards
600,000 Serbs living in Croatia. Belgrade television showed mistreated Serbs
and decaying Serb villages that had been neglected by the hateful Croats, and
demonstrations in the stronghold of Knin, in the former Vojna Krajina (known
today as the Lika region), became regular occurrences.
It was 1989 before the Croats began to respond to this upsurge in Serb
nationalism. In February 1989,  Franjo Tuœman and a group of others involved
in the ‘Croatian Spring’, illegally formed the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica
(Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ), the first non-communist or fascist party
in Croatia since the demise of the HSS and incarceration of Maïek in 1941. The
‘Croatian silence’ came to an abrupt end in December 1989 when the Croatian
League of Communists elected the liberal reformist, Ivica Raïan, as party
leader. Raïan immediately shifted Croatian policy towards Belgrade, and fell in
behind the Slovene leadership in their decision to walk out of the party congress
of 1990. This decision was made in response to Serb gerrymandering with the
federal budget, in which 1.8 billion Dinar (around $1 billion) was removed from
the Federal Bank reserves and given to the Republic of Serbia. The Croatian
League of Communists, again following Slovenia, changed its name (to the
DSP) and called Croatia’s first free elections.
To guarantee victory, the revamped League of Communists established an
electoral system that would ensure that it secured a higher proportion of
parliamentary seats than it secured share of the vote. The plan backfired. Most
of the 600,000 Serbs in Croatia voted for Serbian parties rather than the reformed
communists, who had become more Croatian in outlook. By being all things to
all Croats, Tuœman and the HDZ secured large amounts of funding for their
campaign.173 This funding came largely from Croatian émigrés, organised by the
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future Defence Minister Gojko ‡u°ak. Moreover, there were many other new
parties in Croatia, which split the votes that the (former) communists were
hoping to secure. The electoral system also conspired against the party, and
allowed the HDZ to secure nearly 70 per cent of parliamentary seats with only
40 per cent of the vote.174 Franjo Tuœman was elected President of Croatia by the
HDZ-dominated Sabor.175
Although Tuœman never explicitly called for Croatian independence during
the campaign, he made it clear that a future Croatia would function on an
independent basis within ‘a radically reorganised Yugoslavia’.176 It was only after
the outbreak of fighting and the intervention of the JNA (Yugoslav People’s
Army) coupled with the continuing intransigence of the Serb leadership, that a
snap referendum on independence was held, after the Serbs blocked the rota-
tion of the federal presidency, which would have put the Croat (and future
Croatian President), Stipe Mesiç (legally if not practically) at the head of the JNA.
Croatian Serbs boycotted the referendum, which produced an overwhelming
vote in favour of independence.177 On 30 May 1991 Croatia declared its inde-
pendence from Yugoslavia but had to wait until the beginning of 1992 for
recognition.178 By that time, the city of Vukovar had been demolished by the
Serbs and Dubrovnik had been badly damaged.
Abstract narratives of Croatian identity
Conceptions of Croatian national identity in the 1990s were framed by the
historical statehood narrative with its claim that Croatia has enjoyed continu-
ous statehood since the time of the medieval kingdom. According to Croatian
politicians and intellectuals, ‘people’ become ‘Croats’ through a perceived shared
history of statehood. Unlike the Serbian nation, which found continuity in
Orthodox Christianity, Croatian national identity is founded upon statehood
and was perpetuated by the continuity of that statehood.179 Most writers who
articulate the historical narrative claim that the two Yugoslavias were illegiti-
mate because the Sabor had not freely chosen to enter into the union, unlike – it
is claimed – the unions with Hungary in 1102 and Austria in 1526. The
historical statehood narrative insists that the Croats entered these unions to
protect themselves against the Ottomans but that throughout this period
Croatia retained a degree of freedom of action that it did not enjoy in the two
Yugoslavias. Furthermore, it stresses the separate development of Croats and
Serbs, showing that prior to 1918 the two nations had little connection other
than a similar language.
As an account of the abstract ways that Croatian national identity is
framed, the narrative of historical statehood offers a set of referent points that
constitutes and constrains the way that political entrepreneurs at the second
level can invoke resonant claims about national identity in order to legitimise
particular political programmes. The task now is to address the question of how
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these abstract accounts of Croatian national identity became resonant in the
1990s. Although the historical statehood narrative helps to distinguish Croats
from other nationalities and situates them in an albeit contentious continuous
political community since the tenth century, it tells us little about the salience or
meaning of that identity. While we can accept that the years 1102, 1526 and
1918 provide vital signposts in the thesis of continuous statehood and that it is a
shared belief in this legacy of statehood that distinguishes the Croatian nation
from others by providing an abstract consciousness, there is nothing in the
historical narrative to explain how and why these dates should be so powerful in
constituting the modern political consciousness of people calling themselves
Croats. The next chapter considers four sets of accounts that attempted to make
these abstract ideas of Croatian national identity resonant in the everyday lives
of Croats in the 1990s, either by mobilising people behind one or other political
programme or by criticising those programmes and the forms of consciousness
they tried to construct.
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Contemporary accounts
of Croatian national identity
According to Benedict Anderson , ‘communities are to be distinguished, not by
their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’.1 This
chapter investigates how the Croatian nation was imagined in the 1990s. It
focuses on four sets of accounts that attempted to provide contemporary
resonance to the abstract frames of national identity discussed in the previous
chapter. These accounts attempted to either interpret what it meant to be
Croatian in order to secure support for a political programme, or – as in the
case of the dissident intellectuals – to challenge such accounts. However, they all
attempted to give resonance to abstract ideas in the contemporary context.
After a discussion of the so-called ‘Franjoist’ narrative offered by President
Franjo Tuœman and his party, I will discuss alternative conceptions of identity
that were articulated by opposition parties, dissident intellectuals and the
Croatian diaspora. I argue that each of these ‘political entrepreneurs’ drew upon,
and offered interpretations of, the historical statehood thesis in order to
legitimise their programmes or to challenge the manifestos of others. The abstract
frames discussed in the previous chapter therefore presented common frames
of reference with which to seek legitimacy for political practices or to use to
question that legitimacy.
One of the central themes of this chapter is that different accounts of
national identity (which draw upon a common stock of narrative or makes use
of similar ‘frames’) inform political discourse and compete with each other. As
Michael Billig argued:
Different factions, whether classes, religions, genders or ethnicities, always struggle
for the power to speak for the nation, and to present their particular voice as the
voice of the national whole, defining the history of other sub-sections accordingly.
‘The voice of the nation’ is a fiction … Thus, national histories are continually
being re-written, and the re-writing reflects current balances of hegemony.2
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These narratives of national identity should be seen as a political battleground.
Ideas about national identity provide a framework for political discourse. In the
case of a nation that has only recently achieved statehood, issues of state politics
are ‘nationalised’ and particular rules of engagement are developed.
The dominant narrative: HDZ and ‘Franjoism’
HDZ – zna se – was the most oft-used election slogan of Tuœman’s party, the
HDZ. Zna se means ‘of course’, ‘it is normal’ or ‘it is so’, and thus the slogan
called the reader to equate the Croatian nation with the HDZ, because ‘it is so’.
This linking of the HDZ with Croatia was a recurrent theme in the party’s
rhetoric. For example, the Sahovnica coat of arms became both the symbol of
the HDZ and the state’s flag. In a speech to the party faithful in which Tuœman
identified the main threats to the political well-being of his party, he expressed
alarm at the ‘teaming-up of the internal and external opponents of the HDZ
and of independent Croatia’.3 Thus, opponents of the HDZ were also viewed as
the enemies of Croatia. This linkage extended into the lexicon of political
science. The Croatian Political Dictionary contained entries for ‘snake in bosom’
(opponents of Croatia and Tuœman), ‘Croatian Communist Gulag’, ‘Falian
strategy of Tuœman the warrior’ (taking up three pages) and ‘best’ (describing
this as the HDZ).4 A reviewer in the Feral Tribune noted the exclusions from the
new Croatian political lexicography. The words ‘fascism’, ‘antifascism’, ‘Usta°a’
and ‘Ante Paveliç’ were not to be found.5 Tuœman, the good shepherd of the
Croatian nation, also became its most significant historical figure. In a book of
Croatian ‘heroes’ published by the Ministry of Defence, the medieval kings
received three pages between them, Starïeviç received eight pages, Radiç received
nine pages and Tuœman received thirty-two.6 The linkage between party,
president and state was a deliberate policy that formed the cornerstone of the
HDZ project in the 1990s.
Franjo Tuœman described himself as a ‘Croatian historian, politician and
statesman’.7 He was born in 1922 north of Zagreb, in the same district that Tito
was born in. His parents were Radiç supporters and when the Second World
War broke out he joined Tito’s communist Partisans. After the war, he rose to
the position of Major-General in the JNA. He wrote his doctoral thesis on the
causes of the 1941 uprising in Belgrade and in 1961 decided to leave the army in
order to focus on historical research. He was later appointed Director of the
Institute for the History of the Workers Movement in Croatia.8 In December
1971 he was arrested and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for ‘maliciously
misrepresenting the socio-political situation in Croatia’. In February 1981 he
was imprisoned again, on similar charges, for three years.9 In a letter to the
United States Congress, Tuœman recalled that he fought Nazism in the Second
World War, losing his brother in 1943, that his parents were killed by the Parti-
sans in 1946 and that he was jailed for his ‘anti-totalitarian political views’.10
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According to David Owen, who negotiated with Tuœman when he was acting as
a UN envoy, ‘Tudjman’s [sic] nationalism is worn openly on his sleeve, his
soldiers know that he is ready himself to fight for Croatia … Unlike Milosevic
[sic] who is a pragmatist, Tudjman [sic] is an opportunist in the cause of
Croatia’.11 Jovan Raskoviç, founder of the Serbian Democratic Party in the so-
called Krajina, held a similar view. He stated, ‘he is a tough politician of clear
conceptions who represents what most Croats accept. Tudjman [sic] is the kind
of character who speaks quite openly about his intentions’. Raskoviç also
described the President of Croatia as ‘Croat-centric’ but not Usta°a.12
To sell the HDZ’s vision of a unified and independent Croatia, Tuœman
established a political movement in which he embodied the Croatian nation,
through the ideology of ‘Franjoism’.13 Franjoism held that the extremes of
Croatian political ideology – from fascism to communism – could be repre-
sented and expressed in the person of Franjo Tuœman.14 Tuœman argued that
the transition from a communist system to independent and democratic state-
hood could only be achieved if these cleavages were bridged. The programme of
‘national reconciliation’ involved instigating co-operation between first gener-
ation descendants of Partisan and Usta°a supporters. Tuœman believed that he
could personally bridge the gap between the fascists and communists. Not only
did ‘Franjoism’ include a commitment to unite the ‘bright and dark chapters of
Croatia’s past’ it also sought to bring Croats living in Croatia together with
those living abroad. 15 As one commentator suggested, for Tuœman, Franjoism
meant that he was ‘the president of all Croats’.16
The HDZ saw itself as a national movement rather than a political party in
the normal sense. Tuœman argued that:
Unlike all the political parties present until that moment [the formation of the
HDZ] and based on neither class or ideological-political (middle-class, peasant,
workers, Christian, liberal, socialist) differences, the HDZ appeared as a nation-
wide democratic party focused on bringing together all nation-building forces in all
layers and classes of society, from the radical right through the moderate position
to the revolutionary left.17
Tuœman saw himself as the personification of Croatian unity – through him
national cleavages would be overcome. He tried to foster that unity through his
party. The HDZ was founded illegally in June 1989 and announced its first
political programme in 1990. It announced that it would be a pan-Croatian
movement that would mobilise the entire nation by unifying the diverse strands
of its political traditions. The rallying call for this mobilisation was the fight for
Croatian sovereignty. The attainment of sovereignty was the self-declared
reason for the HDZ’s existence and some argued that sovereignty and national
independence remained its only substantive interest throughout the decade.18
The goal of a united Croatian national identity required particular policy
and rhetorical orientations. Tuœman had to establish a unified narrative of the
‘centuries-old dream’ of Croatian statehood by arguing that the different
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thinkers and politicians (discussed in the previous chapter) all shared that dream
even if they disagreed about the most desirable type of state. In 1981 he wrote
that ‘from medieval times the Croatian nation has preserved its national-state
individuality, which has been encroached upon in the Habsburg monarchy, but
never shattered’19 and continued by arguing that the wealth and diversity of
Croatian historical and national literature could be reduced to a national
aspiration ‘for centuries to realise its full national independence’.20 Tuœman
found no problem with unifying the Illyrianist ideas of Gaj and Strossmayer
with the socialist-confederalist ideology of Radiç, the nationalism of Starïeviç
and the fascism of Paveliç. In each, he simply saw a desire for Croatian statehood.
Tuœman’s first move was to unify the writings and actions of Croatia’s
historical figures by identifying them as ‘Croats’ and seeing diverse political
agendas as products of a shared dream for Croatian statehood. The fact that
Strossmayer favoured pan-Slavism and Radiç initially favoured trialism within
the Habsburg monarchy eluded Tuœman, and he felt adequately qualified to
situate Radiç the pacifist as having the same yearning as Paveliç the fascist
murderer, despite the fact that Radiç’s successor, Vladko Maïek had been im-
prisoned by the Usta°a at the Jasenovac death camp. None of this was problem-
atic for Tuœman. All Croats could rally behind Franjoism, the argument went,
because it encompassed every strand of Croatian political thought.
Tuœman attempted to unify the Croatian people by situating them along-
side an ‘other’, the Serbs. He contended that this otherness was constituted on
three planes – cultural, historical, and geographical. In the cultural realm he
argued that Croats had culture while Serbs did not. For example, contemporary
folk music was exiled from Croatian media not only because of its supposed
‘low cultural quality’ but also because of the belief that such songs ‘belong
exclusively to the Serbian (un)cultural identity’.21 There can be little doubt that
Tuœman supported such purification of Croatian culture, given his view that
Croatian and Serbian cultures were completely different. He told an interviewer
in New York in 1992 that:
Croats belong to a different culture – a different civilization from the Serbs. Croats are
part of Western Europe, part of the Mediterranean tradition. Long before Shakespeare
and Moliere, our writers were translated into European languages. The Serbs belong
to the East. They are Eastern peoples like the Turks and Albanians. They belong to
the Byzantine culture … despite similarities in language we cannot be together.22
Tuœman insisted that this inherent cultural difference was created by the two
nations’ divergent histories. In bringing them together in the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes in 1918, the ‘Versailles powers’ (as Tuœman called them)
forced together two nations that had experienced completely separate histories
since the east–west schism of  395. This schism produced two nations that
were different in their national consciousness, cultural make-up and ‘general
historical, state-political and religious tradition’.23 Croatia and Serbia were also
geopolitically separate, he argued. Croatia was at the heart of Europe, both
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geographically and politically. Drawing one of his many historical comparisons,
Tuœman recalled that ‘at the time of the Ottoman invasion upon Christian
Europe, plundered Croatia received recognition as the antemurale christianitatis.
Today, still defending freedom and democracy, she remains the bulwark of
European democracy against attempts at restoration Communism’.24 Simply
put, in a phraseology that Tuœman used on many occasions, the difference
between Serbs and Croats was not the ordinary difference between two nations.
Instead, it was a difference of civilisations. Croats were European while Serbs
were Balkan. Thus all Croats could rally behind ‘Franjoism’ because they were
united in not being Serb, Balkan or uncivilised.
The discourse of national unity required a narrative of Croatian history
that could bind Croats living in Croatia with those living abroad, many of
whom had connections with the Usta°a. This included an account of the
oppression of Croatia by Yugoslavia and a tentative rehabilitation of the Paveliç
regime into the historical narrative. In a discussion in 1991 with the American
ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, Tuœman succinctly recounted
an account of Yugoslav Croatia that sought to bind Croats together through a
story of common suffering. He recalled that:
45 years of communist rule have destroyed the moral values of Croatian society.
People don’t know how to accept responsibility for their own future. The one-party
system has created disillusions everywhere. The best people have left. Corruption
has become a way of life. The idea of Yugoslavia has been a negative influence … to
us Croats, Yugoslavia was built on an illusion.25
For Tuœman, Yugoslavia, communism and union with Serbia caused a moral
decline in Croatia. Furthermore, he believed that Yugoslavia was responsible
for the economic, social and even demographic problems confronting Croatia.26
These problems impacted on all Croats and united them in suffering.
The main obstacle to uniting indigenous and émigré Croats was the con-
nection that many émigrés had to the fascist regime of 1941–45. The reintegra-
tion of émigré Croats therefore proved to be one of the most controversial
issues in Croatian politics in the 1990s. Some observers suggested that attempts
to rehabilitate the émigrés owed more to the desire to secure important funding
from North America, Latin America, Germany and Australia than to an ideo-
logical yearning for the uniting of the Croatian nation.27 According to Mark
Thompson, these groups contributed $8.2 million to the cause, giving the HDZ
a substantial edge in funding over the other parties.28 One of the most pro-
minent returning émigrés was Gojko ‡u°ak, a Toronto based Croat originally
from Hercegovina. Described in the Croatian independent press as the ‘pizza
man’, he had made his living as a decorator. Though not possessing great wealth
himself, he was instrumental in securing large amounts of money for the HDZ
through its offices in North America.29 After returning to Croatia, ‡u°ak was
appointed Minister of Defence where he gained a reputation as a hard-line
nationalist on the right wing of the HDZ.30
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The policy of uniting émigré and indigenous Croats contained three prin-
cipal elements. First, Tuœman argued that the Serbs exaggerated the scale of the
Usta°a genocide in the Second World War. Second, he insisted that the NDH
state was a legitimate manifestation of Croatia’s historical statehood, even if
what it became was illegitimate. Finally, he changed the names of streets, places,
and institutions to eradicate reminders of Tito and communism and to rehabi-
litate some of the émigrés’ heroes, despite their association with the NDH.
Tuœman’s claim that the Serbs exaggerated the scale of the Second World
War genocide was forcefully put in the most controversial of all his writings, a
book entitled Historical Wastelands, which was revised and reprinted in 1997 as
Horrors of War. His main contention in this work was that the historical record
of Croatia’s role in the Second World War ‘has been repeatedly and intention-
ally altered for political purposes’.31 He argued that while the Belgrade govern-
ment insisted that the Usta°a killed nearly 2 million Serbs, the official figures
indicated that the real number of people killed within the territory of the NDH
was around 60,000.32 While admitting that even the reduced number consti-
tuted an appalling crime, he argued that the figures were manipulated to
legitimise the suppression of Croatian national consciousness after the Second
World War. This was typified by the trial of Stepinac, the deposing of Andrija
Hebrang (leader of the Croatian Partisans), the ‘Croatian Spring’ in 1971 and the
imprisonment of Tuœman himself.33 Tuœman also attacked attempts to imply
the historical guilt of the Croatian people for the genocide. After pointing to
several works that suggested that the Croatian nation had an inherent tendency
towards genocide if left unattended, Tuœman went on to show that prominent
Croatian nationalists such as Starïeviç and Radiç proposed anti-fascist pro-
grammes and the extent to which Croats themselves participated in the anti-
fascist struggle.34
Though a much maligned work, it is important to point out that Horrors of
War did make some important contributions to the Croatian historical record.
It is true that Jews were no better off in Nediç’s Serbia than they were in
Paveliç’s Croatia during the Second World War. It is also true that the number
of people killed at the Jasenovac camp was massively inflated and this inflated
figure was used to suppress expressions of Croatian national identity. Further-
more, Tuœman’s estimates of the total number of people exterminated by the
Usta°a in death camps and massacres is closer to the figure given by most
independent historians than the numbers emanating from Belgrade, but still
missed the mark by around 100,000.35 However, it is a worrying piece of work
because of its alleged anti-Semitic tone and because Tuœman appeared to be
more concerned with the anti-Croatian plot that he was attempting to uncover
than he was with Usta°a crimes.
Horrors of War fulfilled two purposes for Tuœman’s broader mission. First,
it purported to unite all Croats as the victims of a Serbian conspiracy to
discredit the Croatian nation. Second, perhaps most worryingly and conten-
tiously, it argued that the fascist NDH was a legitimate expression of Croatian
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statehood. In 1991 Tuœman argued that, ‘[b]ased on the historical tradition of
Croatian statehood, the Independent State of Croatia [NDH] was established
during World War II’.36 Even the post-independence constitution identified the
NDH as one of the manifestations of Croatia’s historic statehood in its
preamble. It insisted that the NDH was responsible for ‘laying the foundations
of state sovereignty’.
Finally, the integration of the émigrés into Croatian society demanded that
they be made to feel at home. One of the most distasteful ways that Tuœman
proposed to do this was by deciding that the remains of Croats killed in the
Bleiburg massacre of 1945 (which included perpetrators of the Usta°a terror)
should be buried at Jasenovac alongside the remains of their victims in a mem-
orial to all Croats killed in war.37 Not surprisingly, these plans caused uproar in
Croatia and the government also came under immense international pressure,
particularly from the USA. The crisis was resolved when Tuœman ‘discovered’
that among the bones already at Jasenovac were some returned from Bleiburg
after the war, so no bodies needed to be exhumed and moved.38
The émigrés were made to feel welcome in their homeland by the changing
of street names. A Zagreb street called ‘December Victims Street’ in commem-
oration of sixteen Croatian intellectuals hanged by the NDH in December 1943
was renamed ‘St Peter’s Street’.39 Mile Budak, the Usta°a Vice-President, had the
former Duro Salaj Street named after him (Salaj had been a prominent anti-
fascist fighter in the Second World War).40 The ‘Victims of Fascism Square’ in
the centre of Zagreb became the ‘Square of Croatian Heroes’, and across
Croatia thousands of streets, buildings and squares that were formerly named
after anti-fascist fighters were renamed after Croatian ‘heroes’, many of whom
had participated in the NDH abomination.41 After receiving protests about the
removal of the names of famous anti-fascists from street names, Defence
Minister Gojko ‡u°ak retorted that there was no anti-fascism in Croatia because
during the NDH period there was no fascist party.42
The rehabilitation of the émigrés and NDH was the most controversial
aspect of the ‘Franjoist’ project. Rather than emphasising the anti-fascist ele-
ments of Croatian national identity, personified by his own past, Tuœman chose
to attempt to unify the Croatian nation by emphasising its anti-communism at
the expense of accommodating those most ardent of anti-communists, the
fascists. This accommodation provoked many commentators to question
Tuœman’s political integrity.
Three additional Franjoist themes informed some of the government’s key
policies and shaped its conception of national identity. Each depended on a
particular understanding of Croatian national identity and drew upon a parti-
cular interpretation of the historical statehood narrative. These were the focus
on the primacy of Croatian sovereignty and independence, an exclusivist
approach to citizenship, and the promotion of conservative clericalism.
Protecting the sovereignty and independence of Croatia was the one issue
that united the disparate strands of the HDZ. This unity was only preserved
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through a contradictory discourse of sovereignty that described it, on different
occasions, as either the sovereignty of the Croatian territory or the sovereignty
of an ethnically defined Croatian nation.43 According to Tuœman, without the
HDZ the dream of an independent and sovereign Croatia could not have been
realised.44 It is not clear, however, whether that independent and democratic
Croatia was constituted by its Yugoslav boundaries or whether Croatia extended
to all those places where Croats lived. In a message to Croatia’s Serbs delivered
on the eve of Operation Oluja in 1995, 45 Tuœman seemed to suggest that he
equated Croatian sovereignty with the territory of the Republic of Croatia. He
noted that ‘all the attempts of the Croatian state and the international
community to peacefully restore Croatia’s sovereignty over parts of Croatian
territories alienated by the rebellion have been rejected’ and thereby equated the
limits of Croatian sovereignty with what was accepted by international society. 46
Similarly, after signing the Dayton Agreement, Tuœman announced that the
‘great and holy aim’ of the Croatian people was the attainment of ‘total sover-
eignty over its entire, internationally recognised territory’.47
The President was occasionally less reticent about the limits of sovereignty,
according it to the Croatian nation rather than the territorial boundaries of the
state and focusing particularly on the Croats in western Hercegovina. Tuœman’s
stance on the Bosnian question caused Croatia to be frequently rebuked by
international society. Tuœman was clumsy at best in his dealings with the Bosnian
question. In an infamous meeting with Milo°eviç in 1991, he raised the possibility
of dividing Bosnia and Hercegovina between Serbia and Croatia. What Tuœman
overlooked was the fact that Milo°eviç himself had never publicly mentioned
the possibility of partitioning Bosnia and Hercegovina.48 In 1995, Tuœman aston-
ished the British politician Paddy Ashdown when he drew a map on a napkin
showing a Bosnia and Hercegovina that had been partitioned between Croatia
and Serbia.49
There were two main reasons for Tuœman’s ambiguous stance towards
Bosnia and Hercegovina. First, the so-called Hercegovinian lobby provided the
President with valuable economic and political support and in return secured
several top positions within the HDZ government, forcing Tuœman to take an
active interest in Hercegovinian affairs.50 Second, Tuœman believed that he was
president of all Croats, so he felt obliged to shepherd the strategic interests of his
extended flock across the border. His historical research told him that ‘Croatia
and Bosnia constitute a geographical and political unity, and have always
formed a joint state in history’,51 though he was never clear on exactly when
Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina shared the same state. The President also
appreciated the nationalist activism of the Hercegovinian Croats, whose zeal for
fulfilling his national dream was not shared by many Croats in Croatia –
particularly the Istrians and citizens of Zagreb, as we will see in the following
chapters. During a visit to Mostar, the principal city in Western Hercegovina,
Tuœman told his audience that ‘you Hercegovinians are the ideal to all others in
Croatia in many aspects’.52 In calling the Hercegovinians ‘ideal Croats’, Tuœman
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was crediting their political judgement. Allowed to vote in the Croatian elec-
tions, the approximately 365,000 Croats of Bosnia and Hercegovina voted
consistently in favour of the HDZ.53 However, this position towards the Herce-
govinian Croats formed only half of the paradox of HDZ’s position on Croatian
sovereignty. Therefore, the government fell short of openly and consistently
advocating the secession of Hercegovina, attempted (unconvincingly) to distance
itself from the Croat–Muslim war of 1993, and after 1995 supported cross-
border ties with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo.
The HDZ’s interpretation of the historical statehood narrative and its
understanding of Croatian national identity also prompted it to adopt a parti-
cular position on the citizenship question. Although the constitution defined
the state in national terms, this was not done at the expense of the rights of
people of other nationalities residing in Croatia. Article 1 of the constitution
proclaimed that ‘in the Republic of Croatia power derives from the people as a
community of free and equal citizens’. This community, we were told, consisted
not only of Croats but also of ‘Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks,
Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others’.54 Clearly, such a formulation did not fit
with the HDZ’s belief that the Croatian state was intimately linked to the
Croatian nation and the HDZ itself as the party of all Croats, but was necessary
to persuade other states that Croatia was prepared to fulfil its international
human rights obligations. The government therefore passed a citizenship law
which, according to one observer, ‘allow[ed] selective application of the right to
citizenship based on whether the applicant is of Croatian or Serb nationality’ in
contravention of the constitution.55 The UN’s special rapporteur, Elisabeth
Rehn, noted that Article 8 of the Law on Citizenship demanded proof of con-
tinuous residence in Croatia of at least five years and ‘proficiency in the
Croatian and Latin script’.56 Rehn found evidence that this was being used to
deny citizenship to Serbs and Muslims, many of whom had been long-time
residents in Croatia.57 Additionally, Article 26 of the law allowed the Ministry of
Interior to employ broad discretion in denying an application for citizenship on
the grounds of the ‘interests of the state’.58 Similarly, the Croatian Helsinki
Human Rights Watch group showed that the law stipulated that people not
born in Croatia, nor of Croatian parentage, should be denied citizenship.59 The
Helsinki group argued that this provision did not take into account the fact that
Croatia was formerly part of Yugoslavia. People who had lived and worked in
Croatia for the best part of their adult lives were therefore denied citizenship
and thus employment and property ownership rights.60 While not denying the
constitutional rights of Serbs to be citizens of the Croatian state, the law did
represent an attempt to define the Croatian state as a manifestation of Croatian
national identity. This position reflected a particular understanding of the
historical statehood narrative which viewed statehood as a political
manifestation of an ethnic Croatian community rather than viewing the nation
as one constituted by the state and thus defined as simply consisting of those
people who inhabited the territory of the medieval kingdom.
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The HDZ’s interpretation of the historical statehood thesis was also evident
in its overt clericalism. While Orthodoxy shaped the Serb national conscious-
ness, Catholicism did not play a significant role in the historic statehood thesis.61
Indeed, national heroes, such as Jelaïiç, Archbishop Strossmayer and Stjepan
Radiç, either vehemently opposed clericalism (Radiç), promoted ecumenicalism
(Strossmayer) or emphasised the political rather than religious and ethnic nature
of the nation (Jelaïiç). Tuœman, however, propagated clericalism and promoted
the Catholic Church as the moral conscience of his Croatian nation in order to
differentiate Croats from the Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Yugoslavists, and hence
provide a foundation for a unified Croatia. He began by rehabilitating Arch-
bishop Alojzije Stepinac from the ostracism of communist historiography. Tuœman
argued that Stepinac had been the shepherd of the Croatian flock during the
troubled years of the Second World War and had helped many Serbs, Jews and
Croatian opponents of the regime to escape the fascists. Stepinac’s status as a
martyr to the Croatian cause was exemplified by his trial and imprisonment and
by his ceaseless attempts to protect the clergy from communist purges.62 In his
1996 State of the Nation address, Tuœman identified the establishment of good
relations with the Vatican as a cornerstone of his foreign policy.63
The HDZ’s clericalism did not bring the nation together, however. Polls
conducted before 1991 showed that Croatia had the lowest proportion of
religious believers of all the Yugoslav republics.64 Furthermore, policies that
were inspired by the HDZ’s clericalism, such as strict abortion laws, met with
considerable opposition and resentment, especially among the urban young in
Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Osijek and Dubrovnik. The slogan, ‘Even a Foetus is a
Little Croat’, designed to expose the connection between rigid Catholicism and
‘good’ Croatianism, did little to further the cause of Franjoism among liberal
Croats.65 Furthermore, the Church–HDZ union produced many instances of
religious intolerance and the presence of priests among the HDZ’s representa-
tives did much to discredit Catholicism.66
The HDZ, a broad coalition of nationalists with Tuœman as the linchpin,
therefore attempted to transplant its own unity of thought on the subject of the
Croatian nation on to the nation itself. Observers pointed out that Tuœman was
perpetually struggling to restrain the more extreme elements of his party who
wished to extend Croatia into Hercegovina and create an ethnically pure and
Catholic state.67 According to his political opponents, in attempting to bridge
the differences between Croats and create the myth of a common yearning for
statehood, Tuœman made too many concessions to extremists and expatriates.
This left him hamstrung on a number of issues. Tuœman, the anti-fascist, never
publicly distanced himself from the NDH. Widely credited with going to great
lengths to avoid the 1991 war with the JNA,68 he was seen to vacillate over the
Croat–Muslim war in 1993. The HDZ failed to transform the abstract historical
narrative of the ‘centuries-old dream’ into a less abstract and materially
resonant narrative of contemporary Croatian national identity with which
different Croats could associate.69
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The so-called ‘Zagreb crisis’ shows that the HDZ thought that there were
times when the cause of national unity demanded that democracy be subverted
to prevent its (and thus Croatia’s) enemies coming to power. In the 1995 local
assembly elections, the opposition secured thirty-one of the fifty seats in the
Zagreb municipal council. Tuœman was faced with the possibility of an oppo-
sition mayor in the economically vital capital city and feared that an opposition
council would take too much of an interest in the HDZ’s financial affairs.70 At
the very least, property and institutional services previously at the disposal of
the HDZ would become tools for the opposition. Tuœman invoked a national
security clause in the constitution that allowed him to veto the appointment of
top officials. He rejected four opposition choices for mayor of Zagreb and named
his own commissioner to run the capital’s affairs.71 This was justified by two
typically Franjoist arguments. First, Milan Ivkosiç, writing in the government-
friendly newspaper Hrvatski Obzor,72 argued that the immature opposition
parties were acting undemocratically because the HDZ was the single largest
party in Zagreb and should therefore have the right to select the mayor.73
Second, Tuœman explained that his actions represented those of a caring father
forced to do unpleasant things to protect an errant child from itself:
It is important that our public understands that the situation in which Croatia finds
itself regarding the problems of the liberation of the remaining occupied territories
and the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina is such that we cannot allow that sort of
opposition which would rock Croatia’s stability to take root in the city of Zagreb,
capital of Croatia where a quarter of the Croatian population live.74
A political threat to the HDZ was thus reconstituted as a threat to the stability of
Croatia itself.
Much of the HDZ’s rhetoric was imbued with the language of war, threat
and instability. Throughout the 1990s, illiberal measures were justified by the
necessities of war. The war ended in 1995 and the last piece of territory admini-
stered by the UN (UNTAES) was returned to Croatian administration in January
1997. However, the HDZ failed to reinvent itself. Instead, Tuœman embarked
on a search for new enemies for the (right-minded) Croatian people to unite
against. This constant threat required the unity and vigilance of the Croatian
people mobilised through the HDZ.
The Franjoist project of national integration continued after the war
through the construction of new threats for the nation to unite against. On one
level, Franjoist rhetoric could be construed as being little other than the
employment of rhetoric to accommodate disparate groups in a nationalist
movement. Each of the pillars of Franjoism can be seen as appealing to different
sections of the HDZ and its policies were designed to reinforce the ruling party’s
power. Certainly, this instrumental account can explain why Tuœman, the
former Partisan, included the rehabilitation of fascists within his political dis-
course. It also explains his paradoxical views on Hercegovina and the dualism
deployed in his discourse on sovereignty. However, many observers described
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Tuœman as a ‘true believer’ of nationalist rhetoric. He was both its founder
through his historical writings and its guardian against anti-Croatian tenden-
cies. He did not, however, persuade all other Croats that the Franjoist account
of their national identity was the real manifestation of their centuries of shared
statehood. Despite claiming to bridge the cleavages within Croatian society, he
defined those cleavages narrowly, as being only those between fascism and
communism. He was vehemently opposed to internal regionalism for instance,
because this posed a challenge to his carefully constructed unity. He also used
all the bureaucratic power of the state to silence those who claimed that he was
not a good shepherd of the Croatian flock and was not even a particularly
important character in the play of Croatian history. One of the reasons why
Tuœman’s Franjoist account of national identity remained dominant through-
out the 1990s was precisely that there were so many alternative accounts. There
was no single alternative that stood in opposition to Franjoism. The rest of this
chapter will consider these other accounts showing how they made different use
of the frames provided by the historical statehood thesis.
Opposition voices: political parties
In contrast to the ideas of national unity articulated by Franjoists, opposition
politics was highly fragmented in the 1990s and failed to offer a cohesive
counter-narrative. One of the central points of dispute among opposition parties
was the question of how they should relate to Tuœman’s HDZ. On the one
hand, the eventual partners in the winning coalition of the 2000 parliamentary
elections, Ivica Raïan of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Dra¥en Budi°a
of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (Hrvatska Socijalno Liberalna Stranka –
HSLS) advocated a co-operative approach to the HDZ to ensure a peaceful
transition from HDZ governance. Others, such as Vlado Gotovac of the Liberal
Party (Liberalna Stranka – LS), and the leaderships of the Istrian Democratic
Assembly (Istarska Demokratska Sabor – IDS), Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS)
and Croatian People’s Party (Hrvatska Narodna Stranka – HNS), suspected that
any dialogue with Tuœman would be unproductive and would only reinforce
the President’s claim to democratic credentials.75
Opposition politics had two important features in the 1990s. First, opposi-
tion politics operated in a hostile environment. The HDZ was better funded,
controlled the media and manipulated the electoral system to its own advantage.
The second characteristic was fragmentation. Opposition parties organised
themselves into coalitions that tended to change from election to election. In
the 1991 elections the Croatian Peoples Party headed by the leaders of the 1971
‘Croatian Spring’, Savka Dabïeviç-Kuïar and Mika Tripalo, joined with the
HSLS to form the Coalition for National Accord. The socialists formed a second
coalition, and the nationalist Party of Rights (HSP) joined with the HDZ to
form a third coalition.76 In 1997 the HSLS was joined by the more conservative-
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minded Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS), while the HNS joined with the SDP, as
did the newly formed Croatian Independent Democrats (HND), which was
established by HDZ defectors Stipe Mesiç and Josip Manoliç. More often than
not, it was clashes of personality rather than policy differences that caused the
coalitions to change, though the overriding factors were the questions of rela-
tions with the HDZ and the electoral success or failure of each coalition. Within
this context of shifting alliances there were broadly four groups of parties. These
were: extreme nationalists, socialists, liberals, and regional and centrist parties.
The HSP, founded by the extreme nationalist, Dobroslav Paraga, claimed
to be the direct descendent of the nineteenth-century party with the same
name, which had been established by Starïeviç and Kvaternik.77 It insisted that
the Croatian people had an inalienable right to their own state, a right that drew
directly from the historical statehood narrative. It was even more radical than
the HDZ in calling for Croatian independence, a unitary national state and the
revision of the republic’s borders. Paraga was himself jailed in 1980 for
collecting signatures demanding the release of political prisoners. In the eleven
years following this he came to embrace many of the ideas and organisational
facets of the pre-war Usta°a movement, even becoming a self-proclaimed
fascist.78 Paraga demanded ‘Hrvatska do Drine’ (Croatia to the Drina), which
meant that the HSP advocated the revision of borders so that Bosnia and
Hercegovina, up to its River Drina border with Serbia, could be incorporated
into Croatia – something that not even the fascist Usta°a state had achieved.
This policy drew directly on Starïeviç’s observation that the Bosnian Muslims
were simply Muslim Croats, and that the Bosnian (and Croatian) Serbs were
merely Orthodox Croats. Interestingly, the far-right HSP concentrated on
matters of religion and ethnicity much less than the HDZ did. For Paraga, the
Croats were an explicitly political nation, incorporating all the peoples and
territories of the farthest reaches of the medieval kingdom, regardless of their
religion or ethnicity.
The HSP was a vociferous opponent of the proposed partition of Bosnia
and Hercegovina, arguing that Croatia should enter into an immediate confeder-
ation with Bosnia and Hercegovina with a view to eventual union should the
people of Bosnia and Hercegovina assent to it. This was another of Starïeviç’s
legacies. As Starïeviç had done, the modern HSP argued that the ‘Serbs’ and
‘Muslims’ of Bosnia and Hercegovina would naturally come to recognise their
Croatianness over time. Therefore (while using Usta°a symbols and venerating
Paveliç) it insisted that the ethnic cleansing and genocide attempted by the Usta°a
was a crime against an ostensibly Croatian people. The HSP repudiated attempts
to carve out an ethnically ‘pure’ state of Herceg-Bosna in Western Hercegovina.
This led to a major division within the extreme right wing and the creation of
another Party of Rights, HSP – 1861, which aligned itself more closely with the
Frankist and Usta°a traditions of violent pursuit of ethnic purity.79
Paraga’s party imitated the paramilitary structures of the Usta°a. The HSP
attracted the same sort of disaffected youths that had joined Paveliç’s movement
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and organised them into the Hrvatske Obrambene Snage (Croat Defence Forces
– HOS), an armed paramilitary group. Paraga’s men helped in the defence of
Vukovar, which brought him into conflict with Tuœman. Because he insisted
that every centimetre of Croatian land should be defended to the last man,
Paraga believed that the government’s failure to organise the relief of Vukovar
was tantamount to treason. Clearly, there could have been nothing more danger-
ous to Tuœman’s nationalist credentials than to be accused of being unpatriotic.80
A year later, Paraga dispatched his HOS forces to Bosnia and Hercegovina to
defend the Croatian people and work with the Bosnian government forces
fighting the Serbs. He believed that it was incongruous for the Bosnian Croats
to fight the Bosnian Muslims because that meant allying with the real enemy,
the Serbs. When fighting broke out between Croats and Muslims, he ordered
his forces not to co-operate with the official HVO forces and was subsequently
arrested on terrorist charges. Tuœman denounced him as an Usta°a fascist and
forcibly integrated the HOS into the HVO (the Croatian Defence Committee –
the ‘offical’ Bosnian Croat army).81
According to HSP spokesman, Vlado Jukiç, the fundamental problem that
confronted Croatian politics in the 1990s was not that Tuœman was too strong
(on occasions, as in Vukovar and Bosnia and Hercegovina, he was not strong
enough), but rather that the opposition was too weak.82 Jukiç considered Tuœ-
man’s national narrative to be too broadly defined and argued that it should
have focused solely on the right of Croatian statehood. According to Jukiç, the
other opposition parties were ‘pseudo-liberals and former communists’ who
were more interested in criticising the HDZ than in securing the Croatian
state.83 The HSP’s veneration of the Usta°a allowed Tuœman to harass and
impede it in ways that he could not do with the other parties. The reason for this
over-zealous response to what was an electorally small party was that the HSP
criticised Tuœman on his own Franjoist terms. According to the HSP, Tuœman
was neither an ultimate patriot, strong leader, nor trustworthy historian. None
of the other opposition parties attempted to offer an alternative account based
upon Franjoism. Instead they argued that Franjoism itself constituted a
distortion of the historic statehood narrative.
The Social Democrats (SDP) distanced themselves from their communist
past by tracing their roots to the tiny Social Democratic Party of Croatia and
Slavonia, formed in 1894. This party was marginalised by the communists and
then abolished in 1941.84 The modern SDP had its antecedents in two movements.
The first was the liberal reformist movement within the Croatian League of
Communists. At the League’s congress in January 1990 the reformists won a
majority and called for immediate democratic elections in Croatia. The second
developed outside the League of Communists in the guise of the Social Demo-
cratic Party of Croatia (SDH), under the leadership of Antun Vujiç. Initially, the
SDH opposed the SDP, viewing it as the perpetrator of a one-party state, but in
1993 both parties came together within the SDP under the leadership of Ivica
Raïan.85 The SDP had to conduct a difficult balancing act, distancing itself from
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the former communist regime while maintaining the good will of its traditional
supporters, many of whom accepted political pluralism only grudgingly.86
Furthermore, the SDP was the only Croatian majority party that contained a
large number of Serbs. This cleavage was made more troublesome by the fact
that most Serb members of the SDP opposed pluralism while most Croats
advocated it.87 These cleavages were at the very heart of the social democratic
movement and almost resulted in the stillbirth of Croatian democratisation in
1990 when there was an attempt to bring down the liberal wing of the party and
impose a purge of the kind witnessed in the ‘Croatian Spring’ of 1971.88
These problems were resolved when most Serbs left the party to join the
separatist Serb nationalist parties, allowing the SDP to become more overtly
Croatian-centric and politically pluralist. At its inception, the SDP-SDH’s views
on national identity were full of ambiguity and contradiction. Initially, it sought
to emphasise the positive role it played as the former ruling party in carrying
out the peaceful reform of the communist system and allowing free elections. It
also stressed its independence from the other Yugoslav communists and especially
from Milo°eviç. In the first election, the SDP-SDH advocated the maintenance
of the Yugoslav federation, although it was alone among the Croatian parties in
doing so. As more Serbs joined the Serbian nationalist parties, the SDP-SDH
revised its position and advocated the confederal ideas espoused by other
parties. It is interesting to note that the official literature produced by the SDP
in the run-up to the 2000 elections, in which it became Croatia’s largest party,
insisted that the party had always advocated confederalism.89
The leader of the SDP, Ivica Raïan, has a reputation as a liberal-minded
social democrat.90 According to Raïan, the state has a responsibility to look after
the social welfare of the people who helped and suffered in the fight to establish
an independent state.91 Raïan focused on the social and economic emancipa-
tion of the peoples in the Croatian state. For him, the central political goals were
‘enhanced economic growth and a greater degree of social security’.92 Agreeing
with the liberals and the regional parties, the SDP argued that Croatia should
integrate into the European Union (EU) as soon as possible.93
The cleavages within the SDP were most obviously exposed by the national
question. Raïan was adamant in his support for the independence and terri-
torial integrity of Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina. He was also keen to
reiterate the SDP’s multinational traditions, insisting that the ‘SDP has always
been a multiethnic party which is sensitive to the issues surrounding the pro-
tection and integration of ethnic minority communities in Croatia’.94 However,
he has been criticised for not being critical enough of Croatian nationalism.
Noting that it had supported Operation Oluja, Bogdan Denitch criticises the
party not only for not challenging nationalism but also for exhibiting nationalist
tendencies itself.95 Furthermore, Denitch notes that by displaying implicit
nationalist tendencies, the SDP had betrayed its core interest in the social
welfare of the Croatian people since, he claims, the Croats lost the most through
the demise of Yugoslavia.96
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Because the SDP remained uneasy about its own communist history it was
unable to constitute itself as a patriotic party on its own terms, as the liberal and
centrist parties did. In order to portray itself as patriotic it desisted from
criticising Tuœman and actively supported the government abroad. On one
occasion a delegation from the SDP attempted to persuade the European
Parliament not to pass a resolution that condemned the Croatian government
for its human rights record.97
By the time of the parliamentary election in January 2000, however, the
SDP had almost completely reconstituted itself. Because the key issues at this
election were more closely akin to the ‘normal’ issues of European democratic
politics – the economy, welfare and so on – the SDP was able to present itself as
the most patriotic party. While the return of Serbian refugees to Croatia, and
co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY) remained vexed
questions, they were no longer as significant as the questions of unemployment
and the standard of living – questions on which only the SDP had a long track
record of activism. Thus, in the 2000 elections the SDP became the single largest
party and its leader, Ivica Raïan, was appointed Prime Minister.
Of all the opposition parties, the SDP was least certain in articulating a
Croatian national narrative. This was because historically the SDP had a large
number of Serbs within its leadership. However, since most of the Serbs left the
party and because the SDP needed to attract Croatian voters, it had to appear
patriotic. It did this by defending what it believed were Croatia’s interests even
at the expense of defending the HDZ and de-emphasising some of the other
central tenets of its political programme such as multinationalism. This
approach saw it climb from virtual extinction in the middle of the 1990s to
being the largest party in Croatia in the first post-Tuœman elections.
The liberal parties were undoubtedly the parties of the Croatian intelli-
gentsia. The three most prominent members of the liberal movement, Dra¥en
Budi°a, Vlado Gotovac and Ivo Banac, were all well-known academics, and
were all considered to be dissidents during the communist era. With the arrival
of democracy, ‘the Liberals were then the showcase of Croatia – all the bearded
intelligentsia, all the liberal professors of sociology, artists, feminists, even
anarchists’.98 In other words, the liberals were the ‘chattering classes’ of Croatian
urban society, ‘interested in Croatia as a modern, yet decidedly Mitteleuropean
country’.99 For the liberals (as for Tuœman), Croatia was meant to be everything
that Yugoslavia was not. It would be a modern, free and democratic state based
on romantic visions of what it was to be Western European.100 However, despite
having the same rhetorical orientation as the HDZ, the liberals looked upon
Tuœman’s party with disdain, seeing it as little other than a populist manifes-
tation.
Founded in 1989, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) was the first
non-communist political party to be established in Croatia after the Second
World War. It contained two distinct wings from the outset: the singularly
liberal and nationalist-populist. As with the HDZ, the different wings of the
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party were reconciled by their president, Dra¥en Budi°a.101 The first HSLS
programmes focused on the economy, privatisation and wealth creation.102 Its
core principles were those of classical liberalism. The HSLS argued that, ‘free is
the community in which every individual is free and socially secure’.103 Its vision
for Croatia was one of liberal democracy, social cohesion, the inalienable rights
of the individual, the limitation of government, the principle of demilitarisa-
tion, and the need for open and tolerant dialogue between different interest
groups.104 On the national question, the HSLS advocated respect for the human
and civil rights of the Serb minority, although it did not emphasise this as much
as the SDP. Being an explicitly Croatian party, the HSLS described the areas of
Croatia held by the Serbs as occupied territories and after Operation Oluja sent
Tuœman a note of congratulation.105 As with the other opposition parties, the
HSLS saw the Croatian polity as extending only to the republic’s border and not
to all Croats wherever they lived. It viewed the nation in liberal terms as a
diverse group of individuals. The HSLS advocated the decentralisation of power
and the promoted regionalism as a way of combating the national homogeni-
sation pursued by the HDZ.106
Dra¥en Budi°a had good nationalist credentials. He was the leader of the
Croatian League of Students during the ‘Croatian Spring’ and was sentenced to
three years in jail for his anti-regime activities.107 According to Budi°a, the HSLS
was the ‘party of the third direction’, which charted a path between socialism
and conservatism.108 This ‘third way’ drew upon Radiç’s legacy and a tradition
of Croatian middle-class thinking that was developing at the turn of the
twentieth century. Budi°a gave the HSLS a confident national outlook, arguing
that the liberals played a vital role in securing independence for Croatia and that
they most accurately reflected the aspirations and history of the Croatian
people.109 Budi°a argued that the rule of law should provide equality of oppor-
tunity and that the core principle of governance should be subsidiarity, allowing
individuals to shape the national destiny rather than the other way around.
The party split following disastrous election results in 1997, in which the
HSLS secured only one seat in the Sabor. Many of the leading members followed
Vlado Gotovac into the new Liberal Party (LS). One of the defectors, Ivo Banac,
accused Budi°a of legitimising Tuœman’s rule by forming what he described as a
‘normal opposition’ that treated the HDZ as a ‘normal’ democratic government
by co-operating with it.110 The split in the HSLS, while ostensibly about the level
of co-operation with the HDZ, was more fundamentally concerned with the
place of the nation within liberal political programmes. For Budi°a, the
relationship between the nation and liberalism was mutually constitutive and
the defence of liberalism demanded the defence of the nation. For the Gotovac
faction, however, placing the national collective at the centre of the political
programme implied a devaluation of the individual and thus a denigration of a
view of the nation as a group of diverse individuals pursuing their interests.111
The President of the Liberal Party, Vlado Gotovac, was a poet, essayist,
philosopher and journalist. He was jailed for four years for his part in the
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‘Croatian Spring’, and was given a further two years in jail for giving an inter-
view on Croatia to a Swedish television network. During this period, Gotovac
published work with Franjo Tuœman.112 Gotovac defended the importance of
the nation, because – contra Tuœman – the existence of nations implied differ-
ence and ‘diversity makes the world more interesting’.113
The core principles of the LS were almost identical to those of the HSLS,
though with a more pronounced emphasis on the individual. According to a
declaration adopted at the end of the party’s founding congress, individual free-
dom meant ‘freedom from compulsion’ and the interference of state authori-
ties.114 Stronger emphasis was put on limiting state power, individual equality
before the law, and the proper functioning of a liberal economy.115 These principles,
it claimed, drew from a Central European tradition within Croatian political
thought that had not previously been articulated in Croatia, because it was
subject to alien and illiberal rule. Much of its programme was concerned with
ensuring individual rights and criticising the government’s record. It argued
that ‘Croatia is today centralised, bureaucratic and metropolised’, there was ‘no
public opinion’, and what public opinion there was ‘cannot have influence on
either resignation of any minister or any serious consequence or social treatment’.116
The tension between political programme and national narrative, which
caused the ambiguity within the SDP programme, also caused the fragmen-
tation of the liberals into two parties. The HSLS tended to locate liberalism
within a prior narrative of the Croatian nation and was therefore mute on the
question of what the idea of a liberal Croatian nation meant in relation to
Franjoism. This was because the HSLS chose not to challenge the HDZ’s national
narrative, only the government’s specific practices. In contrast, the radical
liberals who joined the LS refuted Franjoism’s national ideology, contested its
ownership of the Croatian political tradition, and rejected the legitimacy of
HDZ rule. The LS could claim to be as ‘Croatian’ as the HDZ in a way that the
SDP could not and the HSLS chose not to because of its adherence to the Fran-
joist national narrative. The leaders of the LS had as good a record of Yugoslav
dissidence as Tuœman. They argued that the legacy of Croatian political thought
was liberal and Central European and should have produced a political vision of
national identity rather than one based on ethnicity, religion and language.
Along with the Party of Rights (HSP), the other party that could claim a
direct antecedent in pre-communist Croatia was the Croatian Peasants’ Party
(HSS). The HSS resumed its activities in 1992. It was the leading party in the so-
called ‘group of four’ (a coalition with HNS, LS and IDS) coalition that came
third in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Like the HSP, the Peasants’ Party
attempted to emulate is predecessor both organisationally and ideationally.
According to Vladko Maïek, one of the strongest elements of the party’s pre-
war organisation had been its activity at the grassroots level.117 Accordingly, the
contemporary HSS put a great deal of effort into building a network of local
organisations, which saw it increase in popularity from its first election where it
won only 4 per cent of the vote.118
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The HSS advocated decentralisation of the state and the democratisation of
local government as ways of promoting participation in politics. It combined
Radiç’s anti-clerical nationalism with a revised citizen-oriented republicanism
that contested many of the conclusions reached by the Franjoists.119 Because of
its conservative orientation, it concurred with the HDZ’s handling of the war
effort but disagreed with the idea of annexing parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
The HSS believed that Tuœman hindered progress towards the democratic
republic aspired to by Radiç. This was clearly a major problem for Tuœman,
who, like the liberals, had to make a leap of interpretation when claiming to
represent the views of Radiç, while the HSS did not have to make such a leap. To
have the HSS identify Tuœman (rather than Serbs) as the major obstacle to ful-
filling Radiç’s dream was understandably damaging to the Franjoist project.120
The Croatian Independent Democrats (HND) were produced by defections
from the HDZ engineered by two leading members, Josip Manoliç – former
President of the House of Counties – and Stipe Mesiç, the last President of the
SFRY (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) and former President of the
Croatian House of Representatives, the central legislative branch of the Sabor.
They argued that Gojko ‡u°ak and Franjo Tuœman had taken the HDZ away
from its core principles of freedom and democracy towards authoritarianism.
Manoliç and Mesiç claimed to offer solutions to the Serbian and Bosnian
problems that were more prudent than the policies espoused by the right wing
of the HDZ. According to Mesiç, Tuœman was seduced by the powerful right
wing of the party, which tended towards ‘Bolshevik’ practices. The ruling party,
he claimed, had closed Croatia in behind a ‘Balkan wall’ of totalitarianism that
prevented its progress into Europe.121 In response, Tuœman argued that it was
inevitable that there would be ‘turncoats’, because the HDZ was a movement
encompassing every strand of Croatian opinion.122 The HND countered by
insisting that by 1993 Franjoism had begun to destroy its own principles. Most
importantly, the very things it fought for in Croatia it was denying to Bosnia
and Hercegovina, and the very things it opposed during communism, such as
restrictions on the media and freedom of speech, had become characteristic
features of the new regime.
The most radical rearticulation of Croatian national identity by an oppo-
sition party was produced by the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). The IDS
was originally formed to protect the interests of the Istrian region against what
it saw as homogenising Croatianism emanating from Zagreb. It was ideologi-
cally oriented towards the liberals and participated in coalitions with the HSLS.
It was distinct inasmuch as it demanded the federalisation of Croatia. National
identity in Istria is mixed between Croats, Slovenes and Italians, but tends to be
subsumed by regional identity. The 1991 Yugoslav census offered the popula-
tion the opportunity to describe themselves as one of 25 nationalities, as
‘Yugoslav’ or ‘regional’. In Istria, ‘despite the Croatian government’s efforts to
infect Istria with its own virulent nationalism, the townspeople registered the
highest number of “regionals” anywhere in the federation: 36 per cent’.123 The
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IDS became dominant on the peninsula, controlling all the local authorities and
pressing its case for regional autonomy.124 The IDS programme constituted a
major threat to Franjoism because it involved a large group of Croats denying
the idea of national homogeneity and claiming a separate history for themselves
and the right to determine their own destiny (see Chapter 6).
The government responded harshly to the IDS threat. On the one hand, it
contained the IDS within Istria by denying it access to the national media.125 On
the other, it portrayed the Istrians as not being ‘true Croats’ and the IDS as
being engaged in a programme of ‘de-Croatisation’ in Istria. In order to bolster
its position, the government attempted to resettle Croatian immigrants from
the USA, South America, Australia, Germany and Bosnia and Hercegovina, in
Istria. Because the Croatian diaspora is generally thought to be radically
nationalist, it was intended that its influx would diminish Istrian regionalism
and ‘Croatianise’ the region.126 However, the scheme was less than popular among
the diaspora and the number of people who ‘returned’ to Istria was relatively
small.
The IDS was the only major opposition party in Croatia to fundamentally
challenge the historical statehood narrative. The other parties made use of the
frames provided by this narrative to challenge Tuœman’s interpretation of it
and the place that he awarded himself within it. For instance, the HSP drew
directly from the teachings of Starïeviç and the writings of Usta°a ideologues
such as Mile Budak. In doing so, it was able to argue that Tuœman was not the
modern manifestation of Starïeviç because he was not radical enough in his
defence of the Croatian state. Similarly, the HSS exposed how Franjoist rhetoric
and practice deviated from the teachings of the Radiç brothers by excluding
citizens from decision-making processes, contemplating the partition of Bosnia
and Hercegovina, adopting clericalist overtones and causing the impoverish-
ment of the many for the enrichment of the few. The other main parties argued
that far from Europeanising Croatia, Tuœman was responsible for its Balkani-
sation. While Tuœman claimed that Croatia belonged to the Central European
political sphere, he acted like a Balkan despot. Hence, it was claimed, Franjoism
had nothing to do with either the legacy of Croatian state-right or its political
and social culture and was thus self-defeating in its attempt to distance Croatia
from all things Yugoslav, as it was only through Franjoism that the two were
related. The IDS, however, argued that the twin notions of state-right and a
Croatian tradition of political thought were not applicable to Istria because the
peninsula had a history and political culture that was distinct from that of
Croatia proper.
Although opposition political parties provided the most significant organ-
ised opposition to Franjoism in the 1990s, they were not the only source of
opposition. Another, more radical, source of opposition were dissident intellec-
tuals. There were many such writers, including Roman Ratkoviç, Boris Buden
and Dubravka Ugre°iç, but there is only space here to consider two as indicative
of the types of challenges to dominant modes of thinking posed by dissident
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intellectuals. The first, Ivo Banac, radically re-evaluated political and historical
narratives about Croatian national identity. The second, Slavenka Drakuliç,
completely rejected such narratives and the political claims they supported.
Dissident voices: two intellectuals
According to Katherine Verdery, intellectuals across Eastern Europe were pro-
minent in articulating visions of national identity.127 In the nineteenth century,
Croatian intellectuals contributed to the national movements by questioning
the roots of people’s origins and tracing their genealogies.128 Intellectuals
questioned the languages people spoke, speculated about what languages they
ought to speak and articulated the recent political past in such a way as to
propose a way forward for the group.
Ivo Banac129 was a dissident during the communist era. His two most
important works, The National Question in Yugoslavia and With Stalin Against
Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, were heavily criticised by the
communists. The former explored how the idea of Yugoslavia manifested in the
pre-Second World War kingdom was contrary to the visions of both Croatian
Illyrianists and exclusivists. This work was condemned by the communists for
being nationalist and contrary to Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’ because it
suggested that the Yugoslavs had not solved the national question and high-
lighted tensions between the Croats and Serbs. The latter book was also
criticised for focusing on splits within the Yugoslav League of Communists and
suggesting that throughout the party’s history there was a large group of
Yugoslav communists who were overtly Stalinist. Unlike other dissidents, such
as Marko Veselica, Petar ‡egedin, Franjo Tuœman and Zlatko Tomiïiç, Ivo Banac
was not integrated into the new mainstream Croatian nationalist discourse in
the 1990s. The main reasons for this were his participation in the Croatian
Helsinki Human Rights Committee, which produced several reports that were
highly critical of the post-communist government, and his membership of the
HSLS and subsequently the LS.130
Although highly critical of the Tuœman government, Banac remained
judicious in his analysis. While aptly pointing out that ‘Tuœman is decidedly
not an Usta°a’ he noted that ‘unfortunately, the amateurishness of the new
administrations, their preoccupation with symbols and trivial matters, as well
as their populist politics, all notable especially in Croatia, have hampered a
more determined transition to democracy’.131 Banac argued that Franjoism
attempted to be all things to all Croats by purporting to be the manifestation of
a centuries-long tradition of political thought. The bulk of Banac’s work on
national identity, however, pointed to the differences within this tradition and
questioned whether any coherent themes arose from it. Banac’s work insisted
that the Franjoist ideology was a particular interpretation of this tradition, not
evidence of its unification.
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Public responses to Banac’s work were extremely critical. Zeljko Sabol
wrote that ‘it is Banac who despises the Croat people. This is the root of his
patronising attitude. Otherwise he wouldn’t have been so intolerant of “evil”
HDZ members’. Commenting on an interview Banac conducted in Feral
Tribune, Sabol proclaimed that, ‘Banac’s interview … seems like an outburst of
a man blinded by hate’.132 Elsewhere, Banac was accused of revising Croatian
history and indulging in ‘activities’ of a sexual nature with ‘Ïetnik’ women.133
The main reason for the vehemence of these attacks was that Banac’s work
challenged the historiography of Franjoism and the HDZ’s status within it.
It was Ivo Banac who first articulated the historicist nature of Croatian
national identity. In tracing literary and historical works that addressed the
Croatian national question, Banac showed that such works tended to make legal
rather than linguistic or cultural arguments.134 He accounted for this tendency
by suggesting that the early intellectuals and nobles believed that the idea of
historical statehood would carry more favour in the Habsburg and Magyar
courts.135 This predilection meant that the primary vehicles for national inte-
gration were the office of the Ban and the continuing institution of the Sabor.
However, Banac suggested that the diminishing jurisdiction of these two
institutions in the nineteenth century weakened the Croatian national body and
contributed to the diversity of national programmes that were disseminated on
the eve of the First World War (see Chapter 3).136 Furthermore, he argued that
because the nineteenth-century national imaginings were a direct response to
aggressive Magyar nationalism, the basis of ‘their national idea therefore could
not be, strictly speaking, Croatian’.137 Such ethnic exclusivism ‘could be mis-
understood as an expression of narrow Croatian regionalism – of the Kajkavian
dialect area around Zagreb, which was generally regarded as Croatia proper at
the beginning of the Nineteenth Century’.138
Banac made several important points about the early articulation of the
claim to historical statehood. The most prominent and oft cited of these con-
clusions was that the relationship between the Croatian nation and Catholicism
was not as clear-cut as some made out. Unlike the Serbian Orthodox Church,
the Catholic Church is an institution with a universalist yearning in that it hopes
to make all people Catholic. It cannot therefore be a national institution because
it does not promote national exclusivity. The borders of Catholicism and
Croatianism are different. Thus, Banac argued, Catholicism could not play a
significant role in either defining Croatian national identity or as a vehicle for its
preservation.139 He continued, ‘the ideologists of Croat nationhood, almost to the
last practicing Catholics, resisted the equation of Catholicism and Croatdom’.140
Banac argued that the idea of the Croatian political nation led to consider-
able confusion. For example, in the previous chapter we noted that Ante
Starïeviç argued that everybody who resided within the boundaries he drew for
Croatia were Croats. Banac argues that this did not mean that Starïeviç denied
the multinational character of the lands and espoused the kind of ‘final solution’
propagated by the Usta°a. Rather, ‘his Croats were a historical – indeed moral –
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community, not a community of blood. The borders of Croatia were set by
primary acquisition not by migrations of a linguistic community’.141 A Croat was
neither somebody who was Catholic nor somebody who spoke a particular dialect.
Instead, a Croat was simply anyone who lived on the territory of the Croatian state.
Croatian national ideologists opted for the historical statehood narrative
rather than a religious or ethnic discourse because such narratives were used
against Catholic Austrians, Venetians and Magyars and not against the Ortho-
dox Serbs or Muslims. This led to a strong emphasis on reciprocity among
Slavs, often at the expense of Croatian exclusivity. The parcelling out of
Croatian lands among different empires also produced the various regional
identities so loathed by Tuœman.142 One manifestation of this was the different
sentiments displayed by nationalists towards Dubrovnik. Banac argued that
during the early period of Croatian nationalism the veneration of the old
republic of Dubrovnik and in particular the literary works of Ivan Gunduliç
provided one of the key focal points for the movement.143 Conversely, however,
Dubrovnik became an irritation to some early nationalists precisely because of
its separateness. Banac pointed out that Starïeviç was most perplexed as to why
so many Croats venerated the idea of Dubrovnik, when its separateness cast
doubt on the city-republic’s relationship with the rest of Croatia.144
Banac did not try to uncover a unified historical narrative of Croatian
statehood, like those articulated by Stephen Gazi, Stanko Guldescu and Franjo
Tuœman. Instead, he chose to focus on particular writers who articulated
visions of Croatia and attempted to situate them within the various traditions of
Croatian national thinking.145 In one such work he concentrated upon the
writings of Pavao Vitezoviç, author of the famous article Croatia Rediviva, the
earliest work of the Illyrian tradition. Vitezoviç was the first writer of the post-
Roman era to envisage the idea of Illyria, a territory that for him spanned the
entire Balkan peninsula except for southern Greece.146 According to Banac,
during the period when Vitezoviç was writing (the seventeenth century), the
words ‘Croat’ and ‘Illyrian’ were common synonyms.147 It was through Vitezo-
viç that the idea of the reunification of the Croatian lands was first postulated.
Through the separation of the terms ‘Croat’ and ‘Illyrian’ the groundwork was
laid for the two key traditions in Croatian national thinking – the exclusivism of
Starïeviç and Kvaternik, and the Illyrianism of Gaj and Strossmayer.148 If we see
Vitezoviç as the earliest proponent of the Illyrian pan-Slavism that developed in
the nineteenth century, Banac’s study of Milan ‡ufflay represents an attempt to
articulate the vision of a key member of the exclusivist tradition. ‡ufflay, who
wrote most of his work during the period of the first Yugoslavia, articulated a
mnemonistic theory of nationhood, by which ‘the past (no matter how distant)
is at one with the present’.149 For ‡ufflay, to be a Yugoslavist was to be an enemy
of Croatdom because the Yugoslav idea distorted the relationship between past
and present, threatening nationhood from within.150 ‡ufflay’s vision was based
upon the right to statehood that emanated from the territorial existence of the
Croatian medieval state.
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A recurring theme in Banac’s work was the idea that notions of Croatian
nationhood derived from different traditions of thought that cannot be divorced
from their historical context. This dissident account of national historiography
had two key aspects that informed his political activism in the LS and challenged
Franjoism. First, through his extensive historical work on the Croatian claim to
historic statehood, it is possible to see how many opposition parties were able to
argue that their programmes drew legitimacy from the state-rights tradition
and a narrowly conceived conception of the historic statehood narrative. Banac
argued that there were two aspects of Franjoism that appeared to contradict the
historical statehood narrative as a basis for national identity, or at least as a basis
of Tuœman’s conception of what Croatian national identity meant. These were
the HDZ’s position on the role of the Catholic Church in the formation of
Croatian national identity, and the citizenship question, both discussed earlier.
The second key aspect of Banac’s challenge to Franjoism was his rejection of the
idea that there was a single tradition of thinking about the Croatian nation that
could be inherited by Tuœman or any other political leader. Throughout his
work, Banac located different writers in different traditions and constantly
reminded us that these thinkers articulated different accounts of Croatian
national identity. Banac’s approach focused upon difference and dispute. Because
of this he remained a dissident, described – as we saw earlier – as an enemy of
Croatia.
Most of Slavenka Drakuliç’s151 early works were fiction novels and short
stories. However, the collapse of communist Yugoslavia and the advent of war
in Croatia prompted her to question the impact of these events on the lives of
Croats, focusing especially on women’s experiences.152 Drakuliç’s first major work
of non-fiction was How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed. In the
1992 edition the author lamented the title of her work, observing that with the
ascendancy of Tuœman, Milo°eviç and war, ‘we have not yet survived commun-
ism, and there is nothing to laugh about’.153 Viewed from Drakuliç’s perspective,
the failure of communism in Yugoslavia could be attributed to its failure to
provide for the basic needs of women, such as sanitary towels and make-up. This
systemic failure made a mockery of the equation of socialism with emancipation
and therefore alienated most women.154 However, there were no mass movements
or protests demanding democracy. Instead, ‘the 1989/90 revolution in Zagreb
was a cautious, sour old lady who, awakened from half a century of sleep, found
herself in a land she didn’t know, among people who didn’t know her. Demo-
cracy in Eastern Europe has a hundred faces, this one was sad and silent’.155
Drakuliç was scathing and sarcastic in her treatment of Tuœman and the
impact of his government, revealing once again the hollowness of the ruling
party’s claim to be all things to all Croats. According to Drakuliç, Tuœman was
neither politician nor diplomat, because ‘he is too convinced of his historical
mission to bother with such things’.156 Such a view helps to explain the impunity
with which he was able to commit diplomatic faux pas such his famous
scribbling on a napkin. Quite simply, the President believed he did not need to
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engage in diplomatic and political niceties because of his historical role.157
Drakuliç’s understanding of the formation of Croatian national identity in
the 1990s comprised four major components. These were: the politics of
forgetting as a national prerequisite, the reduction of identity to the primacy of
the nation, the complex relationship between patriotism and nationalism, and
the role of civil society.
For Drakuliç, the politics of remembrance and forgetting were interrelated.
She chose to invert these processes, which underpinned the new nationalism in
Croatia, by forgetting her Croatianness while remembering that which she
should not – her prior Yugoslav identity. According to Drakuliç, being Croatian
bore no special meaning for many of the post-1945 generation.158 Commenting
on items from the news of war, she described cases in which nationality was
transcended by other forms of identities or emotions. One such case was that of
Admira (a Muslim) and Bo°ko (a Serb) who were shot by snipers while trying to
flee Sarajevo. For them, too, ‘nationality did not matter much: it could not
decide their destiny, or prevent them from falling in love’.159 She argued that the
nation claimed centre stage through processes of forgetting that seemed far
removed from the remembering, resurrecting and reestablishing of the nation
called for by Franjoism. Writing prior to the first Croatian elections in 1990,
Drakuliç warned that the possibility of forgetting should be guarded against –
particularly the possibility of forgetting the horrors of the past, such as the
Usta°a.160 It was with little satisfaction therefore, that she noted that less than
five years later the danger she had warned against – the danger of forgetting –
had come to fruition. The effect of this large-scale amnesia was that:
I feel ambiguous. I feel robbed of my past, my childhood, my education, my
memories and sentiments, as if my whole life has been wrong, one big mistake, a lie
and nothing else … The Croatian ‘new democracy’ hasn’t brought us anything yet
but promises to believe in. The cost is high: renunciation of the whole past and
sacrifice of the present.161
The process of forgetting that created a space for the new Croatian remem-
bering, involved negating all that had happened in the previous 50 years. It
involved the removal of communist stars from the graves of anti-fascist fighters
as part of a process in which even the President’s exalted communist past was
forgotten.162 According to Drakuliç, instead of being the continuation of a
centuries-long dream, the creation of a Croatian national state was based on an
entirely new narrative of identity.163 This identity did not begin with the medi-
eval kingdom of Tomislav and Zvonimir but with the rise of Franjo Tuœman in
1990.
The forgetting of prior identity, accentuated by the war, led to a form of
reductionism whereby all forms of identity were compressed into a single
dominant identity, the nation. Drakuliç’s position on this matter was made
clear by her observation that:
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Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of nationhood – not
only by outside pressure from Serbia and the federal army but by inside national
homogenisation in Croatia. That is what the war is doing to us, reducing us to one
dimension: the Nation. The trouble with this nationhood, however, is that before I
was defined by my education, my job, my ideas, my character and, yes, my
nationality too. I am nobody because I am not a person any more, I am one of 4.5
Million Croats.164
Drakuliç argued that Tuœman’s Franjoist rhetoric was a form of reduction-
ism that negated the identities of Croatian individuals, be it their gender, religion,
class, education or profession. All this, she argued, was reduced to the central
question of national identity. This reductionism was produced by two interrelated
factors. On the one hand, it was produced by the ideology of the ruling party,
which replaced the all-encompassing ideology of ‘brotherhood-and-unity’ with
a new similarly all-encompassing ideology of the Croatian nation. According to
this new ideology, in the new state of Croatia ‘no one is allowed not to be a
Croat’.165 Furthermore, Drakuliç realised that this new ideology was given
greater resonance by the war. It was the war, she claimed, that brought national
ideology into the realm of the everyday. Reciting a conversation with her
dentist, she recalled him stating that, ‘the Serbs have turned me into a fierce
Croat nationalist, a thing I was sure would never happen to me’.166 Had the war
not happened, we may speculate, Tuœman’s national ideology might not have
had the resonance that it came to assume in the day-to-day activities of Croats.
What most interested Drakuliç was the impact of this reductionism on the
experiences of women and the broader questions of gender and nationalism.167
In its most extreme form, nationalist reductionism produced the horrific crimes
committed systematically by Serbs against Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and
Hercegovina.168 The effects of identity reductionism on the lives of women in
Croatia were generally subtler than this. Drakuliç argued that ‘[in Croatia]
women’s lives, by no means spectacular, banal in fact, say as much about
politics as no end of theoretical political analysis’.169 Under the dictates of
communist ideology, women were considered to be both mothers and workers
who were not much different from men.170 Under the new regime, however,
women’s identities were constrained in both overt and subtle ways. Franjoist
clericalism led to the promotion of anti-abortion legislation and an interest in
the role of women in reversing demographic decline.
Throughout her work, Drakuliç observed practices in the day-to-day
experiences of women that were affected by the new national ideology. One
example was a campaign to persuade Croatian housewives to purchase goods
that were made in Croatia. Women could instantly become patriots by doing
this. On the other hand, if they purchased foreign goods they became a burden
on the national economy and disappointed the war veterans whom they
condemned to unemployment. By only buying Croatian goods though, women
risked their domestic budgets because Croatian goods were considerably more
expensive than imported goods.171
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The third component of Slavenka Drakuliç’s engagement with national
identity in 1990s Croatia was her claim that there was a tendency to confuse
nationalism and patriotism. She argued that nationalism should be seen as an
idea based upon the collectivisation of mass society in a way similar to com-
munism. Patriotism on the other hand should be seen in terms of loyalty to a
state based upon notions of citizenship and democracy.172 These two ideas ‘were
mixed up’ by the war so that ideas of citizenship came to be imbued not with
democratic notions of patriotism but with the ideas of mass society inculcated
by nationalism.173 This mixing up accounted for the lack of distinction between
government and people that was encapsulated by Franjoism. Thus patriotism
was appropriated by the ruling party for its nationalist purposes, jettisoning
ideas of democracy and citizenship and replacing them with ideas about loyalty
to the party that were reminiscent of communism.174 The role of the dissident
intellectual was to identify this confusion and articulate a vision of Croatian
patriotism that invoked ideas of citizenship and democracy, since ‘we [dissident
Croatian intellectuals] believe that if you don’t support the government, it
doesn’t mean that you don’t support the Croatian people’.175
The final strand of Drakuliç’s critique of national discourse raised questions
about the development of civil society. She argued that one of the principal causes
of the war and the reason why Croatia’s political imagination was so easily
colonised by the Franjoists, ‘is that this society never had a proper chance to
become a society not of oppressed peoples, but of citizens, of self-aware individuals
with developed democratic institutions within which to work out differences’.176
The rapidity of the shift from communism to independence to war meant that
there was no time for a civil society based on patriotic ideas to develop. The idea
of active citizenship therefore remained just that, an idea. Still, Drakuliç argued,
citizens believed (and were made to believe) that social change came from the
top down, which meant that social movements in Croatia remained hesitant
about mobilising people on issues such as human rights, the democratic deficit,
or economic deprivation.177 The crux of the problem was that citizens – herself
included – still looked to others to provide the engine for change rather than
acting themselves. Extending this vision, she concluded that every Croatian
citizen bore responsibility for the actions of the government because given the
democratic nature of the new Croatia, in theory at least, every citizen had the
opportunity (denied under communism) to take that responsibility.178 Of course,
the possibility for civic action was made more difficult by the politics of forget-
ting, the negation of non-national identities, and the confusion of patriotism
and nationalism, all of which were actively encouraged by a government and
state that permeated daily life no less than the communist state before it.
Drakuliç focused on the realm of the personal. For her, Franjoist rhetoric
was so powerful because it could reorient an individual’s past and frame its
destiny as part of a national body. She emphasised the intersection of the nation
and the individual, highlighting a struggle between collective and individual
identities. With the first three themes raised by Drakuliç it appears that collectivism
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was unassailable, but by discussing the role of the individual in civil society she
suggested a strategy for overcoming pernicious nationalism by separating out
patriotism and nationalism. As with Banac, therefore, Drakuliç understood the
nation to be inscribed on the everyday and perceived Franjoism as something
other than the manifestation of the will of the ‘national body’.
A brief overview of two voices of dissent – Banac and Drakuliç – therefore
reveals disquiet with the Franjoist project. This disquiet was primarily expressed
in two ways. First, the dissidents argued that Franjoism represented an unten-
able interpretation of the historical statehood narrative rather than constituting
its zenith as it claimed. Banac provided intellectual credence to many of the
claims articulated by opposition parties by exposing how national political
programmes were historically framed as a political rather than ethnic or
religious discourse. Furthermore, he convincingly challenged the idea that there
was a unity of thought or common way of interpreting the historic statehood
narrative in Croatian national thinking by precisely detailing different strands
of thought that emerged from different social classes, historical epochs or
regions. Thus civil Croatia developed within the classical European feudal
order; Vojna Krajina developed as a peasant and warrior society; Dalmatia
enjoyed Mediterranean forms of social organisation; Istria had both feudal and
Mediterranean forms; while Hercegovina developed within the Turkish millet
system.179 In this light, Franjoism can only be seen as a historically contingent
construction rather than the manifestation of an abiding national truth.
The second way that these dissident voices raised disquiet with the Franjoist
project was by describing the rupture with the past caused by the new national
‘realities’. Drakuliç highlighted the ways that forgetfulness was induced at the highest
levels, while at the level of the everyday there were many points of resistance –
the resistance of remembrance. By drawing our attention to the everyday,
Drakuliç exposed the ridiculousness of Tuœman’s rhetoric and lamented that in
the transition from communism to ‘democracy’ very little had actually changed.
Outside voices: the Croatian diaspora
The final section of this chapter will briefly consider accounts of national identity
articulated by elements of the Croatian diaspora, located primarily in Herce-
govina, the USA, South America, Australia and Germany.180 Because their key
claims were similar to those of ‘Franjoism’, they will be considered only briefly.
The government attempted to persuade the Croatian diaspora to return to the
‘homeland’ for two principal reasons. First, it was argued that the economy
badly needed the inward investment potential promised by the ‘wealthy’ diaspora.
Second, it was argued that the worrying demographic situation in Croatia
necessitated their return to inhabit under-inhabited regions such as the Adriatic
islands.181 It should be noted, however, that despite their staunch nationalism,
members of the diaspora were generally reluctant to return to Croatia.
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Of the various diaspora groups, by far the most prominent were the Herce-
govinian Croats. Their role in launching a campaign to carve out a Croatian
territory called Herceg-Bosna in Bosnia and Hercegovina has been well docu-
mented, as was the Tuœman government’s support for the plan.182 According to
Tuœman, Hercegovina was one of the pillars of Croatia and the Hercegovinian
Croats were the pride of Croatia.183 Hercegovina – the cradle of Croatian
extremism and the Usta°a movement – was not regarded so fondly in Croatia
itself. Hercegovinian Croats were generally identified as extremists and criminals.
This perception was made credible by Mate Boban, the one-time head of the
HDZ in Bosnia and Hercegovina (HDZ-BiH) who ran a nationalist fiefdom in
Herceg-Bosna, which he attempted to make nationally ‘pure’.184 Many Croats
from Croatia were embarrassed by atrocities committed by Bosnian Croats and
the reluctance of the government to co-operate fully and unconditionally with
the ICTY.185 This disquiet was fuelled by the financial influence of the Herce-
govinian Croats on the HDZ. They profited greatly from the privatisation
programme and formed a powerful lobby in the heart of the Croatian
government. The Hercegovinian lobby was accused of operating in Mafia-like
ways because corruption and violence were central components of their status
within Croatia.186
The HDZ-BiH was the only Croatian party in Bosnia and Hercegovina to
win significant support and its programme was very similar to that of the HDZ
in Croatia. Its core policy was the protection of the ‘interests’ of the Croatian
people of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which it defined narrowly as the protection
of the language, religion, symbols and physical security of the Croats in Bosnia
and Hercegovina. Although by 1995 it had come to subscribe publicly to the
principle of Bosnia’s territorial integrity, the party continued to call for the
strengthening of ties with Croatia and subscribed to the idea of a confederation
between the two states.187 This idea was supported by the HDZ in Croatia.188
Active extremism among the Croatian diaspora in Germany and Australia
was most prominent in the time of Tito’s Yugoslavia. In Germany, émigrés with
links to the wartime Usta°a movement formed the Hrvatski Narodni Otpor
(HNO – Croat National Resistance), under the leadership of Max Luburiç, a
former Usta°a general. Immediately after the Second World War, this organ-
isation launched armed incursions into Yugoslavia. By the 1970s, Usta°a-type
organisations had developed into terrorist groups that orchestrated bomb attacks
in Yugoslavia and attacks on Yugoslav diplomats throughout the world.189 The
HNO had a distinctly anti-Yugoslav persuasion:
[We] regard Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia as the greatest and only evil that has
caused the existing calamity … We therefore consider every direct or indirect help
to Yugoslavia as treason against the Croat nation … Yugoslavia must be destroyed
– be it with the help of the Russians or the Americans, of Communists, non-
Communists or anti-Communists – with the help of anyone willing the destruction
of Yugoslavia: destroyed by the dialectic of the word, or by dynamite – but at all
costs destroyed.190
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Other groups, such as the Ujedinjeni Hrvati Njemaïke (United Croats of
West Germany), Croatian Republican Party, Hrvatska Pravda (Croatia Justice),
Fighters for a Free Croatia and the World League of Croat Youth articulated
narratives similar to those of Franjoism, celebrating the memory of Croatian
thinkers and activists such as Radiç, Hebrang,and Starïeviç.191 Despite the large
number of such groups, they did not achieve popularity among the Croatian
diaspora. The principle reason for this was their perceived closeness to the
Usta°a movement. These organisations were, to a large extent, orchestrated by
participants in the NDH regime who had escaped Croatia in 1945. By contrast,
the vast majority of Croatian migrants were economic migrants. The first wave
of modern migrants had left Croatia in the nineteenth century, followed by
greater numbers during the inter-war period and then again in the 1960s and
1970s. Many who settled in the West came into contact with liberal ideas for the
first time and rejected the extremist claims of separatist groups.192
The best examples of non-Usta°a related émigré groups be seen by briefly
considering associations set up by Croats in the USA. There are a large number
of Croatian groups in the USA. The largest and most well known organisation is
the Croatian Academy of America, which publishes its own journal, the Journal of
Croatian Studies. Its mission statement declares that:
Inspired by the persistent desire of the Croatian nation for its proper dignity before
all men, realizing that no people can make a responsible contribution towards a
peaceful and democratic world without being freely self-determined i.e. endowed
with the right to choose its own sovereign state, recollecting that Croatian liberty
has been frustrated for centuries because of tyranny from without and within,
conscious that the denial of freedom at home often requires the conservation of the
national genius abroad, mindful that the friendly guardianship of the just
aspirations of men has always been the keynote of American hospitality, we hereby
establish and constitute The Croatian Academy of America.193
The Academy’s primary purpose is to educate members and the general public
about Croatia. Through this it hoped that the Croatian nation could eventually
come to exercise its inherent right to self-determination. The distinction
between this organisation and the radical separatist groups mentioned above
can be uncovered by briefly examining the contents of the Journal of Croatian
Studies. It is clear that there is a more expansive understanding of the Croatian
nation and its position in Yugoslavia than that put forward by the radical
separatists. The journal has published work on Croatian and Yugoslav literature
and culture, dissident Croatian writers such as Vlado Gotovac, Croatia and
America, language issues, and historical tracts on specific themes. As well as
containing the work of well-known Croatian émigré nationalists such as Stephen
Gazi and Vladimir Goss, the journal has also contained works on Croatia by
non-Croats and those not normally considered to be Croatian nationalists, such
as Ivo Banac.194 The Academy argues that education is the best approach to
fulfilling Croatian self-determination and that this would be best served by
debates that revealed the strength of the Croatian claim for that right.
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Many of the other Croatian American organisations are affiliated to the
National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA). These include the Alliance
of Croats of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Croatian Benevolent Association, the
Croatian Catholic Union, the Croatian Council, the Croatian Fraternal Union,
the Croatian Fraternal Lodge, the Croatian National Association and the Feder-
ation of Croatian Societies. According to its statement of principles, ‘the NFCA
was founded to promote an independent, democratic, free market Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina’. Distancing the association from the radical separatists
mentioned at the beginning of this section, its core principles also include the
protection of human rights for all, regardless of nation, ethnicity or religion, the
inviolability of the borders of Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the
promotion of co-operation between the two states. In case there is any question
of whether the Federation is some kind of Usta°a cell, Principle 8 states that
‘atrocities committed during World War II in the name of ethnicity and ideo-
logy by all parties in the former Yugoslavia are condemned and repudiated’.195
Unlike the Academy, the central objective of the NFCA is the promotion of
Croatia in the USA and the strengthening of ties between the two societies.196 On
the question of political orientation, the NFCA maintains that it is independent
from the government of Croatia and that it is not affiliated to any political party
in Croatia. However, its mission statement insists that ‘the NFCA will vigor-
ously defend the Republic of Croatia when it is unfairly attacked’.197
There were therefore a number of traditions of thought about national
identity within the Croatian diaspora after 1945. In the immediate aftermath of
the Second World War, organised diaspora groups had links to the Usta°a
members who had managed to evade Tito’s purges. However, in recent years,
the influence of Western political thought has become more discernible.
Nationalist claims were elaborated with reference to ideas of self-determination
and the idea of Croatia as a modern ‘Western’ democratic state was widely
disseminated. However, this dissemination took place within an intellectual
context where the central tenets of Franjoism were accepted and re-articulated.
Furthermore, it was still possible to trace the roots of extremism to the diaspora,
in the form of the former Defence Minister and ultra-nationalist Gojko ‡u°ak
for example.
Competing voices of the nation
The nation is a contested terrain of political discourse. The frames provided by
the historical statehood narrative informed contemporary national narratives
that in turn informed political discourse in the 1990s. Those same narratives
and histories were mobilised in different ways to produce incompatible inter-
pretations of the nation. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, the nation can be
thought of as existing at different ontological sites. Hence, Slavenka Drakuliç,
for example, was able to locate the nation in the personal and day-to-day
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experiences of people and radically rewrite accounts proffered by political
parties or diaspora movements that were located at the more abstract level of
state policy.
The HDZ’s Frajoist programme combined nationalist rhetoric and prac-
tical policy. At its core was the President, Franjo Tuœman. Tuœman was the
central figure articulating Franjoism, and, given the high degree of presidential
power wielded in the 1990s, he was also its main instigator. Franjoism insisted
that national sovereignty and independence could only be achieved through
national unity. Because the Franjoist project involved unifying a nation that was
historically divided, Tuœman tried to be all things to all Croats. He failed to
achieve his goal of national unification for at least two reasons. First, the
rehabilitation of the diaspora and Croatia’s fascists required policies and rhetoric
that alienated many Croats in Croatia. Second, Tuœman had an idea of what ‘his
Croats’ would look like. They would be ‘ethnic Croats’, who spoke a pure
Croatian language and practised Roman Catholicism. As we shall see in the next
two chapters, these ideas permeated government policy throughout the 1990s.
Such a view of Croatian national identity represented a narrow and particularist
interpretation of the historic statehood narrative rather than its embodiment.
Different political groups appealed to different aspects of the historical
statehood narrative in order to legitimise their own political claims. This was
attempted most blatantly by the modern Party of Rights (HSP) and the
Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS) who both claimed a direct though tenuous
lineage to their predecessors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
These parties claimed that Tuœman did not adequately embody the national
ideology put forward by the founding fathers of their traditions, Ante Starïeviç
and Stjepan Radiç. Other parties also attempted to locate themselves in Croa-
tian political tradition. For example, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) traced
its history back to a small social democratic movement that appeared in Zagreb
at the very end of the nineteenth century. Although the liberals admitted that
there was no ostensibly liberal tradition in Croatia they argued that this was
because of the illiberal rule of imperial overlords. Thus they were able to discern
traces of liberalism in the historical statehood tradition by claiming that this
tradition was a citizen-based ideology. What was striking was that opposition
parties (with the exception of the IDS) did not challenge the historical
statehood narrative outlined in the previous chapter. Instead, they challenged
the location of Franjoism within that narrative, seeing it as a particular
interpretation of that tradition rather than its manifestation.
To look for accounts of national identity that challenged the historical
statehood tradition, we need to turn to the works of dissident intellectuals. Ivo
Banac’s historical research showed that it is not accurate to speak of a single
Croatian political tradition. Instead, Banac revealed a plethora of different tradi-
tions that were encouraged by the differing conditions and histories of Croatia’s
regions. Slavenka Drakuliç shared similar concerns, and radically challenged
Franjoism by discarding claims about a centuries-old dream. She argued that
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rather than being about remembering latent forms of intrinsic identity that had
been suppressed by the communists, Franjoism was actually about forgetting
the recent past. The Croatian national identity articulated by the new regime
was entirely modern and entirely fabricated, Banac and Drakuliç argued.
Our next task is to consider how these different ideas about national
identity were manifested in contemporary social practice. The next chapters
therefore address the question of the intersection of Croatian national identity
with other social operators. As such, they locate debates about national identity
within six different social settings and question whether the different ideas
about national identity raised in this chapter had material resonance in social
practice.
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The nation in social practice I
Economy, football and Istria
The following two chapters assess the way that the disputes about the meaning
of Croatian national identity in the 1990s (discussed in the previous chapter)
were manifested in a variety of social practices. This third level of abstraction is
concerned with how competing conceptions of national identity (Chapter 4)
that make use of abstract frames (Chapter 3) are manifested and embedded in
social practice and in identifying sites of resistance to the national ‘common
sense’. The six brief studies contained here reveal the nation to be a terrain of
political competition in which the state is but one, albeit powerful and well
resourced, protagonist. Such disputes take place not only among political and
intellectual elites but also within a diverse range of social practices. The focus
here then is on how interpretations of the historical statehood narrative are
manifested in the identities that inform social practices. These chapters ask how
competing ideas about Croatian national identity are manifested in different
areas of social activity by considering the resonance and reinterpretation of
abstract ideas in six areas of social activity.
In each of these areas the ‘nationalising state’ attempted to enforce the
Franjoist conception of national identity articulated in the previous chapter.
However, there were also radical reformulations of nation identity manifested
in social practice. Although the government was successful in enforcing its own
account of national identity in some areas, such as the education system,
alternative accounts flourished in others, such as sections of the economy and
the senior hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The contest can be understood as a
series of attempts by the ruling elite to embed Franjoism in the everyday
activities of Croats and practical resistance to such attempts. Sometimes this
resistance drew on the ideas discussed in the previous chapter, sometimes they
reinterpreted Franjoism, and sometimes they drew upon other influences.
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The national economy
Most Croatian papers on the economy in the 1990s begin with a caveat: all the
problems that the economy faced were exacerbated by the 1991–95 war. This
caveat was important to the government because one of the central claims made
by Croatian dissidents during the Yugoslav period was that Croatia’s natural
economic strength was stifled by so-called ‘Yugo-communism’. Marko Veselica,
imprisoned after the 1971 purges, argued that the Croatian economy was held
back by Yugoslavia because ‘political instead of economic priorities determine
the allocation of development capital’, a wasteful exercise since ‘[e]ven though
Montenegro has invested twice as much into the means of production per
worker as compared to Croatia, its accumulation per worker is less than one
third that in Croatia’.1 He argued that the Yugoslav economic system had a
particularly negative effect on Croatia because of Croatia’s Western-oriented
economy.2 Other problems included the bureaucratic manner in which
infrastructure projects were decided upon. A more oft-repeated argument was
that Yugoslavia ‘stole’ the foreign currency income earned by Croatian tourism
and Croatian gasterbeiter (guest workers) in Germany.3
Because economic claims played a significant role in legitimising Croatian
independence, an external reason had to be found to explain why Croatia did
not become a ‘Balkan tiger’ after independence. This is why virtually every
official Croatian tract on the economy in the 1990s began with a list of war
damages, apportioning blame for the failure of the economy upon external
enemies. This is not to say that the economy was not badly damaged by the
1991–95 war. It is estimated that direct war damages in Croatia amounted to
$43 billion, that industrial output decreased by around 39 per cent, and that
provision for more than a million refugees cost an additional $1.3 billion or
around one-fifth of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1992. As a result of
war damage on industry, the GDP in 1992 was less than half the 1989 GDP.4 The
economic situation was made worse by the decision of the Croatian National
Bank (Hrvatska Narodna Bank – HNB) to finance the 1991 war by printing
Yugoslav banknotes, which inadvertently helped to fund the Serbian war effort
through the cross-border transfer of notes, which was still possible prior to the
1991 ceasefire.5 In 1992 inflation reached 765.5 per cent and in 1993 it rose to
1,617.5 per cent, before the implementation of the stabilisation policy.6
The revival of the national economy was a key aspect of the government’s
policy and fulfilled an important role in legitimising the government’s con-
ception of national identity. According to Dragomir Vojniç, a Zagreb economist,
‘the fundamental objectives of the economy and policy of transition consists in
re-establishing the ties with some essential historical and civilisational trends
that were broken by socialism’.7 Such trends, Vojniç argued, included plurality
of ownership and political pluralisation. Furthermore, ‘transition will encom-
pass all spheres of the human lives and human relations, including the most
subtle areas in the realm of the ideology, religious and other segments of the
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social conscience’.8 Similarly, the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction
argued that economic reform would lead to the ‘revitalisation of the Croatian
cultural and humanistic values, especially humane and educational values’.9
The transition to a market economy was therefore perceived as part of a wider
social transition and a return to the ‘roots’ of traditional Croatian commercial
practices, which bore greater resemblance to those of Western Europe than
those of Balkan communism. Failures within the economy were explained away
as the handiwork of Croatia’s enemies. As Marko ‡kreb, Governor of the HNB
warned, ‘one should never forget the vested interests in the economy
[communists and Serbs] and their resistance to change’.10
The first major attempt to redirect the new national economy was the
stabilisation programme in 1993.11 It attempted to curb inflation by abandoning
the former currency and introducing the Croatian Kuna currency. This was
accompanied by an austerity programme that limited government spending
and directed it almost totally towards funding the war. This meant that other
areas of the public sector, such as education and infrastructure, were starved of
cash for long periods and public sector workers went without pay for long
durations. In monetary terms, the stabilisation programme was a success.
Inflation was lowered to 0.6 per cent and remained low for the rest of the
decade, providing a source of national pride. Economists often pointed to the
favourable comparison of Croatian inflation with that of other transition
economies.12 This linking of neo-liberal and nationalist objectives (low inflation
is a neo-liberal aim and demonstrates that Croatia is different from other
Balkan states) won the approval of foreign economists.13
Two cases were frequently cited as instances of economic success and
justification for the stabilisation programme: the success of the Ericsson Nikola
Tesla telecommunications company and the partially privatised Croatian Post
and Telecommunications Corporation (HPT). Not only did Ericsson Nikola
Tesla achieve large profits (despite laying off many workers), it also helped to
create and develop the Zagreb stock exchange. At the end of the 1990s, a decline
in its fortunes was ascribed solely to the Russian economic crisis.14 HPT was
split into its postal and communication functions for full privatisation, but
remained the only profitable state business. In 1998 it achieved profits of $79.4
million, a unique achievement among state industries throughout the former
communist world. According to the government, HPT owed its success to a
massive investment programme (the government estimated that 80 per cent of
HPT’s equipment was new), economic stability, and a Western-oriented busi-
ness ethos. However, other factors in the success may have included its virtual
monopoly position, its access to investment funds appropriated from its
banking activities, and large reserves accumulated during the Yugoslav era.15
The single most important aspect of the stabilisation programme was the
introduction of the Kuna currency. Many nationalist-minded Croatian historians
and economists argued that ‘Croatia’s currency has an old and distinguished
history’.16 They pointed out that the Kuna had been a symbol of the Croatian
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people since its first known usage in 1256. Contrary to those who argued that
the currency had a fascist heritage, they argued that during the Second World
War the Kuna was the currency of both the Usta°a and the Croatia Partisans,
who issued bonds in a denomination called Dinar-Kuna. This dual role made
the Kuna an important symbol of Tuœman’s national unification campaign.
The Kuna was used to portray many things about contemporary Croatia. The
currency became a symbol of stability and continuity.17 This stability was
attributed to the international credibility it gained from the fact that each Kuna
was backed by equivalent HNB holdings of foreign currency.18 According to the
Governor of the HNB, ‘the introduction of the Kuna was a political event that
led to economic stability’ and ‘added credibility to reform and national pride’.19
This national pride was heightened by the fact that the HNB produced Kuna
coins rather than just paper currency, symbolising the stability of the economy
and the finality of the transition from the inflationary Yugoslav economy.
However, these currency reforms were closely linked to flawed banking
reforms through which Croatia tried to establish a Central European banking
system but instead established a network of unprofitable and corrupt banks
with close links to the HDZ. Prior to the transition, Croatia had two main state
banks: Privredna Banka, which was linked closely to the League of Communists
and JNA, and Zagrebaïka Banka.20 Banks in socialist Yugoslavia had a peculiar
and distinctive role. Generally funded by local political elites and enterprises,
the bank’s primary role was to support the local economy. The bank’s founder,
who was often also the head of a local enterprise and the local party, distributed
profits and loans.21 As such, when banks were privatised at the beginning of the
1990s, the main shareholders were the enterprises that were also the main
customers. Therefore, as Kraft and George argued, ‘banks have been privatised
to the extent that their shareholders have been privatized’.22 After the liberal-
isation of banking there was an explosion in the number of banks so that by the
end of the 1990s there were around forty. Although the majority of these banks
were privately owned, the five banks that remained in state ownership con-
trolled around three-quarters of the total market share.
The main problem with the banking system was that there were too many
banks that lacked a solid financial base. This meant that they frequently
collapsed. Many Croats lost their savings because there was only a weak system
of checks and safety nets.23 Critics argued that Croatian banks were responsible
for a ‘grand theft’ and for maintaining a communist-style economy in which
some people became very rich while the majority remained impoverished. One
famous case was that of the collapse of Dubrovaïka Banka. As with most banks
in Croatia, this bank was run by people close to the HDZ who handed out
millions of Kuna in so-called ‘sweetheart loans’. These loans were often unsup-
ported loans awarded to HDZ colleagues to allow them to buy businesses
through the privatisation programme. As Ivo Biïaniç explains, ‘[Sweetheart
loans] are part of a completely untransparent system by which top managers
receive large loans from banks (whose managers are their established business
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partners and often friends). Sometimes the banks accept as collateral the shares
themselves, overvalued real estate, or frozen ‘foreign currency savings’.24
As more often than not the borrowers were unable to repay the loans,
Dubrovaïka Banka was unable to meet its savers demands and had to be bailed
out by the HNB.25 The general distrust of the banking system that this produced
was exacerbated by the national bank’s failure to regulate such corrupt practices.
As Bruno Schonfelder pointed out, ‘any attempts to enforce some standards of
sound banking would be bound to run up against the powerful interests repre-
sented by the major publicly owned banks, some of which clearly engage in shady
business’.26 Veïernji List reported that in response to claims of corruption in
Croatian banks, the Finance Minister Borislav ‡kegro launched an investigation
into four banks that resulted in criminal charges being brought against 109
people.27 It is not surprising therefore that many Croats did not consider the
economic system to be the source of national pride intimated by Marko ‡kreb.
A core element of the economic transition, and a key part of the stabilisa-
tion programme, was the privatisation process. The Croatian privatisation law,
which was passed in July 1992, built on reforms embarked upon two years
earlier by the then Yugoslav President, Ante Markoviç. By doing this, the
Croatian government gained the advantages of a progressive programme and
culture of reform but also adopted the peculiarities of the Yugoslav privatisa-
tion initiative that strengthened the iniquities inherent within it.28 In particular,
the Yugoslav legacy gave the government the opportunity to build an extensive
state-owned sector and passed on an ‘imperfect’ privatisation concept that
retained a substantial degree of so-called ‘social ownership’.29 The legacy of
social ownership, coupled with the widespread phenomenon of ‘sweetheart
loans’ mentioned above, meant that many companies were privatised without
any investment capital and were sold to individuals who had no intention (or
means) of providing such capital.30 Nevertheless, the government often pro-
claimed the success of privatisation, claiming that with each successful
privatisation ‘Croatia comes closer to Europe’.31
Another important aspect of the privatisation programme was the return
of, or compensation for, property confiscated by the communist authorities
after 15 May 1945. The compensation was theoretically available to all those
who were citizens of Croatia in August 1996. It was aimed at providing redress
for Croats who had left Croatia in 1945 (many with Usta°a connections) but
was extended to include Jews (but not Serbs) who had property confiscated by
the NDH during the Second World War.32 Although the state could not afford
to compensate every Croatian citizen who had property confiscated by the
communists, this legislation demonstrated that privatisation was viewed both
as a way of breaking down communist structures in Croatian society and as a
way of emphasising that communism had always been an alien concept for the
Croatian people. Importantly, it also aimed to reinforce the unification process
by insisting that all Croats had suffered through the confiscation of property at
one time or other.
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Far from uniting the nation in a great march to a privatised economy,
however, the government’s handling of the process alienated large sections of
society. According to the Liberal Party (LS) leader and former Yugoslav
dissident, Vlado Gotovac, the privatisation programme was a ‘grand theft from
the Croatian people’, because socially owned industries were sold cheaply to
friends of the government through the extensive use of ‘sweetheart loans’.33 As
early as 1992, the HSLS tabled a thirteen-point reform plan for privatization,
and a few months later the HSS also tabled a motion in the Sabor condemning
corruption.34 The SDP, meanwhile, insisted that upon election to government
its first priority would be to root out all the corrupt ‘cronies of the HDZ, who
have become rich while the rest of Croatia suffers’.35 In February 1993 the
generally government-friendly (and most widely read) daily newspaper,
Veïernji List, published an opinion poll on privatisation. Contrary to seeing
privatisation as a source of national pride, 43.6 per cent of respondents declared
that they were dissatisfied with the programme compared with 18.9 per cent
who declared satisfaction. Additionally, 57.3 per cent of respondents supported
demands for a parliamentary debate on the issue (only 9.8 per cent did not).
The HDZ secured a large part of the ‘private’ economy for its members
through privatisation. It was able to put itself in positions of economic power in
regions (such as Istria) where it lacked local political power. Moreover, because
of the problem of a general lack of solvency throughout the economy, ‘a good
portion of the economy [was] still owned by the government’.36 Thus, the state
retained control of the strategically vital Tisak newspaper kiosk group and the
Skolska Knij¥ara (school book) shops.
Despite the obvious flaws with its handling of the privatisation programme,
the government was keen to extol its virtues and make grandiose claims for it.
This included emphasising that transition meant a return to traditional
Croatian economic values embedded in the historic statehood narrative and
distanced Croatia from economic practices in the communist Balkans. To
support this claim, much was made of cases where the policy of national unity
produced economic dividends. One of the most often used cases was that of the
Karlovaïko Pivovara (Karlovac brewery), which was revived thanks to a large
injection of cash from Jaime Guerrero Devlahovich. Devlahovich, a Croatian
émigré from Chile, returned to Croatia to invest DM15.3 million in the brewery,
which expanded its operations as a result.37
The Croatian Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA) was formed explicitly
to promote the image of the economy as a dynamic ‘Western’ one. CIPA had
responsibility for attracting foreign investment by promoting Croatia’s econo-
mic virtues both abroad and domestically. To accomplish its task, the agency
deployed two tactics. First, it attempted to show that the Croatian economy was
similar to Western liberal economies and in particular the economies of Central
Europe (Austria and Hungary). It insisted that because of its ‘basis of low
inflation and conservative fiscal policy, the structure of the Croatian economy is
similar to that of other developed economies’.38 Furthermore, CIPA pointed out
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that for investment purposes Croatia was internationally classified in the same
group as Greece, Hungary and Poland.39 CIPA emphasised the fact that by the
end of the 1990s over half of Croatia’s foreign trade was carried out with
members of the European Union (mainly Austria, Germany, and Italy), and
that a further 20 per cent of trade was conducted with the members of the
Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).40
The second strategy was to stress the extent to which Croatian culture and
history created a natural Western tendency within the economy. CIPA listed
seven reasons why foreign investors should invest in Croatia, each of which was
designed to emphasise the Western (and decidedly un-Balkan) orientation of
the economy. These were: a stable and democratic political environment, a
stable economy with low inflation, a favourable legal framework for foreign
investors, a fast growing market, a skilled and well-educated workforce, a favour-
able geopolitical position, and a friendly environment for foreign investment.41
The Chamber of Economy added several other factors, including a Croatian
tradition of entrepreneurship, another tradition in conducting international
business, and a historical legacy of innovation.42 With all these facets and
traditions, the Croatian economy was thought to be successfully disengaging
itself from the alien economics of self-management socialism, re-engaging with
its ‘natural’ partners in Central and Western Europe and re-establishing Croatia’s
‘natural’ patterns of economic activity that were suppressed during the Yugoslav
period. Because of this, the President of the Croatian Chamber of Economy,
Nenad Vido°eviç, declared that ‘Croatia can say that it has met the precon-
ditions for economic prosperity’,43 while the Governor of the HNB observed
that ‘Croatia has been a remarkable success story among transition countries’.44
The idea that Croatia’s commercial tradition lay in trade with Central and
Western Europe drew upon the historic statehood narrative that emphasised
that Croatia’s historic links were with Austria and Hungary, not Serbia.
However, this view of the success of the national economy was not one that
was widely shared outside governmental and economic elites. Low wages, high
prices, high unemployment and a reduction in the standard of living from that
enjoyed in 1980s Yugoslavia led many people to question whether independent
statehood, coupled as it was with a presumed increase in the quality of life, had
actually made life better. As we saw earlier, the agencies of economic govern-
ance in Croatia insisted that any economic problems the country confronted in
the 1990s were caused by ‘vested interests’ (communists) and the Serbian attack
on Croatia. However, as official unemployment approached 20 per cent, GDP
stagnated and the economy actually shrank after the war, such arguments had
little resonance with large sections of the population.
The most pressing problem was that while wages remained at 1980s levels,
with an average gross wage in 1998 standing at 3,555 Kuna per month (around
$450) and GDP per capita at $4,227,45 prices increased sharply. This dramatically
reduced the standard of living. A prices index published by the Central Bureau
of Statistics demonstrates the dramatic nature of this change. Remembering that
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average wages were very similar in 1997 to what they were in the 1980s, the cost of
living index (taking 1993 as the base of 100) had reached 234 by 1997. Thus even
in the four years after the implementation of the stabilisation programme prices
more than doubled, while wages remained static and unemployment increased.46
The change in currency meant that this increase was hidden from the inflation
figures, which had become meaningless by 1993. Also, this came after the main
fighting in the Serb-Croat war, and two of the four years covered by this index
were after the Dayton Agreement had put an end to the war in Bosnia as well.
™eljko Rohatinski speculated that this disjuncture between prices and wages
explains why inflation in post-stabilisation programme Croatia remained so low.
High prices and low wages meant that demand for products did not grow and
this lack of economic activity prevented further inflation.47 This is a somewhat
different explanation from those offered by the HNB and CIPA discussed earlier.
This disjuncture produced two economic practices that undermined the
official characterisation of the national economy. One the one hand, long standing
bills for services were paid only infrequently. It was estimated that in 1996 there
was about 8 billion Kuna of unpaid bills and that this figure was increasing at a
rate of 2 billion Kuna per year.48 A substantial amount of this debt (1.2 billion
Kuna) was owed in unpaid bills to the Croatian state electricity company, show-
ing the effect of the price–wage inconsistency on household economies.49 A
second common practice was engagement with the unofficial economy. A con-
servative estimate suggested that about one-quarter of all economic transactions
in late 1990s Croatia were unofficial.50 ‘Unofficial transactions’ meant people
working unofficially and transactions not being officially recorded. Around 54,000
people were believed to be engaged in unofficial employment.51 However, there
was also a significant number of people who did not work but who also did not
claim the meagre unemployment support offered by the state and hence did not
appear in unemployment statistics. Moreover, there were no official statistics to
show the number of people who were technically in employment but did not
receive regular wages or had not been paid for a considerable period of time.52
The significance of the unofficial economy increased in the last two years of the
1990s thanks to the introduction of a new value-added tax (PDV) of 22 per cent
on all products purchased or brought into Croatia. Ostensibly designed to bring
the Croatian taxation system into line with European tax systems, the
imposition of this tax increased black market participation.53 Interestingly, the
government did little to stem the tide of the unofficial economy, despite the
unoffical economy casting doubt on to the government’s claims about the
national economy. According to the Chamber of Economy, the government
recognised the fact that the unofficial economy alleviated the fall in the standard
of living caused by the disjuncture of wages and prices and thus ‘protected the
state from excess social unrest’.54 Although the government legislated against
the unofficial economy, it only employed 74 inspectors to enforce it.55
Thus one of the main legitimating claims put forward by Croatian
nationalists in support of independence was that the Croatian economy was
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adversely affected by Yugoslavia. They claimed not only that the practicalities of
self-management socialism were damaging to the economy but also that Yugo-
slavism itself was a drain on the economy. Any economic system imposed by
Belgrade was necessarily alien to the Western European economic traditions of
Croatia, they argued. Thus independence for Croatia would make Croats
wealthier. Programmes of privatisation, currency reform and the introduction
of a market economy would reunite Croats with their economic heritage.
However, despite numerous economic reforms, including the much-vaunted
stabilisation programme, most Croats became worse off. While the HDZ
insisted that this was the result of the war, many people believed that it was the
result of endemic corruption. That the HDZ chose to sell off state industries to
its own members is unsurprising if we recall that the HDZ believed that it was at
one with the Croatian nation. Viewed this way, only the HDZ could be the
custodian of the economy. The HDZ insisted that allowing a free process of
privatisation would threaten the economy by placing it at the mercy of foreigners
or, worse, Croats who were less committed to the national project.
There were therefore at least two national narratives about the Croatian
economy. On the one hand, the government and economic elite portrayed
Croatia as a new Central European economy that had successfully seceded from
Balkan self-management socialism. In the process of this disengagement, Croatia
rediscovered the economic system that most closely fitted its economic culture
and exposed the alien nature of the Yugoslav system. The new country was able
to establish its own currency and achieve levels of inflation comparable with
Western Europe. For some this was a source of great national pride. For others,
however, talk of low inflation and foreign investment did not correspond with
their view of a new economy characterized by ‘crony capitalism’. For them, the
new state meant unemployment and a fall in living standards. It meant that to
survive they had to retain the habits learned during the communist period.
Such habits, based on the belief that the state worked against the individual
rather than for it, included trading on the black market and not declaring
employment. The mood of trade unionists such as Davor Juriç was one of
resigned disenchantment and pessimism about the future. For them, privatisation
was a theft and the ‘centuries of national dreaming’ frequently referred to by
Tuœman remained a dream. For in 1990s Croatia, as Slavenka Drakuliç pointed
out, ‘no-one is getting rich by working’.56 As the 1990s developed there was
therefore widespread apathy towards the national rhetoric espoused by the
HDZ and Franjo Tuœman.
Football
In the summer of 1999 Zagreb hosted the second World Military Games.
According to the chief organiser, General Luïiç, the games were significant
because of the ‘organisational achievements and [the] transmission of positive
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influences from Croatia to the entire world’. He also stressed that the games
‘provided a new spirit to Croatian sports [and] its entire social life’.57 The nexus
of sport and nationalism is a growing area of interest to academics from several
disciplines.58 In a 1990 conference on ‘sporting nationalisms’ three central
themes were identified. These were: ‘sport as a mechanism of national solidarity
promoting a sense of identity, unity, status and esteem’, ‘sport as an instrument
of confrontation between nations stimulating aggression, stereotyping and
images of inferiority and superiority’ and ‘sport as a cultural bond linking nations
across national boundaries, providing common enthusiasm, shared empathetic
experiences, the transcendence of national allegiances, and opportunities for
association, understanding and goodwill’.59 Mangen argued that, ‘most contri-
butors [to the conference on sport and nationalism] point to the significant
contribution of sport in the making of modern European nations, both inten-
tionally and unintentionally, internally as an agent of consolidation stressing
similarity and externally as an agent of confrontation emphasizing difference’.60
These tendencies were at work in Croatian football in the 1990s. The
national team played a significant role in forging Croatian unity, promoting
Croatia internationally and creating a popular homogenising sense of national
pride that the disastrous economy or the Catholic Church failed to do. On the
other hand, club football in Croatia promoted anti-government activism. Such
movements included those defending the name of Dinamo Zagreb and the
regionalist anti-Zagreb sentiments that were promoted by the Torcida fans of
the Hajduk Split football club. Dinamo Zagreb acted as a catalyst for one of the
best-supported anti-Tuœman lobbies in Croatia. This was a particularly
interesting group because the ‘Bad Blue Boys’ (the self-designated name for
Dinamo Zagreb supporters) were precisely the national constituency to which
Tuœman first appealed in 1990. Furthermore, the Bad Blue Boys had eagerly
volunteered to join the new Croatian Army (HV) at the start of the war.
When the Croatian national team achieved third place in the 1998 football
World Cup in France, Franjo Tuœman opined that ‘football victories shape a
nation’s identity as much as wars’.61 One of the important products of Croatia’s
independence from Yugoslavia was thus its ability to field a national team in the
first place. As the Croatian defender Igor Stimac declared on the eve of his
appearance in the World Cup semi-final, ‘we were under Yugoslavia for 45
years and we couldn’t say we were Croats. Now we can. That is very important
for us’.62 Moreover, the fact that the Croatian football team could beat teams
from Western Europe gave the Croatian state equivalence with states such as
Germany and the Netherlands. The significance of football for Croatian national
identity was echoed by a close ally of Tuœman, Miroslav (Ciro) Blazeviç, the
national team coach. Prior to a European Championships qualifying match
against Milo°eviç’s Yugoslavia in Belgrade, Blazeviç told reporters, ‘we should
not hide it, this will be more than just sport … every victory of the Croatian team
is a victory for their people’.63 Blazeviç often made this link between the ‘people’
and the national football team. In an interview with Simon Kuper he argued
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that prior to each international match he invoked the memory of ‘the people’
for whom the players were playing. He told Kuper, ‘[o]n every occasion before a
match I speak to the players of Croatia’s problems, the suffering of all our patriots.
Because in football motivation is very important. Yugoslavia, an unmotivated
side, never won anything despite having some of the best players in Europe’.64
Blazeviç once commented that ‘I have two gods. One is in heaven and the
other one is Franjo Tuœman’.65 The President exerted considerable influence
over the national team. After the 1998 World Cup, the goalkeeper Dra¥en Ladiç
announced his retirement from international football and was reputedly
telephoned by Tuœman and persuaded to continue playing for the national
team. Similarly, it was widely believed that the frequent absence of Robert
Prosinecki from the national team and his club team, Dinamo, owed more to
his publicly stated views about politics and dislike for Blazeviç and Tuœman
than to his football skills or injuries. Prior to a match against Estonia, Tuœman
predicted that Croatia would win 6–1. With 15 minutes left to play the score
was indeed 6–1 to Croatia and Blazeviç shouted to the Croatian captain,
Zvonimir Boban, ‘Stop! Do not score any more’.66
Much of the literature on sport and nationalism discussed the importance
of national sporting heroes in promoting national unity. For Croatian football
in the 1990s, two such heroes were Zvonimir Boban and Davor ‡uker. Boban
established his hero status in May 1990, just days after the Croatian elections
that brought the HDZ to power, when he tackled a Serbian policeman who was
beating a member of the Bad Blue Boys during a clash between Dinamo Zagreb
and Crvena Zvezda Beograd (Red Star Belgrade). Davor ‡uker became a national
hero prior to being the top goal scorer in the 1998 World Cup. His oft-repeated
pride at being able to play for Croatia endeared him to the national audience
and his success as an overseas football player at Real Madrid served to ‘glorify
the Croatian state’.67
According to Slaven Lerotiç, there was a ‘cult of the state’ in Croatia, which
derived from the historical statehood narrative discussed in earlier chapters.68
Following this logic, the sporting successes of individuals like Davor ‡uker did
not reflect upon the sportsperson alone but also upon the Croatian state. This
idea reflected the connection made between sporting success and national
success alluded to by Blazeviç and helps to explain Tuœman’s remarks about the
importance of football in shaping national identity. Football players also helped
galvanise national unity through their connections with the homeland. For
example, Davor ‡uker was born and brought up in the city of Osijek where his
parents remained during the worst of the fighting in 1991. When asked about
that period (he was in Spain during the war) ‡uker replied that ‘I think it was
the most difficult period of my life. When you are playing football in a country
that is peaceful … you feel a bit guilty when you remember that there were a lot
of people suffering back home. But I always hoped that my exploits would give a
little joy to the fans who followed my career with keen interest.’69 The Croatian-
Australian football player, Mark Viduka, expressed a similar view. Viduka,
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whose uncle and grandfather were killed by the JNA on the same night in 1991,
echoed ‡uker by arguing that ‘it’s not nice to say it, but those players [Croats
playing in foreign leagues] do more for Croatia than a soldier giving his life’.70
The 1998 football World Cup provided examples of the union between
football players and the ‘Croatian people’. According to one foreign observer,
‘there is a relationship between player and follower that puts other countries to
shame’.71 At the Croatian squad’s French World Cup base in the village of Vittel
it was reported that players and fans mingled in the bars and in some cases
players paid for the fans’ accommodation and tickets. Darko Tironi, a spokes-
man for the Croatian Football Federation (Hrvatska Nogomet Savez – HNS)
explained that ‘the players are very close to the fans’, and BBC Television
presenter Adrian Chiles, who has a Croatian mother, tried to explain this
phenomenon by calling on viewers to ‘imagine what it would be like if people
here [UK] weren’t allowed to call themselves English until seven years ago’.72
The Croatian team had an inauspicious start to its World Cup campaign,
narrowly beating the relatively weak Jamaican and Japanese teams and losing to
one of the favourites, Argentina. In the second round, Croatia scraped past a
Romanian side that had earlier defeated England, thanks to a retaken Davor
‡uker penalty. It was only in the quarter-final match that the Croatian side caught
the headlines and achieved a great ‘national victory’, by beating Germany 3–0.
The World Cup was not without its national controversies, however. The
first controversy occurred at the press conference following Croatia’s 1–0 victory
over Japan. It transpired that the translator hired by FIFA (the world football
federation) to translate for Ciro Blazeviç was a Serb. The Croats considered this
highly insensitive at best, not only because of the recent history but also because
the translator was expected to be able to translate the ‘pure Croatian’ language
being used by the national coach, a task that a non-Croatian speaker would not
be able to accomplish (see Chapter 6).73 The second incident occurred prior to
the Croatia–Germany match. According to Branko Tuœen, while German tele-
vision viewers were given the opportunity ‘to see the atmosphere of the official
box’ and to see Chancellor Kohl during the playing of the German national
anthem, such an opportunity did not extend to the Croats because the tele-
vision director chose not to show Tuœman, even though he was sitting less that
10 metres away from Kohl.74 Writing in Veïernji List, Tuœen argued that ‘this
approach is tasteless, not to mention insulting’ and showed that the French
‘underestimated the abilities of our players – hence, they underestimated the
presence of our President, whose political moves cannot be forgiven by many,
firstly pertaining to the toppling of the Versailles order’.75 Here again we see a
manifestation of Lerotiç’s notion of a cult of the state. The thrust of Tuœen’s
argument was that because Croatia should have been considered a serious
competitor at the World Cup, President Tuœman should have been accorded a
status identical to that of Chancellor Kohl.
Prior to the game against Germany, the Croatian defender Slaven Biliç
offered a somewhat different reading of its significance. Asked whether the
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match would be a revenge for Croatia’s defeat by Germany in the European
Championships two years earlier, Biliç responded, ‘I mean, what’s revenge?
There’s no revenge. They didn’t steal from us or kill someone. Football is only a
sport, it’s not like war … Germany was the country that helped Croatia most in
building up, politically and economically.’76
Blazeviç described the match itself in Tuœman-like terms as a ‘historic
victory’.77 Croatia secured a 3–0 victory and passage to the semi-final. Accord-
ing to Marcus Tanner, ‘Croats revelled in the attention their country received
after reaching the semi-finals of the World Cup and welcomed the coverage
which raised its profile abroad, finally convincing the world that Croatia was
separated from Yugoslavia – seven years after independence’.78 Following a
narrow defeat by the eventual world champions France, Croatia beat the Nether-
lands to claim third place in the tournament. This performance was received
with mass celebrations in Croatia. As Michael Walker wrote, ‘coming second
might suck to Tiger Woods or American advertising executives but to the
footballers of a small, emerging country like Croatia, coming third in France –
in their first World Cup finals – has been the greatest statement in their young
history’.79
There can be little doubting the importance of this success. Recognising
this, leaders of all the major opposition parties attempted to claim the victory as
their own. Even an American diplomat, Strobe Talbott, commented that
‘Croatia’s footballers have shown the world that Croatia is a small nation which
can show its high level of competition and perseverance’, adding that he
believed that ‘Croatia will do the same in the fields of economy, social services
and democracy’.80 An estimated 100,000 people greeted the team’s return to
Zagreb.81 Tuœman personally congratulated the players, telling them:
It is my honour, on behalf of the Croatian state leadership, to congratulate the
players of the Croatian soccer representation for their great results at the World Cup.
By reaching these heights, dear soccer players, you have contributed to Croatia
which stood behind you in Zagreb. During your matches, the entire Croatian people,
numbering some eight million, from the homeland and abroad stood behind you.
You have given a great contribution in raising Croatia’s reputation in the world.
Your magnificent success is a great contribution to the independent state of Croatia.82
In this statement alone we can see many of the features of Franjoism and the
role of sport in nationalism discussed earlier. First, the cult of the state is pro-
minent in Tuœman’s closing sentence. Moreover, earlier in the speech Tuœman
indicated that he believed football to be a force for national unity, not only
between Croats in Croatia, but among the ‘eight million’ Croats throughout the
world. Not all commentators held such positive views about Croatia’s foot-
balling success. The London Evening Standard described Croatia as the ‘most
disgusting small nation in Europe’ and writers in the Guardian took the rise to
prominence of the Croatian flag as another opportunity to claim that both it,
and the nation it represented, had fascist undertones.83 On the whole, however,
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international responses to the Croatian success were positive and within Croatia
the success promoted the state and homogenised the Croatian people behind
‘its’ footballers. It was widely rumoured at the time that the government planned
to capitalise on the success by holding early elections, though this did not
materialise.
Although the World Cup success did much to promote national solidarity,
it was a relatively short-lived phenomenon. Elsewhere, football provided a focus
for discontent with the government, manifested in the battle over the name of
the leading Zagreb team – Dinamo Zagreb or Croatia Zagreb. Football support
had provided an important means of resistance in Yugoslav Croatia. Andrej
Krickoviç, a Zagreb journalist, argued that the Bad Blue Boys (Dinamo Zagreb
supporters) were at the forefront of the national movement 1990 and that they
had offered their ‘wholehearted support’ to Franjo Tuœman and the HDZ in
Croatia’s first elections.84 This was particularly important at the time, Krickoviç
argued, because Croatian national identity was confronting a massive propa-
ganda assault that was launched by Milo°eviç’s Serbian regime. Referring to the
Bad Blue Boys and the Torcida fans of Hajduk Split, Sasa Podgorelec (a Zagreb
film director who produced a documentary on the Bad Blue Boys) argued that,
‘they were conscious enough of their own identity and brave enough to express
their wishes for Croatian independence … when others were too frightened to
say so’.85
In socialist Yugoslavia, football clubs were important channels for
exercising political, social and economic influence. Typically, a club was linked
to, and financially dependent on, a political group and was identified with that
group’s political views. This had an impact upon its football activities. Partisan
Belgrade, for example, was known as the team of the JNA. As all Yugoslav
footballers had to do national service they often ended up at Partisan and the
better players frequently had their national service extended to prevent them
returning to their original club. Crvena Zvezda (Red Star) was also attached to
the JNA, but was more strongly linked to the Republic of Serbia and was seen as
a club for Serbian nationalists. Hajduk Split was and is a focal point for
Dalmatian regional identity – from Rijeka to Dubrovnik – but also had an
interesting ambiguity at the heart of its identity. While being representative of
Dalmatia (particularly in contemporary Croatia) and Croatian nationalism (in
the early 1990s), Hajduk was originally a Partisan club supported by Tito
because the city of Split was renowned as a JNA garrison city and had been a
bastion of resistance to the fascists in the Second World War. All this ambiguity
was captured in Hajduk. For the residents of Split, the meaning of Hajduk had a
regional significance similar to that of Dinamo for Zagreb residents. On the
other hand, for northern Croats and Slavonians, Hajduk prompted questions
about the ‘true-Croatianness’ of the Dalmatians.86
Dinamo Zagreb was known as the team of the rulers of the Socialist Republic
of Croatia and was widely seen as representing not only Croatian national
identity in the Yugoslav leagues, but also Zagreb’s particular identity within
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Croatia and Yugoslavia. Dinamo Zagreb also acted as a focal point of interest for
the recently departed members of the Croatian diaspora. Diaspora groups
formed clubs called Dinamo and referred to themselves as Bad Blue Boys.87 The
infamous match against Crvena Zvezda came soon after the 1990 elections. On
13 May 1990 about 1,500 Crvena Zvezda supporters (Delije) arrived in Zagreb.
Zeljko Raznatoviç, better known as the war criminal ‘Arkan’ whose Serbian
Volunteer Guard (‘Tigers’) became renowned as one of the worst groups of
militia responsible for many war crimes in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and
Hercegovina, was the leader of the Delije fan club. The Delije began destroying
the south stands before the Bad Blue Boys tried to get across the pitch and the
police responded in a heavy-handed and biased fashion.88 One of the most
significant events of 13 May was the intervention of the future Croatian national
team captain, Zvonimir Boban, mentioned earlier. This event achieved a
mythical status as the first violence of the war.89
Once the war started, the Bad Blue Boys volunteered for the Croatian Army
(HV) en masse. Before the army had its own badges, soldiers attached Dinamo
badges to their military fatigues.90 Many were killed in the earliest fighting and
the Bad Blue Boys erected a monument to their fallen friends outside the
stadium at Maksimir. The epitaph read, ‘to all Dinamo fans for whom the war
started on 13 May 1990 and ended by them laying their lives on the altar of the
Croatian homeland’. In 1994 Tuœman wrote that he was ‘a Dinamo supporter
like most Zagreb and Croatian … patriots, because it was the most Croatian
club in the Yugoslav federation’.91 Not many in Zagreb believed him, least of all
because during his time as a major-general in the JNA in the 1960s he had been
Chairman of Partisan Belgrade.92 Dinamo supporters claimed that not a single
government or club official paid their respects at the monument.
Tuœman first changed the name of Dinamo Zagreb in 1991, arguing that it
was a communist and Serbian name. The first name he chose was Hrvatski
Akademski Sporski Klub Graœanski – 1903 Zagreb. This name consisted of two
elements, which to anyone old enough to remember were the names of two
rival pre-Second World War Zagreb clubs, HASK and Graœanski. Given that not
many among the Bad Blue Boys recognised or remembered the ancient heritage
of Croatian football, of which the new club name was supposed to remind
them, Tuœman changed the name again in 1993 to Croatia Zagreb, although
‘Croatia’ is not even the Croatian word for Croatia (Hrvatska).
As Dinamo Zagreb had been the symbol of Croatian resistance to Yugo-
slavia and as the Bad Blue Boys had been the vanguard of active Croatian
nationalism, the supporters were confused and disheartened by the decision to
change its name. To them, the name change suggested that the change of regime
had not equated to a change in political practices. Many Bad Blue Boys began to
question why they had volunteered to fight and why so many had sacrificed
their lives. While still attending matches at Maksimir, the Bad Blue Boys vented
their anger at the VIP box, waving Dinamo flags and chanting ‘Dinamo’, in a
clear sign of protest against the regime. At an election rally in 1995, Tuœman
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began berating the Dinamo fans, calling them foreign agents, to which his
audience responded by chanting, ‘Dinamo not Croatia’. Tuœman reacted by
declaring, ‘if you want Dinamo go to Serbia’. Unsurprisingly this did not endear
him either to the people of Zagreb or to the war veterans whose ‘Croatianness’
he was questioning.93 Subsequently, the Bad Blue Boys decided to boycott home
matches, watching Dinamo only when it played in European matches. Whereas
the average attendance at Maksimir had been around 20,000 at the beginning of
the 1990s, that figure fell to below 3,000 towards the end of the decade.94
The Bad Blue Boys took no pleasure from the success of Croatia Zagreb.
Croatia was seen as the state team and they believed that the Croatian league
was fixed to enable Croatia to win every year.95 The closing stages of the 1998–99
season seemed to confirm this belief. It was widely thought that the club NK
Rijeka would win the championship as it led the league by a considerable
margin. However, towards the end of the season a series of questionable referee-
ing decisions meant that NK Rijeka finished runners-up to Croatia Zagreb. Ivo
Pukaniç, editor of the weekly tabloid Nacional, obtained documents showing
that referees had been pressurised by people close to the President to ensure
Croatia Zagreb’s triumph. Special police units attempted to recover the
documents by raiding Pukaniç’s house and office. They failed and throughout
July and August 1999 Nacional published one document every week showing
how the ruling party helped to fix the results of football matches.96
Tuœman initially adopted a conciliatory response to Bad Blue Boys’ agita-
tion because this group had originally been part of his core constituency. In an
open letter in 1994, he wrote:
Dear singing and always loyal ‘Bad Blue Boys’. After the establishment of the free
and independent, sovereign and democratic Croatian state, we embarked on
decisive elimination of all those unhealthy things that the former Yugoslav and
communist regime imposed on Croatian sports. Some petty politicians promote
the demand to restore the name Dinamo because they are against the policy that –
under my leadership – brought into being the free and democratic, independent
and internationally recognized Croatia. If we give in on this they would go further,
and we will not allow the destabilisation of our independent Croatia.97
Needless to say, for people who believed themselves to be ardent Croatian
patriots who had seen their friends killed on the battlefields, being told that they
were being manipulated by ‘petty politicians’ who wanted to ‘destabilise
Croatia’ did little to persuade them of the merits of the name change. One such
‘petty politician’, Zdravko Tomac – Deputy Prime-Minister in 1991–92 and
presidential candidate in 1995 – had earlier noted that:
At that time [in the Yugoslav period] it was enough to be a Dinamo fan to be
accused of nationalism. In 1972, after the Dinamo management had been purged of
people with ‘bad’ political tastes [so-called nationalists] I became President of the
Dinamo club and offered them a safe haven there. That is why I and many other
people who have supported Dinamo through thick and thin find it insulting when
MUP_Bellamy_06_Ch5 9/3/03, 9:32119
T   C  120
we are accused of anti-Croatian stands and conservatism, only because we do not
accept the change to the name of the club.98
What was worse, Tomac argued, was that the man responsible for the change in
name and for the accusations was formerly chairman of Partisan Belgrade.
Other typical accusations, aired after a violent demonstration in 1998, were that
the Bad Blue Boys were agents of Yugoslav communists, and the international
financier, George Soros, was paying them to destabilise Croatia.99
The struggle over the name of Zagreb’s football team was also a struggle
about the meaning of Zagreb’s identity. In the previous chapter we saw that in
1995 the people of Zagreb had elected the opposition to power in the city
assembly, a move that was blocked by the President. This prompted a fear
among Zagreb’s intellectual elite that the capital was being ‘ruralised’. In parti-
cular, Krickoviç noted that there was a large influx of Hercegovinian Croats into
Zagreb during the war.100 We noted earlier that the President praised the
extreme nationalism of this group and held it up as an example to other Croats.
A second influx of rural Croats were the Kosovar Croats, who set up home in a
residential area near Dubrava (an eastern suburb of Zagreb), which became
popularly known as Kosovarska.101 Therefore, the Dinamo campaign developed
into a campaign to protect Zagreb’s cosmopolitan identity against the perceived
extremism of the rural Croats migrating to Zagreb.102
One of the less often cited legacies left to Croatia by Tito’s Yugoslavia was
institutionalised sport. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, social elites gathered around
football clubs. Tuœman’s attitude towards football teams appears to have been
very similar to Tito’s. He tried to associate himself with the national football
team. His close friend, ‘Ciro’ Blazeviç was appointed coach of the national
team, despite his questionable past and his links with corruption at Marseille’s
football club. While the national team united the Croatian people around a
common cause there was little evidence that the Croatia represented by the
national team was a Franjoist Croatia, particularly as most of the national team
did not play their club football in Croatia. However, throughout the World Cup
in 1998 the government attempted to situate itself alongside the team, arguing
that the national football team was successful because the Croatian state under
the HDZ was successful. This reflected the ‘cult of the state’ identified by Slaven
Lerotiç and resonated strongly with the Franjoist understanding of the
historical statehood narrative. This led Tuœman to conclude that the name
Dinamo was an aberration because of its communist overtones. As a historian
conscious of the historical statehood narrative, Tuœman thought that the name
of the main Zagreb football team should be reverted to the 1945 name of two
long-since defunct Zagreb clubs.
Changing Dinamo’s name sparked fierce resistance from a section of
Croatian society that had earlier been steadfast HDZ supporters. This resistance
was heightened by Tuœman’s response to the criticism, which was inspired by
his own belief that an attack on him was an attack on Croatia. As so many of
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their number had been killed in the war, the Bad Blue Boys did not take kindly
to being called ‘Yugo-nostalgics’. Thus resistance in Zagreb both to the Presi-
dent and the renamed Croatia Zagreb increased exponentially to the extent that
the capital became an opposition party stronghold whose inhabitants were
strongly opposed to what they saw as the ‘ruralising’ tendencies of the HDZ.
Therefore, prior to the 2000 elections the government ensured that Zagreb
would be divided into four different electoral districts. Parts of Zagreb shared
an electoral district with coastal areas. This move was designed to weaken
Zagreb’s political identity. Interestingly, the opposition won majorities in all
four electoral districts.
Football was a hotly contested subject in Croatia. The Croatian national
football team promoted national solidarity and unity, particularly during the
1998 World Cup. This was despite the overt control that the President exerted
over the team. However, this national unity was short-lived. Against this back-
drop, the Dinamo issue appears baffling at first. On the one hand it is startling
that Tuœman could so successfully alienate one of his core constituencies. On
the other hand, it seems bizarre that the nationalists in the Bad Blue Boys
should worry about the name of their team at precisely the time when they were
given the independent state for which they had agitated. On closer analysis,
however, the Dinamo conflict posed fundamental questions about Croatian
national identity. For the Bad Blue Boys in 1990, an independent Croatia ought
to have meant an end to authoritarianism and foreign rule. It was for this that
they went to war. However, by changing Dinamo’s name, Tuœman demon-
strated that the new regime would be just as authoritarian – and foreign – as the
old regime. Even though many of the Bad Blue Boys were violent skinheads,
they believed that Croatia ought to be liberal, democratic and European, a Croatia
in which the right to support their own football club would be protected.
However, by the mid-1990s they perceived that little had actually changed since
the change of regime. Their flags were still confiscated, their songs remained
banned and they were derided as foreign agents by the government, just as they
had been by the communists. The Dinamo issue was representative of wider
problems and helps to bring the competition over differing conceptions of
Croatian national identity into focus. Furthermore, it exposes the failure of the
government to impose its own interpretation upon the wider Croatian society
at this third level of analysis.
Istrian regionalism
In 1990s Croatia, regionalism was a powerful source form of political opposi-
tion. However, this form of political mobilisation was relatively weak because of
the centralised nature of the Croatian state and the concentration of political
power and economic wealth in Zagreb.103 The Croatian flag includes the emblems
of the so-called historic regions of Croatia. These are ‘civil’ Croatia, Slavonia,
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Istria, Dalmatia and Dubrovnik. The Croatian Triune Kingdom was known as
the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. The Dalmatian region was first
established during the Roman period and retained close links with Italy, thanks
to long periods of occupation by the Venetians.104 The Croatian region with the
longest history of independence, as a republic in its own right until the
beginning of the nineteenth century, was Dubrovnik. However, in the 1990s the
only region to successfully assert its political and regional identity was Istria.
Istria is a peninsula at the northern end of Croatia’s Adriatic coast. It is
separated from the rest of Croatia by Mount Uïka and is bounded on the other
sides by Slovenia and the Adriatic Sea. It has a close proximity to Italy, both
geographically and socially.
The existence of a strong and assertive Istrian regional identity was
problematic for the elite in Zagreb. According to some lawyers, ‘the Republic of
Croatia is defined as a unitary and indivisible democratic and social state’.105
Such a system ‘does not allow for any kind of complex state models such as
federation of confederation’.106 In the early 1990s there was a wide-ranging
public debate about the principles that should be used to determine the admini-
strative borders of the new state. According to Mladen Klemenïiç, a majority of
geographers, spatial planners and political scientists favoured a system of
between twelve and twenty counties based upon the old system of regional
governance known as ™upanja.107 Davor Brunïiç argued that this solution meant
‘the return to the traditions of Croatian local state organization’.108 However,
although ‘historical inheritance’ was taken into consideration when drawing
Croatia’s new internal boundaries, physical, demographic and economic indi-
cators were also used and evidence taken from working papers written for
decision makers suggests that the most important factor was the ‘the existing
network of central places’.109 Under this arrangement, only Istria and Dubrovnik
retained territory analogues with their historical boundaries, while Dalmatia
and Slavonia were divided into several counties. Minority rights were to be
supported at the district and individual level rather than at county level because
it was argued that no county had a distinctive ethnic composition deserving
special rights.110
A great deal of work was put into insisting that Istria was Croatian and
always had been.111 The core Franjoist argument was that despite the peninsula’s
many rulers (Venetians, Austrians and Italians) Istria has always been ‘ethnically
Croat’.112 For example, explaining why so many people in Istria called them-
selves ‘Istrian’ rather than ‘Croat’ in the 1991 census, Klemenïiç, Vesna Ku°ar
and ™eljka Richter concluded that the figures were distorted by the fact that
Croatian Istria was formerly part of a wider political unit encompassing lands
that were not part of Croatia. This, they argued, exacerbated regionalist
tendencies.113 Similarly, Crljenko insisted that the dialects peculiar to Istria have
Croatian origins and therefore pointed to the peninsula’s Croatian heritage.114
Furthermore, according to a researcher based in the largest Istrian city, Pula,
‘the most important topic of contemporary Istrian history is research of the
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emergence of the modern Croatian nation’, which, the author concluded,
‘represents a lasting and durable achievement of the Istrian Croats and Croats
in general’.115
What is particularly interesting is that these arguments were made in
explicitly ethnic terms in contrast to the other nationalist claims that were
framed by the historical statehood narrative. Because Istria was probably not
part of the medieval kingdom, certainly never entered into a union with
Hungary, spent most of its history under either Venetian or Austrian rule and
usually both simultaneously (Venice ruled over most of the coastline, while the
interior was mostly held by the Austrians), was not in the first Yugoslavia, and
was only incorporated into Croatia after the Second World War, at which time
only part of Istria was given to Croatia (a part of Istria is in the Republic of
Slovenia), the historical statehood narrative is not a tenable basis for a Croatian
claim to Istria. This posed a problem for a Zagreb government determined to
oppose any manifestation of regionalism in Istria. Thus the government and
many Croatian writers resorted to ethnic criteria to insist that Istria is Croatian.116
The selective application of criteria clearly presented problems. If, for instance,
Istria was Croatian because it was mostly Croats that lived there for centuries,
should not the Lika area of inland Dalmatia (so-called Krajina) be considered
Serbian because mostly Serbs have lived there for centuries? Importantly, the
historical statehood narrative was used to legitimise the state itself, not its parti-
cular boundaries. These ethnic arguments were deployed specifically against
Istrian regionalists in order to cast doubt on to their claim to separateness
rather than to justify the existence of the Croatian state per se. As we noted in
Chapter 3, Croatian politicians, leaders and intellectuals have always disagreed
on the precise extent and nature of the Croatian state.
At the beginning of the 1990s, journalist Mark Thompson visited Labin on
Istria’s southern coast. Labin contained the highest proportion of people (36
per cent) in the whole of former Yugoslavia who defined themselves as ‘regionals’
(in this case ‘Istrians’) in the 1991 census.117 According to Thompson, Istria was
unique among former Yugoslav regions in having its territory defined with
something approaching clarity because it is a peninsula bounded by mountains
on one side and sea on the other.118 However, perhaps the most striking and
commonly observed feature of Istrian identity was its heterogeneity. This may
be a product of Istria’s recent history, which is endowed with frequent popu-
lation movements. Most recently, following Yugoslavia’s annexation of Istria
after the Second World War, tens of thousands of Italians were forced to leave
and ‘return’ to Italy. They were replaced by Croats and Slovenes. This dramatic
exodus followed a similarly large exodus of Croats and Slovenes from Istria
prior to the Second World War when Mussolini’s fascist Italy ruled Istria.119 For
Fulvio Suran, a researcher in the Istrian town of Rovinj, Istrian identity ‘is
revealed in heterogeneity and pluriethnicity and can thus also be defined as
pluri-identity’.120
The day-to-day reality of this multi-layered identity had salience beyond
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bilingual road signs and regionalist political activism. Many Istrians perceived
national identity in purely instrumental terms. In 1994 three Istrian villages
were annexed by Slovenia. When a Croatian reporter went to interview inhabi-
tants of these villages he was confronted with a strange reaction. To this Croatian
reporter the inhabitants declared themselves to be Croats. However, later in the
day the reporter found that to Italian reporters the villagers had described
themselves as Italians and to Slovene reporters they had called themselves
Slovenes. Drakuliç explained that the reporters were only allowing the villagers
an ‘either-or’ choice in defining their identity, whereas for these villagers who
inhabited a perpetual borderland between Croatia, Slovenia and Italy there was
no incompatibility in being Croatian and Slovenian and Italian.121
The distinctive feature of Istrian identity in the 1990s was therefore its high
degree of multinationalism, a feature of which Istrian politicians were very
proud.122 This ambivalence towards national identity was reflected in attitudes
towards the break-up of Yugoslavia. Sabrina Ramet, for example, argues that
Istrians tended to feel uneasy about the dissolution because the multinationalism
that was central to Istrian identity was better protected by confederal Yugoslavia
than by a nationalist Croatia.123 This unease was expressed in a poll carried out
by Mladina in 1990. The poll showed that 5.3 per cent of Istrians favoured an
independent Istria, 22.2 per cent wanted to join Italy, 38.6 per cent preferred to
join Slovenia, and only 18.4 per cent wanted the region to remain in Croatia on
the condition that it was granted substantial autonomy.124 Later research, how-
ever, concluded that the ‘vast majority’ of Istrians favoured autonomy within a
Croatian state.125
Istrian identity is an ambiguous multinational identity based on an attach-
ment to the peninsula’s territory. Such ambiguity was clearly an anathema to
the Franjoist elite in Zagreb. While many in Zagreb saw Istrian identity as a
challenge to Croatian national identity, this zero-sum calculation was not
prevalent in Istria itself. Vjeran Katunariç explains that ‘a majority of Istrians do
not see their regional identity in exclusive terms: “Istrianness” and “Croatness”
are not held to be mutually exclusive’.126 There was much less social distance
between Istrians and members of other national communities than was the case
in the rest of Croatia. The space between Istrian Croats and Italians was
virtually non-existent, while the space between Istrian Croats and Serbs was
much less pronounced than in other parts of Croatia.127
One of the most interesting problems was the question of how the peninsula
developed such a strong regional identity and a politically resonant regionalism
while other regions did not. The separation of Dalmatia and Slavonia into
different counties inhibited the growth of regionalist parties there. The region
with the strongest tradition of independence and autonomy was Dubrovnik, yet
although Dubrovnik was given its own county the inhabitants did not establish
a strong regionalist movement. There are seven explanations as to why Istria
developed its own identity and politics in the 1990s while other regions did not.
These are: a distinctive history, an equally distinctive geography, the economy,
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the proximity of the ‘West’ and the importance of ‘Western’ ideas, the signifi-
cance of the Italian community, the activism of the IDS, and the effect of the
recent war.
The distinctiveness of Istrian history was the first thing that many Istrians
pointed to when asked why their region should be granted autonomy.128 There
was considerable debate between Croatian and Italian historians about the
origins and fate of the Histre tribes who were the first known settlers on the
peninsula prior to the Roman conquest. According to some writers, the Histre
pre-dated the arrival of Slavs on the Adriatic coast.129 Istrians go on to point to
their close incorporation in the Roman Empire – evidenced today by the
amphitheatre at Pula – and their long association with Venice and Vienna.
Nenad Klapïiç argued that Western European political ideas were prevalent in
Istria because of this association and that this explained why ‘Istrian values’
were at one with the values of the present day European Union.130 The fortified
border between the Venetian Republic and the Habsburg Monarchy was
located in Istria, bringing many different nationalities to the peninsula and
fostering the multinationalism that is a cornerstone of contemporary Istrian
identity. In more recent times, Istrians point out that neither fascism nor
communism were strongly supported during the Second World War and that
instead most Istrians took a ‘pragmatic view’ of their relations with the Italian
fascists, the Usta°a and the Partisans, who each controlled the peninsula at some
point.131 Thus the first claim made by Istrians was the separateness of their
history. However, other regions of Croatia had a similarly separate history.
Dubrovnik, for instance, was an independent republic for around five centuries.
The second argument was that unlike most other regions in former
Yugoslavia, Istria is geographically well defined. Moreover, it is not well
connected to the rest of Croatia. The region has a longer border with Slovenia
than it does with Croatia and travel from Croatia into Istria is only possible
through a tunnel under Mount Uïka. As Mark Thompson observed, ‘nobody
passes through Istria; one goes into it. It has always been a region in the fullest
sense, with its own history, dialects and folklore’.132 According to a tourist road
map, the region is geographically unique and its entire history and identity has
been shaped by that geography.133 While no other Croatian region has such
geographic homogeneity, it should also be remembered that the northern part
of the peninsula is in Slovenia and, as Drakuliç noted earlier, this borderland is
far from well defined.
The third argument was that Istria had a distinct political economy. One of
the main goals of the IDS was to obtain a level of regional economic control
similar to that enjoyed by Istria in Tito’s Yugoslavia. According to Nenad
Klapïiç, under Yugoslav rule Istria had controlled 60 per cent of its finances
itself. He estimated that by the end of the 1990s about 10 per cent of public
finance was controlled by the region. Furthermore, Klapïiç believed that the
Zagreb elite had attempted to undermine the Istrian economy, parts of which
had a GNP per capita 50 per cent higher than the Croatian average.134 He argued
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that the government frequently criticised Istrians because of their attempts to
establish close economic ties with Italy and Slovenia. Conversely, the govern-
ment sold Istrian resources to foreign companies for considerably less than they
were worth in order to discredit and weaken the indigenous economy. One
example of this was the sale of Istrian Gas to the Italian firm, Agip, which
Klapïiç claimed cost Istria millions of dollars in lost potential earnings.135
Therefore, Istria can be understood as a distinctive economic region because it
is considerably wealthier than the rest of Croatia. The region is divided into
several districts and throughout the 1990s none of them had a GDP per capita
lower than the Croatian average, while in coastal areas it was considerably
higher. Furthermore, the Istrian economy was distinct because of its type. Based
on tourism, it had a level of services comparable with that of Western European
states and attracted large amounts of foreign currency.136 Towards the end of the
1990s, tourism began to regain the levels enjoyed in the 1980s, while other tourist
areas such as Makarska (south of Split) and Dubrovnik had not recovered
nearly as well.
The fourth argument was that Istria enjoyed a geographic and social
proximity to Western Europe that influenced the predominant ‘world view’ of
Istrian identity. According to the IDS, Istria was a region where people
supported the ideas of democracy and freedom of speech to a far greater extent
than in the rest of Croatia. It argued that because of Istria’s geographical
proximity to Italy and the shared history of the two, Western ideas were more
widely articulated in Istria than elsewhere. One example of this was the pro-
European stance of the IDS, which was not wholeheartedly shared by other
political parties, who were more eager to protect Croatia’s hard-earned sover-
eignty than sacrifice it to Brussels. Istria became a member of the Association of
European Regions and moved to its forefront by hosting its annual summer
school in 1999. Istria became a bastion of the idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’
because, as Drakuliç pointed out, ‘the Istrians of today … have learned to put
their region above nation or ideology’.137 This ‘European world view’ was also
present in public opinion and social attitudes. Attitudes towards sexuality and
marriage among educated Istrians were considerably more liberal than those in
other areas of Croatia, with the exception of Zagreb.138 It was claimed that
because of its attitudinal and geographic proximity to Italy, Istria was in a
position to become more closely integrated into the European matrix of
regions. Not only did the IDS support rapid entry into the EU, it also envisaged
a ‘Croatia of the regions’ whereby counties would be amalgamated into larger
regions and power devolved from Zagreb to centres such as Pula (Istria), Split
(Dalmatia) and Osijek (Slavonia).139 However, while this was certainly a feature
of Istrian identity it was by no means the only Croatian region to boast a
‘European world view’. Both Dubrovnik and coastal Dalmatia (particularly the
city of Zadar) had similar foreign connections and the small northern region of
Meœimurije had very close links with neighbouring Hungary and a large
Hungarian minority in the region. It was only through the political activism of
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the IDS that Istria became incorporated into the matrix of European regions.
Indeed, attitudinal surveys suggested that the ‘Western’ views held in Istria were
held to the same extent in Zagreb as well.
The argument that Istrian identity had a ‘European world view’ went hand
in hand with the view that Istria was a special region because of its Italian
minority. The most active minorities in taking up the considerable rights
bestowed upon them by the constitution were the Hungarian and Italian
communities. There were principally two reasons for this. On the one hand,
both minorities had the active support of their nation-name-bearing states. On
the other hand, the Croatian government was keen to foster good relations with
these minorities because of their links with mainstream European states and
because members of these minorities were perceived to be more ‘loyal’ than
other minorities. The relative number of volunteers for the Croatian Army
(HV) was not noticeably different in Istria than in other regions not directly
affected by the war. The siege of the JNA barracks in Pula by local defence forces
was one of the most effectively organised and well-supported siege operations
of the war.140 The Italian community developed an extended network known as
the ‘Italian Union’, which organised cultural events and promoted Italian
folklore in Istria.141 This was also used to promote the Italian dialect of Croatian
known as Ïakavica, which is peculiar to Istria. The newspaper Novi List, which
is produced in Rijeka (very near to Istria), frequently used this dialect and,
although not as radical as the Feral Tribune, often voiced its concerns about
Istrian regional issues.142 These cultural networks enabled the promotion of
Istrian culture and folklore, with the Italian community as the politically active
driving force.
The sixth argument was that Istria became a uniquely distinct region in the
1990s because of the political success of the IDS. At the end of the 1990s the IDS
held about 70 per cent of seats in the county assembly and had acquired over
half the Istrian vote in national elections. The IDS rapidly became a genuinely
regional party, winning majorities of votes from all the national communities of
Istria as well as from those who described themselves as ‘Istrian’. The core
principles of the IDS programme were outlined in the ‘Rovinj declarations’ of
1991 and 1994. They contained advocacy of individual human rights but also
insisted that ‘the differences and distinctions of the various parts of Croatia as
manifested and verified by its regions be considered as the wealth of Croatia’
and that ‘a more democratic system of 6–8 regions (which would hold a notable
portion of legal capabilities) be established to replace the current system’, and
finally that ‘regions be allowed to have their own legislation which would
guarantee rapid and commendable development’.143 As well as being electorally
successful, the IDS was also successful in putting the issue of regionalism on to
the political agenda. According to one analyst, despite its small size and the
often outright opposition of other parties to the very idea, regionalism was one
of the most frequently discussed topics in election campaigns.144 The success of
the IDS was in stark contrast to the fortunes of the other main regionalist party,
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Dalmatian Action, which lost its only Sabor seat in the 1995 elections.145 The
political activism of the IDS was crucial in publicising Istria’s unique identity
and challenging the vision of Croatian identity articulated by the HDZ (see
Chapter 4).
The final explanation as to why Istria was able to establish its particular
identity within the Croatian polity goes further towards explaining why other
regions did not. According to Ivan Rimac, proximity to the war assisted the ruling
party’s quest for a homogenous Croatian nation. Those regions most exposed
to the ravages of war, such as Slavonia, Lika, parts of Dalmatia (particularly
Zadar) and Dubrovnik, did not develop political identities that deviated from
the Franjoist view of ‘Croatness’. These regions also tended to support the HDZ,
though by 1999 this tendency had almost entirely evaporated. They supported
the HDZ because its programme focused solely on the protection of Croatian
sovereignty and territorial integrity. To those who had first-hand experience of
the violence that accompanied that threat to sovereignty, this issue
overwhelmed all others. Because Dubrovnik and its surrounding area was the
target of a sustained assault in 1991 (which continued sporadically until 1995)
and because the integrity of the city and the lives of its inhabitants were
constantly and genuinely threatened, the majority of people in Dubrovnik
perceived that their physical security depended upon a defence mobilised by
Croatia as a whole. As such, the HDZ became popular and regionalist ideas
were considered to be dangerous and fractious notions that Dubrovnik could ill
afford.146 Other than the crisis at the JNA barracks in Pula in 1991, Istria was not
directly affected by the war. To keep the tourist industry operating as much as
possible, refugees from other parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina were
mostly housed on the Dalmatian coast where the tourist industry had been
decimated by the war; they were kept away from areas where the tourist
industry was still functioning – such as Istria. Because of this distance from
violence, Istria escaped the homogenising effect of the war that made multi-
nationalism more problematic. Hence, Istria was able to retain its multinational
identity and specific regional identity to a greater extent than other regions.147
For the proponents of Franjoism, Istrian regionalism represented a
challenge to ‘true’ Croatian identity rather than a positive exercise in Western-
style pluralism. Vesna Pusiç, a sociologist and leading member of the HNS,
argued that the government constructed ‘internal enemies’ to legitimise repress-
ive measures. According to the government, she argued, the internal enemy
wanted to bring down the state. Given that the state was democratic, this meant
that the internal enemy wanted to bring down democracy itself.148 Therefore,
‘the conclusion is that we must suspend democracy in order to prevent the
internal enemy from destroying it’.149 One group of internal enemies was the
Bad Blue Boys discussed earlier and another were the Istrians who were branded
as enemies.
Tuœman spearheaded the attack on the Istrians. He insisted that ‘some
bought an idea that the people, the nation, are not so important as the region.
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That idea is directed against Croatian independence and sovereignty’.150 For
Tuœman, regionalist tendencies in Istria were best described as ‘irredentism’
organised by ‘disintegrative elements’.151 Such elements were organised by the
Italian community in Istria, enabling Tuœman to tell ‘his’ people that ‘we are
facing the continuous presence of Italian imperialism and irredentism’.152 These
imperialists engaged in violent acts against the Croatian state. He claimed that
‘some Italian generals advised Serbs how to conquer Zadar’.153 Tuœman also
railed against the cultural autonomy and language rights of the Italian com-
munity that were guaranteed by the Croatian constitution. For him, a policy of
bilingualism in Istria constituted a direct threat to Croatian sovereignty.154 It is
interesting to note, however, that in his vilification of Italian imperialism
Tuœman ignored the fact that by the mid-1990s a majority of Croats in Istria
also supported the IDS.
Tuœman was not alone among Croatian politicians in condemning
manifestations of Istrian regionalism. Responding to the IDS’ ‘declaration of
the multiethnic and multilingual Istria county’, which described both Italians
and Croats as ‘national communities’, Dra¥en Budi°a (leader of the HSLS)
condemned what he saw as the attempt to transfer the special rights enjoyed by
the Italians prior to the Second World War on to the contemporary Croatian
statute. In a speech in the Sabor, Budi°a complained that the Italian community
was deliberately trying to increase its numbers in Istria at the expense of Croats
in the region. Budi°a highlighted Article 4 of the ‘Rovinj Declaration’ that
announced a determination to ‘promote and encourage minority languages and
cultures in its territory in order to preserve the identity of a unique and unified
Istrian culture’. He claimed that the promotion of this culture would negate
Croatian culture in Istria. Therefore, he argued, the IDS declaration represented
an assault on Istrian Croats.155
Opposition to Istrian regionalism manifested itself in practical policy. In
the 1990 elections, HDZ candidates were defeated throughout the region and
the adjoining Kvarner region (Rijeka). In retaliation, the new government used
its control of ministries to shut down alternative sources of information in the
region. In one early instance in August 1990, the Ministry of Information
dismissed the director of the radio and television station at Pula and suspended
the station’s operating license.156 In other instances, agents close to the HDZ
attempted to ensure that if they were to be denied political power in Istria they
should at least secure economic power in the region. Thus the party faithful
replaced enterprise managers throughout the region and the privatisation
programme was manipulated to ensure that enterprises were not sold to
employees and thus remained in the hands of the privatisation funds (CDNS),
in other words the state and the HDZ. This tactic was used most frequently in
the regulation of the media in Istria, although the most popular newspaper,
Novi List, was able to maintain a relatively high degree of editorial independence.157
Another way that the government sought to disrupt the strength of the
Istrian movement was by locating the regional administrative centre in the
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relatively remote town of Pazin. Rather than situating the administrative centre
in the region’s largest city and central focal point, Pula, the government decided
that local government should be based in Pazin, which is located in central
Istria. Because Istria’s large settlements are mostly on the coast, Pazin is a rather
remote town surrounded by farmland and small villages and is poorly con-
nected to the rest of Istria. The semi-official view was that it would stimulate the
local agricultural economy, which was not as developed and received far fewer
tourists than the rest of the region. Moreover, according to Mladen Klemenïiç,
Pula is a ‘marginally located’ town while Pazin is more centrally located.158
However, although Pazin does have railway connections with Zagreb, the
travelling time by road from Zagreb to Pula and Pazin is not very different.
Furthermore, Pula is connected to the other major Istrian centres (Umag,
Poreï, Rovinj and also Rijeka) by relatively fast new ‘highways’ and has its own
international airport. Add to this the fact the Pula is the largest city in Istria, has
the largest port in Istria, and houses most offices of governmental institutions
and non-governmental organisations, it becomes clear that Klemenïiç’s instru-
mental arguments need to be brought into question.
Other writers, and the IDS itself, believed that political rather than instru-
mental motives were at the fore in the decision to locate the administrative
centre in Pazin. Ivan Rimac pointed out that the ethnic composition of Istria is
such that interior areas contain larger majorities of people describing them-
selves as ‘Croats’ than coastal areas. The largest majority of Croats is to be found
in the town of Pazin. Thus, the argument goes, the location of the centre was
prompted by a desire on the part of the HDZ for local bureaucracies to be
controlled by ‘Croats’. Furthermore, because Pazin is isolated from the coastal
towns this location created a distance between local government and the coastal
areas, which are more heavily populated by Italians and IDS supporters.159
Finally, Pazin was historically the centre of Croatian resistance and political
organisation in Istria, so it is thought that the historian president valued the
history of Pazin more than the history of the more Romanised and Italianised
Pula. Moreover, locating the administrative centre in Pazin pointed to a degree
of historical continuity in Croatian statehood and political activism in Istria.
The Istrians articulated the most coherent counter-narrative to Franjoism
in the 1990s. They made seven key arguments to emphasise their distinct regional
identity. The first Istrian claim, that the peninsula had a distinct history,
constituted a direct attack on the historical statehood narrative. Simply put, it
was claimed that Istria did not figure in the historical narrative outlined earlier.
The six other arguments included the geographical separateness of the
peninsula, its distinct political economy, its proximity to Western Europe, its
European ‘world view’, and the successful political mobilisation driven by the
Italian community. These factors, Istrians argued, produced a heterogeneous
society in which national identities were intermingled and subsumed in regional
identity. Many Istrians saw no incompatibility between being Croatian and
Slovenian and Italian all at once. This heterogeneous view was clearly at odds
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with the vision of national identity articulated by the HDZ. In response,
throughout the 1990s the government attempted to undermine Istrian identity
by a combination of subtle administrative manoeuvres and open attacks that
questioned whether the Istrians were loyal citizens.
Istrian regional identity posed a serious threat to Tuœman’s view of a
homogenous Croatian national identity. Not only was ‘Istrianness’ a multi-
national and multicultural identity that was tied to a region rather than the
nation, its ambivalence towards the national question was clearly a threat to
Franjoism. The Istrians were also particularly irritating because they could point
to a separate history, one in which Istrians as referents were much maligned by
Italians, Yugoslavs and Croatian centralisers. Rather than seeing Istrian identity
as a model of Europeanisation to be adopted throughout Croatia, the govern-
ment saw it as a challenge and attempted to control it by branding the Istrians as
‘internal enemies’ of the state and behaving accordingly. This had the
predictable effect of hardening the Istrian stance and increasing support for the
IDS and other opposition parties in Istria.
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The nation in social practice II
Language, education and the Catholic Church
The language question
Many writers argue that language is one of the distinguishing aspects of a
nation. Eugene Hammel, for instance, suggested that in the Balkans, linguistic
and religious identification are the primary sources of nationality.1 Attempts to
form a codified language for the Southern Slavs were a cornerstone of the
Illyrian movement in the nineteenth century and both Yugoslav states tried to
enforce a standardised state language as a means of avoiding the potentially
fractious nature of the national language question.2 The significance attached to
the unifying aspects of a common Southern Slavic language provoked a reaction
among Croatian nationalists in the Yugoslav era. Challenges to the idea of a
common South Slavic language was a key component of the Croatian move-
ments in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s. For nationalist activists, ‘the Croatian
standard language is for the Croatian nation, just as any other standard langu-
ages are for other nations. Croatians do not have any other standard language.
The rights of a certain language cannot be determined by the fact that it is more
or less similar, completely dissimilar or very similar to some other language.’3
Because of the perceived importance of language in framing national
identity, the language question not only dominated political debate during the
Yugoslav period but also continued to create controversy in independent
Croatia. In the early 1990s, Vjesnik ran a campaign complaining about the
proliferation of English names among new businesses in Zagreb. This campaign
was taken up by a HDZ representative in the Sabor who proposed a law
stipulating that new firms had to be given Croatian names. The representative
commented that such legislation was vital in order to protect the ignorant
visitor to Zagreb, who, upon seeing all the English names in shop windows,
would mistake the Croatian metropolis for some other world centre such as
London or New York.4
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The first systematic attempt to codify a ‘pure’ Croatian standard language
in modern times was carried out by the Usta°a. One of the most significant
linguistic changes in this period was the production of an etymological
orthography that replaced the phonetic orthography pioneered by the Serbian
nationalist linguist Vuk Stefanoviç Karad¥iç.5 The NDH’s Office of Propaganda
attempted to purge the Croatian language of Serbian words by publishing a list
of words that were forbidden. Anybody found using these words could be
prosecuted as a criminal.6 Another strategy that the fascists deployed, which was
resurrected in the 1990s, was the production of dictionaries designed to show
the differences between Croatian and Serbian words. Academics such as Guber-
ina and Krstiç produced lists of words that were different in the two languages,
resurrecting many words that had been supplanted by ‘Serbian-isms’ after the
formation of Yugoslavia.7
Throughout the socialist Yugoslav era the language question caused conflict
between elites in Zagreb and Belgrade. The 1948 Yugoslav constitution recog-
nised ‘the equality of all languages’ but did not resolve the problem because the
languages that were recognised were not named.8 Many communist and Serbian
writers, such as Jovan Skerliç, argued for the complete unification of Serbian
and Croatian languages, while most Croatian intellectuals argued for the recogni-
tion of Serbian and Croatian as distinct and equal languages.9 There were four
distinct periods in this debate: the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement, which established
the Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian language; the 1967 declaration of Croatian
intellectuals renouncing the Novi Sad Agreement; the 1971 uprising and 1974
constitution; and the shift of emphasis in the 1980s.
In 1954, twenty-five Serbian, Montenegrin and Croatian writers and linguists
met in Novi Sad, capital of Vojvodina. Here, they passed a resolution calling for
the publication of a common Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian dictionary. The
Novi Sad Agreement, which was passed under considerable pressure from the
regime in Belgrade, was meant to determine the rules under which a common
language for Croats and Serbs could be formulated. These rules were to be
based upon the ‡tokavian dialect spoken throughout Serbia and parts of Croatia
(excluding the Zagreb region, Istria and Dalmatia).10 For many Croatian writers,
the endeavour to create a common language for the Southern Slavs represented
little more than a pretext for the propagation of the Serbian language in non-
Serbian-speaking regions.11 As a result of the Novi Sad Agreement, Matica Srpska
and Matica Hrvatska, the leading cultural institutions in Serbia and Croatia at
that time, jointly published an orthographic dictionary in 1960. While the
various volumes of this dictionary were widely praised by party cadres and
intellectuals across Yugoslavia, by the mid-1960s they were criticised by many
Croatian intellectuals.12 According to Ljudevit Jonke, for example, the first three
volumes of the dictionary revealed a preference for the ‘eastern variant’ (Serbian)
over the ‘western variant’ (Croatian) in cases where there were substantial
differences. As a result, Matica Hrvatska pulled out of the joint venture and
subsequent volumes were published in Novi Sad by Matica Srpska and became
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increasingly ‘eastern’ in orientation.13 At the same time, other Croatian linguists
such as Dalibor Brozoviç were abandoning the Yugoslav norm of describing the
Southern Slavic language as consisting of two variants by identifying a separate
‘Croatian language’. This language, Brozoviç argued, was the language of the
Croatian people and not the language of the inhabitants of the Socialist
Republic of Croatia.14 During the ‘Croatian Spring’ in 1971, Brozoviç published
his ‘ten theses of the Croatian language’, which argued that there was a distinct
Croatian literary tradition and language.
Discontent about the status of the Croatian language within Yugoslavia and
the way it was defined and circumscribed by the Novi Sad Agreement was
brought together in the ‘Declaration concerning the name and position of the
Croatian literary language’, published in 1967. Signed by Matica Hrvatska, the
PEN club of Croatia (a writers’ club), departments in Croatian branches of the
Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, research centres in the Universities of
Zagreb and Zadar, and the internationally renowned writer Miroslav Krle¥a,
this declaration represented a direct attack on the Belgrade government’s
language policy.15 It insisted that ‘among these attributes, the national name of
the language spoken by the Croatian nation is of paramount importance,
because it is the inalienable right of every people to call its language by its own
national name, irrespective of whether in a philological sense this language is
shared in its entirety or through a separate variant by another people’.16
The declaration insisted that Croats had a constitutional right to their own
language but that this right was being eroded by continual efforts to unify the
Croatian and Serbian languages. As if this was not bad enough, it insisted that
the new standard language was a reconstituted Serbian tongue. To halt this
‘fuzziness’, the signatories called upon the central authorities to recognise the
existence of four literary languages in Yugoslavia: Slovenian, Croatian, Mace-
donian and Serbian.17 This declaration marked the most overt and direct
challenge to Belgrade in the ‘Croatian Spring’ uprising. Thus the language issue
became one of the most heavily politicised and nationalised subjects in
Yugoslav Croatia.
In line with an oft-repeated tactic employed by Tito, the propagators of
these national linguistic demands were purged from their positions in society,
while at the same time many of their demands were granted. The 1974
constitution guaranteed ‘the right to belong to a nation or nationality, to
express their national culture, and to use freely their language’.18 In socialist
Croatia’s new constitution, which accompanied the new federal constitution,
there were several references to a specifically Croatian language. Article 138 of
that constitution stated that, ‘in the Socialist Republic of Croatia there is in
official use the Croatian literary language’.19 This legal framework also allowed
the Serbian people in Croatia to use their own language. Not only did the 1974
constitution confirm the existence of a Croatian language, it also stipulated that
this language was different from Serbian. This led the Zagreb-based linguistic
journal, Jezik, to conclude that:
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In light of the fact that the Croatian literary language has received its constitutional
sanction in both name as a standard linguistic form for Croats and Serbs in Croatia,
as well as equal status with all other languages represented in the Yugoslav federation
of republics, there is now a solid foundation for the Croatian language to develop
itself in accordance with a natural progress and in keeping with its rich heritage.20
Although the constitution identified the existence of a separate language known
as Croatian, the state refrained from sanctioning attempts to codify a standard
Croatian language and the Novi Sad compromise of ‘Serbo-Croatian’ or ‘Croato-
Serbian’ remained the official standard language that was taught in schools.
In the 1980s the decentralising tendencies of the 1974 constitution became
manifest in language politics. This was reflected in the fact that linguistic studies
became ethnically based. One example was a study by Stjepan Sekere° of the
dialects of the northern Baranja region of Croatia. Sekere°’ study contained
separate analyses of the dialects of Serbs and Croats in the region, emphasising
that the disparities were caused by ethnic difference rather than by local village-
to-village differences. According to Greenberg, in the 1960s such a study would
not have distinguished between people according to their ethnicity but rather
according to their geographic place.21 This ‘ethnification’ of language resulted in
the unwritten rule that scholars should only write about their own national
group and in the appropriate national publications.22
By 1991 the language question had become one of the defining issues of the
national question as a whole. There were two key debates about the relationship
between language and national identity. On the one hand there was the question
of whether the Croatian language was distinct from Serbian. On the other hand
there was the issue of what that Croatian language should look like, given that
there has been no generally accepted and widely used Croatian standard language
in recent history. Thus the central issue considered here is the claim to an ancient
linguistic heritage that was distinct from Serbian, and attempts to establish a
new Croatian standard language in the 1990s, which provoked opposition from
those who spoke regional dialects and from linguists who claimed that pure
Croatian standard languages have little to do with the contemporary vernacular.
Dalibor Brozoviç insisted that it was possible to define the Croatian
standard language as ‘an autonomous language, always codified and function-
ally polyvalent, born in the moment in which a nation, aware of its peculiar
identity, started using it as its national linguistic expression within an inter-
national community’.23 These ideas were crystallised in his ‘ten theses’ mentioned
above. Brozoviç argued that the Croatian language was the language used by the
Croatian nation and that the most important manifestation of this language was
the Croatian standard language. This standard language could trace an unin-
terrupted heritage to the Glagolitic writings of the Middle Ages that developed a
‘culturo-linguistic’ structure independently of other linguistic traditions.24
However, one of the major problems that confronted those who tried to codify
a standard Croatian literary language was the extensive linguistic diversity of
Croatian society. Not only were there three quite distinct dialects, discussed
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below, there was also little communication between those attempting to develop a
standard language and those using different vernaculars to communicate.25
The principle claim put forward by those seeking a codified and generally
used standard language in contemporary Croatia was that Croatia had an ancient
and unbroken linguistic heritage, which resulted in the Croatian language being
different from Serbian. Dubravko ‡kiljan, one of the most renowned contem-
porary Croatian linguists, pointed towards a tendency to identify a non-Slavic
heritage. These linguists argued that the Croatian language had its genesis in
Persia and was therefore closer to Persian languages than to Serbian.26 Chris-
topher Spalatin, for example, insisted that the Croatian standard language had
its beginnings in the sixteenth century in the early writings of the Dubrovnik
writers, playwrights and poets. By the eighteenth century, Spalatin argued, the
language had been standardised into a common language through the literary
activity of Franciscan writers. However, Serbian and Yugoslavist linguists, such
as Vuk Stefanoviç Karad¥iç, who believed that by writing a common south
Slavic language they could unite different peoples into one nation, rudely halted
this march to a Croatian standard language.27 Nationalist linguists therefore
accounted for the diversity of Croatian language by suggesting that the natural
course of linguistic development towards a standard had been interrupted by
those who developed and later imposed a South Slavic language, which as we
saw earlier owed more to Serbian than to Croatian linguistic tradition.
The second important argument made by nationally minded contem-
porary Croatian linguists was that the vernacular spoken in Croatia constituted
a specific language that was identifiably different from either the Serbian langu-
age or Serbo-Croatian. According to Celia Hawkesworth, in the 1980s and 1990s
language and nation became treated as synonymous throughout Yugoslavia.
Where there was once one language called ‘Serbo-Croatian’ (or ‘Croato-Serbian’)
there became three languages: Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian. Confronted with
this confusion, speakers of these languages referred to their language simply as
na°ki, which means ‘our language’.28 For Daria Sito Suïiç, the renaming of
languages had little to do with their communicative function and was instead
entirely symbolic. She argued that ‘what matters is not that people can com-
municate and understand each other, but that they can call the language they
speak by different names’.29 However, such views were neither popular nor
widely held. Christopher Spalatin’s views, first put forward in the 1970s,
appeared to be much closer to popular perceptions of language in the 1990s.30
For Spalatin, ‘Croatians feel the distinctiveness of their language’, though he
admitted that the differences between Croatian and Serbian were not the same
as the differences between French and German but were similar to the
differences between Danish and Swedish.31 Because of this closeness, there was a
need to emphasise the differences that had been downplayed by communist
Yugoslavia. As an example, Spalatin pointed to the fact that many Croatian
speakers did not differentiate between the sounds made by ç and ï (see note on
pronunciation on page ix).
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Immediately after independence, scholars gathered around the Institut za
Hrvatski Jezik i Jezikoslovlje (Institute of Croatian Language and Linguistics),
such as Kaïiç, and those at the Miroslav Krle¥a Lexicographical Institute, such as
Kaœiïiç, produced a series of Croatian and Serbian dictionaries that aimed to
demonstrate the extent of difference between the languages. Each page of the
dictionary was organised into two columns. In the first column was the Croatian
word and in the second the corresponding Serbian.32 The effect of this concerted
effort to promote the difference between Serbian and Croatian was that by the
mid-1990s virtually everyone in Croatia referred to their language as Croatian,
though the spoken vernacular had not discernibly changed. Furthermore,
according to Dubravko ‡kiljan, this shift occurred without public debate,
although other linguists such as Ivan Ivas argued that there had in fact been no
resolution to this question. According to Ivas, the case for and against the idea
of a separate Croatian language could be sustained depending upon the socio-
linguistic criteria employed. Thus in strict linguistic terms it could be argued that
Serbian and Croatian are the same language but Ivas argued that this would be
to ignore the socio-political aspects of language, which he insisted were crucial.33
For many Croatian linguists, the attainment of a standard language was
essential for Croatia’s accession to full membership of a world of nations. They
insisted that language was a fundamental part of their national identity and that
the reason why it was still to be fully codified was because the misguided Yugo-
slavists interrupted the language’s natural development. Speculating about the
nurturing of language within an independent Croatia, Spalatin had called upon
future leaders to establish organisations dedicated to the cultivation of Croatian.34
This call was heeded at the end of the 1990s when the two most prestigious
academic institutes in Croatia, Matica Hrvatska and the Miroslav Krle¥a Lexo-
graphical Institute began to codify the Croatian language, and, as we saw earlier,
there was also an institute founded specifically to investigate and promote the
standard Croatian language. In the 1970s Spalatin had insisted that ‘the Croatian
schools must encourage the new generations to accept and nurture the Croatian
standard language with the same love, patriotism and pride as our ancestors
built it for us and bequeathed it to us’.35 As we will see in the next section, this
call was taken up with vigour by the education system in the 1990s.
Although the promotion of the standard Croatian language was endorsed
by most linguists in Croatia, was manifested in the work of institutes and the
influential journal Jezik, and dictated the teaching of Croatian in schools and
universities in the 1990s (see below), some linguists argued that the vernacular
spoken by most Croats did not actually change. According to ‡kiljan, Croatia
was a largely agrarian and illiterate society until quite recently. He argued, there-
fore, that we should not pay too much attention to earlier attempts to codify a
literary language. Such a language was designed for the intellectual and political
elites and had little impact upon the language actually spoken by most Croats.
Likewise in the 1990s, there was little communication between the intellectuals
who supported a standard language and the majority of vernacular speakers.
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Most people did not buy dictionaries and most children spoke their parents’
language rather than the ‘pure’ Croatian standard that they were taught in the
classroom.36
Because of this history of illiteracy, language change did not occur through
the subtle changes over time in literature but rather through the changes of
language instigated by political elites. Dalibor Brozoviç once called upon Croats
to ‘speak as the President [Tuœman] speaks’, because this was the correct
Croatian way to speak. Tuœman was keen to be heard speaking ‘pure Croatian’,
as well as using obscure words that were reputedly ‘old Croatian’. He was also
credited with founding a host of neologisms. For example, a popular joke
contrasted King Zvonimir’s curse that Croatia would not be ruled by one who
spoke the people’s language with the language of Tuœman, which was quite
alien to many Croats. However, the President himself was not entirely immune
to the old ways. In response to Brozoviç’s call, in August 1995 Feral Tribune
conducted a review of the language Tuœman used and highlighted the fre-
quency with which he used ‘Serbian words’.
In August 1995 Vice Vukojeviç, a HDZ representative in the Sabor, pro-
posed two draft parliamentary bills. In the first, Vukojeviç proposed that the
phonetic alphabet be replaced by an etymological one and that 30,000 of the
existing 60–80,000 words be purged from the Croatian language – a proposal
that harked directly back to the language restrictions put in place by the NDH.37
The other draft bill aimed to enforce this by establishing a government office for
the Croatian language. The office would have a policing function so that anyone
found breaking the new language rules could be fined or even imprisoned,
depending on how serious the ‘violation’ was. Although both draft bills were
rejected by the Sabor and were resoundingly condemned by large sections of the
media and most linguists regardless of their political orientation, they were
indicative of the radical Franjoist views of sections of the ruling party.38
While education in Croatia will be dealt with in greater detail later, it is
worth noting here that language teaching changed greatly after 1991. The
Cyrillic alphabet was removed from the curriculum, increasing the estrange-
ment of Serbs and Croats. This produced a common fear among linguists in
Zagreb that in years to come Croatian and Serbian would become different
languages and that communication between Croats and Serbs could become
problematic because of the teaching of a particular type of language in schools.
According to Ivan Ivas, language policy went beyond the simple affirmation of a
Croatian language and the attempt to re-establish Croatian words that were
suppressed by the Yugoslavists.39 There developed what Ivas called a ‘super-
Croatian’ language. This was a language used by nationalist politicians but was
also the language being taught in schools. It included anachronisms and neo-
logisms alongside genuine Croatian words.
For the foreign observer, one of the noticeable things about language
changes in Croatia was the way in which this new language represented a step
back from globalised standard words. For example, the Serbo-Croatian word
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for airport was aerodrom, a word that would be instantly recognisable not only
to English speakers but also to speakers of most European languages. Aerodrom
was replaced by the ‘Croatian’ for airport, zraïna luka. While this is technically
correct, given that zraï means ‘air’ and luka is the Croatian word for a port or
harbour, it seems bizarre that linguists should ‘discover’ an old Croatian word
for airport probably predating the arrival of air transport in Croatia. Interest-
ingly, Croatian–English dictionaries continued to contain an entry for aero-
drom, and according to road signs Zagreb, Split and Dubrovnik still have an
aerodrom, though duty-free shopping bags declare that Zagreb has a zraïna
luka. Another example of this was that the ‘Serbian’ word for football, fudbal,
which was again akin to the German and English words for this sport, was
replaced by the Croatian nogomet. While this was a legitimate and often-used
Croatian word, it is interesting that the word was used to distinguish Croatia
from Serbia. Following a football match in Belgrade between Croatia and
Yugoslavia in 1999, Croatian television proclaimed the ‘victory’ of nogomet over
fudbal. Another example of super-Croatian could be found in the subtle change
of the Croatian word for sport. Prior to the 1990s, the Serbian, Croatian and
Serbo-Croatian word for sport was sport. Croatian linguists agree that sport is a
Croatian word and that there is no ‘old Croatian’ word that has been defiled by
sport. However, for reasons that we can only speculate about, towards the end of
the 1990s Croatian television broadcasts began referring to sport as °port (see
note on pronunciation on p. x). As such, many Croats began to use the word
°port rather than sport, while the Langenscheidt English–Croatian dictionary
insisted that sport was the Croatian word for sport in all its manifestations. The
only explanation was that the new °port sounds similar to the German for
‘sport’ and makes the Croatian sound distinct from the Serbian word.
The standard-bearer of the new Croatian literary language was the linguistic
journal, Jezik. Founded in 1952 as ‘a journal for the cultivation of the Croatian
literary language’, its editor was always considered to be the leader of the
Croatian language movement.40 In 1979 the hardline communist, Stipe ‡uvar
wrote that ‘the militant nationalistic policies advocated by a group of people
around the journal Jezik … cannot and should not influence our scholars and
teachers’.41 In contemporary Croatia, much of what was taught in schools and
universities was based upon research published in Jezik. This research tried to
demonstrate the independence and unity of the Croatian language in all the
fields of linguistics. For example, in phonetics several writers endeavoured to
show that words such as tijelo (body or constitution) and dijete (child) should
be pronounced in two syllables rather than the three prescribed by Serbo-
Croatian grammars.42 As well as work on semantics, the journal also ‘established
the vitality of the suffix in contrast to Serbian linguists’, and ‘flatly refused to
even consider the use of the hyphen’, which was added to some Serbian words.43
Both Dubravko ‡kiljan and Ivan Ivas identified Jezik as the focal point for the
attempt to codify a new Croatian standard language and much of its earlier
work on differentiation came to form part of the language taught in schools.
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There were two principal obstacles in the way of those who wished to codify
a new Croatian standard language in the 1990s. First, as we have seen, there was
little communication between intellectual elites who ‘refused to even consider
the use of the hyphen’ and the majority of people who used the vernacular in
social practice. Furthermore, while nationalist oriented newspapers such as
Vjesnik and Veïernji List attempted to incorporate the new linguistic rules and
words into their journalism, other publications such as Feral Tribune, Novi List
and Jutarnji List tended to write in a vernacular that was far removed from the
official orthography. This meant that the Croatian language put forward by
Jezik was considerably different to the language spoken on the streets. This
problem was exacerbated by the existence of three distinct dialects. Labelled
according to their word for ‘what’, these three dialects are called ‡tokavian,
Kajkavian and Ïakavian. Each is quite different from the other in terms of
lexicography and structure, to the extent that a speaker of one dialect that is not
conversant with the other may find communication with speakers of other
dialects problematic. Furthermore, the dialects are rigid. According to ‡kiljan, a
Ïakavian speaker from Split who lived for many years in the Kajkavian dialect
area around Zagreb would not change dialect over time.44
Geographically, most of Croatia speaks the ‡tokavian dialect, a dialect that
forms the basis of the Croatian standard that was shared with the Serbs and was
spoken throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina. ‡tokavian was spoken in Slavonia,
Kordun (around Gospiç), Lika (Dalmatian interior) and southern Dalmatia, to
Dubrovnik. Within this dialect there are two key variants, which reputedly
emerged in the Middle Ages. These are a western and eastern variant, with the
eastern being closer to the Serbian standard language. The Kajkavian dialect is
perhaps the smallest dialect if judged by geographic area but has many speakers
because it is the dialect spoken in Zagreb and its environs and as far north as
Vara¥din, close to the Hungarian border. The dialect with possibly the most
variance is Ïakavian. This dialect is spoken in Istria, Kvarner (Rijeka), Dalmatia
(Zadar, ‡ibenik and Split) and on most of the Adriatic islands. Istria has its own
particular variant (Ïakavica), as does the Zadar region, which also has an Italian
heritage. The islands also offer an interesting variety of dialects. On the island of
Korïula, for example, each village has its own variant and the difference
between the dialect of the town of Vela Luka (on the western tip of the island)
and the town of Korïula (on the eastern tip) is great. Because the existence of
such well defined and rigidly demarcated dialects also served as a form of
regional identification, there was little discernable weakening in the use of such
dialects, despite the crusade to establish a standard language. Daria Mateljak
Bartulin, former head of the government’s media relations department and
resident of Zagreb, for example, expressed her wish that her young daughter be
brought up to speak the Ïakavian dialect rather than a ‘standard language’.45
However, she also recognised the importance of learning the standard language
as this was central to academic and professional success. This seems to indicate
that there is a disjuncture between the language used in formal and written com-
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munication and the language used for everyday verbal and non-formal commun-
ication. The significance of the differences between the dialects prompted Ivan
Ivas to suggest that if the aim of the new linguistic politics in Croatia was to
devise a language that was completely different from Serbian, a better route
would have been to base the standard on Ïakavian or Kajkavian, which are
considerably different from the ‡tokavian-based dialects spoken by Serbs.46
For many writers, then, language was the primary source of national identi-
fication in the Balkans. The evidence certainly suggests that the HDZ thought so
throughout the 1990s. Building on a tradition of linguistic nationalism that was
a recurrent theme of academic debate during the Yugoslav period, the HDZ
attempted to inculcate a new official language. The first move in doing this was
to determine that Croatian and Serbian were separate languages. Linguists in
Croatia and abroad were divided on whether they were one language or not.
However, the government was insistent that Croatian was a distinct language.
To make the standard language properly Croatian, linguists gathered around
two important institutions and devised dictionaries that emphasised the differ-
ences between Croatian and Serbian. ‘Old’ Croatian words were reintroduced
and some new Croatian words were invented to describe modern phenomena
that had only been previously described in ‘Serbian’. However, there was a
crucial disjuncture between the standard written language and spoken
Croatian. Strong regional dialects meant that in some regions spoken Croatian
and Serbian were very similar, whereas in other areas the dialect was based upon
different sets of rules to those of basic ‡tokavian.
Although ‡kiljan claimed that there was no debate in Croatia about the
future of language, it was possible to see opposition in the 1990s. The first
cleavage, which sparked as much debate outside Croatia as in it, was the question
of whether Croatian and Serbian were different languages. By the end of the 1990s
very few Croats argued that they were the same language. The more contentious
debate, however, concerned what the Croatian language should look like. This
was a debate between purists and anti-purists. Purists wished to see thousands
of words purged from the dictionary while anti-purists did not. According to
Ivas, the public greeted the orthographical work of linguistic nationalists with
shock because new and previously unheard of words began to appear in the
media, in schools and in politicians speeches. An ‘old Croatian’ word that has
not been used for over half a century may as well be a completely foreign word
to those too young to remember it. Ivas defined this sort of language as ‘super-
Croatian’, a language of the elite. This was a language used to prove the pure
Croatian credentials of the speaker. However, it was also a language that was far
removed from that used by most Croats and emphasised the distance that had
emerged between the nationalist ideologues within and close to the HDZ and
the people the party considered to be its constituency. The emphasis on a parti-
cular form of Croatian language produced a reaction. As we saw earlier, the
Istrians promoted their own dialect and Novi List included a weekly section
written in this dialect.
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Education
According to an OSCE report published in 1999 ‘the formative role of the
education system in the maintenance of identity is widely understood’.47 For
modernists like Ernest Gellner a modern education system is an essential part of
the nationalizing process because ‘mass education alone can endow its citizens
with self respect and a sense of identity’.48 According to Anthony Smith, the aim
of a public mass education system is to ‘unify them around certain shared
values, symbols, myths and memories’.49
Immediately prior to 1918 Croatian school textbooks were written in the
spirit of Yugoslavism that derived from the Croatian lllyrianist movement of
the previous century. However, despite this general theme, Charles Jelavich
observed that there was little treatment of the histories and backgrounds of
other Yugoslav peoples and that no detailed knowledge about other nations was
imparted through textbooks. This forced Jelavich to conclude that ‘the
educational system of Serbia and Croatia did not adequately prepare students
for South Slav Union in 1918’.50 After the establishment of the royal dictatorship
in 1929, Croatian textbooks stressed an idealised picture of the three constitu-
ent nations (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), emphasising their common links and
‘constant desire’ for a unified South Slavic state.51 However, Wolfgang Hopken
noted two key problems with this new Yugoslav education. First, the idealised
portrayal of harmony between the three nations was at odds with the political
reality of post-1929 Yugoslavia. Second, the vision of Yugoslavia contained in
these textbooks was a decidedly Serbian vision. History textbooks focused on
the history of the Serbian royal dynasty, and the history of Yugoslavia was
embedded in the history of the Serbian state.52 In Tito’s Yugoslavia, textbooks
focused on non-national issues in order to avoid marginalising one or other
national group. Thus the Yugoslav identity pursued in the textbooks was a non-
national identity based upon the common struggle of all nations and nation-
alities for self-management socialism against the forces of fascism.53 Ideological
rather than civic unity was promoted, which, according to Wolfgang Hopken,
‘simply produced a set of codes necessary for behaving in conformity with the
existing political system, but nothing like an identification with the system’.54
After the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, education throughout Yugoslavia
began to display nationalist traits at the expense of a Yugoslav orientation.
Croatia, however, was an exception to this trend. Under the education policy
espoused by the hard-line communist ideologue Stipe ‡uvar, Croatian text-
books continued to contain a heavy anti-nationalist stress up to 1990. In 1988,
for example, the proportion of the history curriculum taken up with Croatian
national history was only 12 per cent compared with 37 per cent in Macedonia.55
This prompted widespread fears that national identity was losing the historical
basis that was essential for the historical statehood narrative. In terms of con-
tent, it is interesting to note that Croatian history textbooks in the 1980s did not
make too much distinction between Croats and Usta°a, and although they did
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add tales of atrocities committed by Ïetniks to their stories of Usta°a crimes, the
negative side of the Partisan campaign (particularly the massacres at Bleiburg)
was nowhere to be found in the textbooks.56
After independence, it was soon recognised that the education system
would have to be reformed. Not only should the new education system better
reflect Croatia’s national history, it was also important for the system to incul-
cate a new set of Franjoist values among the young. According to the State
Institute for the Protection of Family, Maternity and Youth, reform of the
education system was important for:
Abandoning the system of education that was monolithic and egalitarian, unsensi-
tive [sic] to individual differences between children and not tolerating versatility of
educational goals and approaches as well as real-life models in families, parents and
their children are now enabled to choose an institution (state, private and religious)
and program (state and alternative) according to talents, preferences and needs57
Education reform was about inculcating post-communist values such as choice
and diversity and escaping the homogenising educational goals prescribed by
the communist regime. It was believed that such an approach to education
would also inculcate Western, liberal values, given that ‘in the course of their
education, children and youth are taught in the spirit of peace, understanding,
tolerance and respect for the natural environment’.58 Moreover, the education
system was described as ‘open, democratic and anticipative. In this sense, it is
becoming ever more compatible with educational systems of European coun-
tries.’59 Thus, in articulating the aims and purposes of the Croatian school
system, the Ministry of Education and Sports insisted that ‘the Croatian school
should be human’, the ‘development of the Croatian school-system should lead
to the creation of identity of the Croatian school’, and ‘the Croatian school
system is based on European cultural values’.60 The inculcation of these values
was converted into the guiding principles for education reform in Croatia in
combination with Croatian national values. The six guiding principles
identified by the Ministry were: Croatisation, which we were told  ‘was neg-
lected in former Yugoslavia’; (re)connection with Croatian educational
tradition; pluralism and democracy; life-long education; the attainment of an
all-embracing and mixed education system; and the development of the
European dimension in education, including education for peace and minority
rights education.61
What is interesting about these guiding principles is that, as we saw with the
portrayal of the economy, ideas of ‘Croatisation’ were linked to ideas of ‘demo-
cracy’, ‘Europeanism’ and ‘humanism’. There was a conscious effort to separate
what was considered to be Croatian and what was considered to be communist.
As such, Branka Baranoviç argued that the impetus for reform was provided by
two ‘ideological determinants’. The first was the need to build a new school
system that could fulfil the role of creating a new nation-state. The second was
the requirement that the school system remove all traces of socialist and
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Yugoslav values in the education of the young. These processes were part of a
wider process labelled ‘re-traditionalisation’.62 Baranoviç argued that the new
education authorities gave themselves the role of promoting a ‘national renewal’
that ‘implied a moral and spiritual renewal of the youth through the promotion
of ethnic cultural values’.63 Baranoviç insisted that the most significant change
to the Croatian curriculum was not the inculcation of European or democratic
values but that ‘ethnic culture entered the school curricula’.64 For example, in
1991 Vjesnik wrote that ‘the story of our country, the beautiful Croatian patri-
otic songs, historic heroes and poetry of old Croatian writers present true
refreshment in teaching language and literature, music, history and the arts’.65
For Baranoviç, the ‘ethnification’ of the school system reflected the more
general ethnification of Croatian society that was deliberately produced by the
HDZ. More generally, Hopken noted that ‘strengthening national identity is
now the unquestioned leading goal in education in all post-Yugoslav republics’
with ‘the new textbooks obviously intend[ing] to demonstrate an entirely
separate past in order to legitimize a separate future’.66
The impact that the national curriculum had on the delivery of education
throughout the country was significant because the system was centralized, with
all pupils following the same curriculum. What was more, the curriculum
specified particular authorised textbooks and deviation away from those books
was not tolerated by the Ministry. This meant that the standard approach taken
by textbooks was the only approach or opinion to which pupils were exposed.
The Ministry closely regulated the content of teaching, as teachers could only
use textbooks specifically authorised by the Ministry. The levels of co-ordination
between ministry, publishers and authors in devising a standard approach was
immense. Even the school book publishing company was owned by the state.67
The Croatian curriculum was mandatory for all schools. National minorities
(including Serbs) were also compelled to follow this curriculum, although they
did have the right to follow it in their own language.68 The Zavod za ‡kolstvo, a
professional pedagogic supervisory board, was abolished and replaced by direct
supervision by the Ministry.69 What Previ°iç described as ‘totalitarian one-
mindedness’ led to the denigration of alternative proposals for curriculum
changes. Opponents of the government’s view were often labelled as ‘Yugo-
nostalgics’ or ‘agents of foreigners’. Previ°iç noted that ‘alternative [educa-
tional] initiatives are too often labelled as “ideologically nostalgic” for the
former regime’.70 The result of this rigidly enforced curriculum was that ‘after
three years, we are not speaking of Croat-centric textbooks, those that have
Croatia in the centre of their attention, but of truly Croatian textbooks. Today
there is almost nothing that would reflect socialism or Yugoslavism in our
textbooks’.71
The education reforms were also enforced through the co-option or coercion
of teachers. The autonomy of schoolteachers diminished greatly in the 1990s.
Headteachers were declared to be ‘government officials of particular social
importance’ and it was mandated that they be appointed by the Ministry and be
MUP_Bellamy_07_Ch6 9/3/03, 9:35149
T   C  150
responsible directly to it.72 Headteachers were given much greater power to
regulate and control the work of teachers and the contents of lessons. They were
often appointed because of their affiliation with the HDZ.73 As a result the
quality of teaching deteriorated – something that was not helped by a shrinking
education budget. According to the OSCE, in 1999 only 3.7 per cent of the state
budget was reserved for education. This is a figure well below the 6 per cent
recommended by UNESCO.74 There was no new investment for school build-
ings, recruiting teachers, or improving their meagre salary. This contributed to
overcrowding in urban schools, reducing the number of contact hours between
teachers and pupils.75 Job insecurity among teaching staff also increased
substantially. Teachers were pressured into being ‘ideologically correct’ in their
methods and many who had taught subjects deemed to have a Marxist content
had their positions terminated.76 In 1992 the Ministry demanded that only
Croatian teachers could teach literature courses, although this was retracted in
1994.77 The Ministry wielded direct control over schools in order to maximise
the impact of its new curriculum and ensure that there were no deviations. It
also ensured that there were no deviations in the way that teaching was
delivered by directly appointing and regulating headteachers and giving those
headteachers wide powers to enforce teaching content and style.
The area of the new curriculum that aroused most attention was the
provision for history teaching – an area of particular concern for a government
that wanted to sustain its own interpretation of the historic statehood narrative.
According to the OSCE, new history textbooks focused specifically on Croatia
and the Croats.78 In Croatian history textbooks of the 1990s 57 per cent of the
space was taken up by exclusively Croatian history. This national history was
presented through the history of the Croatian state, its territory and the Croatian
people. Furthermore, nearly half of the sections on Croatia and the Croats
focused on the ‘national suffering’ of the Croats and less than 8 per cent of the
books looked at the histories of other Yugoslav nations. Most tellingly, only 3
per cent of the space in the books analysed talked about similarities between
Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims, whereas many pages were filled with
stories of ethnic conflict.79 The OSCE found that the new history textbooks con-
tained high levels of intolerance towards other national groups, particularly
towards Serbs. It noted that on many occasions references to Serbs were pre-
ceded with adjectives such as ‘barbarous’, ‘uncivilised’ and ‘brutal’.80 The didactic
centrepiece of new history textbooks was the historical statehood narrative.81
The revisionism in history teaching is best described by looking at how two
recent historical periods were portrayed in textbooks. In Ivo Periç’s textbook
the Second World War period was reinterpreted considerably. We noted earlier
that, in Tito’s time, Croatian textbooks made particular reference to Usta°a
crimes but hardly referred to Partisan crimes. These tendencies were now com-
pletely reversed. In the 1990s Croatian textbooks did not mention Usta°a
atrocities in any detail and viewed the NDH period as a legitimate expression of
the aspiration for Croatian statehood. Whereas the Partisans and Ïetniks were
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accused of orchestrating a planned genocide against the Croats, Usta°a crimes
were portrayed as an ‘understandable reaction’ to prior injustices.82 For example,
Periç wrote that ‘many Croats who were not interested in politics, who were not
Ustashas [sic], but simply Croatian patriots, experienced the formation of the
NDH as the coming of a long-awaited national state’.83 Typical of the national-
isation of history was Periç’s analysis of the Usta°a crimes. Periç distinguished
between the NDH as a manifestation of the will of the Croatian people and the
nature of the Usta°a government. He noted that ‘the Ustasha [sic] prisons were
full of well-known Croatian writers, painters, sculptors, composers, scientists,
priests, educators, athletes’.84 However, his only reference to the mass murder of
Serbs and Jews was to admit that the Usta°a committed genocide against the
Jews and that ‘they also terrorised a part of the Serbian population’.85
Many teachers believed that the quality of historical learning deteriorated
as a result of the new curriculum and textbooks. Many found that the pupil’s
comprehension of Croatian history was impaired without a good appreciation
of world and Yugoslav history.86 Furthermore, it was noted that the curriculum
did not include a historiography section asking why we should study history,
and pupils were not presented with different opinions on historical events.87
History textbooks (by Ivo Periç) only offered historical narrative and only one
perspective on that narrative. There were no references to different historians or
perspectives. Baranoviç suggested that the reason for this may be found in the
Ministry’s own justification for the teaching of history. The new course outline
on the teaching of history produced by the Ministry insisted that history should
be ‘a weapon of political struggle’.88
Changes to the history curriculum were also discernible in the treatment of
the recent past. According to Hopken, a process of ‘de-Yugoslavisation’ was at
work here. The Croatian Yugoslavist and Illyrianist movements were described
as ‘illusionist’ and given considerably less space than they enjoyed prior to the
1990s.89 Ivo Periç’s textbooks portray both Yugoslavias as essentially ‘greater
Serbias’ that caused the continuous suppression of the national rights of the
Croatian people.90
The government responded to many of these criticisms in its reply to the
OSCE report on education mentioned earlier. On the issue of the reinter-
pretation of the Second World War, the Ministry insisted that ‘it is … correct
that the terror of the partisans and communists is described, which is logical
since in the previous regime it was forbidden to write about the suffering of the
Croats in Bleiburg of their Calvary’.91 The reinterpretation of history was thus
legitimised in terms of the one-sided approach to teaching history in the former
Yugoslavia. However, rather than opening up the subject to a plurality of views
and historical opinion or even merely providing the established historical facts
about the Second World War, the new curriculum offered an approach remin-
iscent of the communist approach but with the over-emphasis shifted from the
crimes of the Usta°a to the crimes of the Ïetniks and Partisans. While the Ministry
did not deny that it reinterpreted history in the new curriculum, it did deny that
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other nations were portrayed in an unnecessarily unfavourable light. It argued
that ‘it is entirely untrue that particular nations are satanised and labelled. The
crimes are condemned, as well as the uncivilized and barbaric behaviour of
those who committed them, and that is done with the intention of teaching the
pupils in ethics and morals and to keep an open mind in order to understand
different cultures, through the truthful interpretation of historical events.’92
A second area of the curriculum that was substantially revised was literature.
In the 1990s the literature curriculum was transformed by the introduction of
Croatian writers that were unfamiliar to many people, including professors in
the linguistics faculty at the University of Zagreb.93 The new textbooks did not
contain a single text from Serbian literature. They considered Serbian literature
to be ‘a radical diversion from the century-old school-literary tradition’.94 The
new literature textbooks made it appear ‘as if other nations and peoples do not
even exist’.95 Thus the literature curriculum for the seventh and eighth grades
stated among its tasks and purposes the aims of: ‘[the] development of home-
land feelings and feelings of responsibility to the homeland’, ‘acquaintance with
Croatian cultural heritage’ and the ‘development [of] abilities of comparing the
Croatian and European cultural heritage’.96
In essence, the course was a history of Croatian literature charted chrono-
logically rather than thematically and included nothing from European or any
non-Croatian literature. The most notable absences from the curriculum were
the nineteenth-century Illyrianist poet, Ljudevit Gaj, and the Nobel Prize for
literature winner, Ivo Andriç. In 1831 Gaj wrote the famous nationalist poem
Jo° horvatska nije propala, but presumably his views about forming a South
Slavic union made him inappropriate for inclusion in the literature curriculum.
Although Andriç was born in Travnik, a Bosnian of Croatian parents, his
famous work The Bridge over the Drina, an internationally renowned classic,
primarily portrays relations between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims and pre-
sumably cast neither of them in a negative enough light.97 Andriç’s other works,
such as his Bosnian Chronicle, presented a Bosnian rather than Croatian ‘world
view’ and was thus presumably contrary to the desire to foster the ‘homeland
feelings’ that the course aimed to produce.98
The curriculum began by covering what is generally regarded to have been
the first Croatian book (The Missal). It went on to look at the renaissance
literature of Dubrovnik, with the work of Marko Maruliç and Ivan Gunduliç. It
included an analysis of the writings of the nationalist conspirators Petar Zrinski
and Krsto Frankopan, who were included because of their nationalist role
rather than for the quality of their writings. Although the Illyrian movement
was taught briefly, there was no reference to Gaj or Strossmayer and the only
text that was considered was a piece entitled ‘Croatian fatherland’ by Mihanoviç,
a relatively obscure writer on the fringes of the movement. Of the twentieth-
century writers, only Tin Ujeviç and the famous Miroslav Krle¥a were taught
and the texts of theirs that were used were selected very carefully so as to portray
an appropriate image.99 The re-traditionalisation of the literature curriculum
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meant the exclusion of writers who were not purely Croatian or who did not
portray suitably Croatian themes, and their replacement with obscure writers or
historical figures whose literary endeavours were of little international renown.
A third area of the school curriculum that aroused controversy was reli-
gious education. According to the OSCE, international law demands ‘the liberty
of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children’.100 This
right was heavily circumscribed in the former Yugoslavia, since all religious
tuition was banished from schools and disincentives were used to prevent
individuals from taking religious instruction outside. After independence, the
Croatian state moved to ensure that access to religious education was offered to
all school pupils. However, it did not provide a state curriculum on religious
education aimed at teaching pupils about different religions and issues of ethics
and morality. Instead, optional religious education was offered to all pupils and
was provided by the different religious communities themselves. This meant
that the majority of pupils were taught religious education by Catholic nuns.
This in itself created a number of pedagogical problems. How, for example,
could a Catholic nun teach moral issues surrounding abortion in a balanced
way or provide an adequately nuanced account of Islamic theology? The latter
issue was avoided because religious education did not include the teaching of
alternative religions. What is more, while religious education was technically
optional, it was effectively compulsory. No alternatives to religious education
were offered and those who ‘opted out’ were often singled out as being ‘differ-
ent’ from the rest of the class and subjected to abuse from both pupils and
teachers alike. For those following Catholic instruction in religious education,
attendance at Sunday Mass was a compulsory element. This raises the question
of whether the purpose of religious instruction was education or conversion.
The idea that elements of curriculum change owed more to promoting Church
attendance than to promoting education in religious matters could be seen in
the justifications for changes. In 1990 Vjesnik reported that as part of the
cleansing of Marxist ideology from school textbooks it was necessary to ‘free’
them from ‘atheist indoctrination’.101
Processes of ‘Croatisation’ and ‘de-Yugoslavisation’ were thus at work in
the changes to the teaching of history, literature and religious education in
Croatian schools. In the latter two subjects, this involved the process of re-
traditionalisation identified earlier, whereby changes were legitimised by the
claim that they represented a return to previous, truly Croatian, social practices.
Thus the Croatian literary tradition was purged of all non-Croatian elements
and the provision of religious education attempted to emphasise the links
between Catholicism and Croatian national identity. Meanwhile, the teaching
of history persevered with the communist pedagogic tradition of offering a sanitised
account of Croatian history that avoided making young Croats face up to some
of the more unpleasant aspects of their own national history and did not
encourage students to think critically about historical events or to look at them
from different perspectives. The core aims and objectives of history teaching in
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Croatia did not change with the change of regime. All that changed were the core
values that history was used to inculcate – from communism to nationalism.
One centre of opposition to this education regime was the Open Society
Institute (OSI) in Zagreb. Part of George Soros’ East European network, the
OSI ran many projects in areas such as law monitoring, fostering culture and
civil society, and economic reform.102 The education programme aimed to ‘raise
education levels to the best international standards’ through the application of
‘contemporary learning methods’.103 It attempted to promote ‘critical thinking’
and internationalism.104 Other than specific teaching and exchange program-
mes, the OSI tried to foster critical thinking about the provision of education in
Croatia and questioned the curriculum’s aims and objectives. In 1998 it
participated in the international ‘forum for freedom in education’ that allowed
educators in Croatia to work on common problems with colleagues from across
Europe.105 This forum also brought together educators and members of the
opposition parties. The OSI had planned to include the Ministry of Education
in this project but the Ministry refused to participate.106 Another way that the
OSI sought to enhance the quality of education and introduce pupils to
different ideas was through a scheme to donate one computer with an internet
connection to every school in Croatia. However, the Ministry refused to accept
the computers, arguing that the internet would ‘weaken the morality of
children’.107 Furthermore, the Ministry actively discouraged headteachers from
working with OSI, though where headteachers did want to co-operate with the
institute it was often achieved through unofficial means.
As part of the process of ‘de-Yugoslavisation’, the government initially
supported the founding of private and alternative schools as a way of promoting
the pluralism that went hand-in-hand with post-communist politics. However,
by 1993 it had become clear that having alternative schools meant that the
Ministry could not completely regulate the content and style of education. After
1993, therefore, alternative schools were tolerated but the education authorities
refused to co-operate with them. This meant that they had to be entirely self-
funding and could not benefit from any technical assistance from the state. This
threatened the existence of many alternative schools and although many con-
tinued to exist, particularly in Zagreb and Istria where educational innovation
was more notable even in state-run schools, they existed within a hostile
environment.
Although the government claimed that its educational policies enhanced
the ‘morality’ of the young and promoted new post-communist values, social
marginalisation and resultant ‘anti-social behaviour’ increased among the young.
One particular problem was that of psychological disorder, which according to
the State Institute for Motherhood, Family and Youth more than tripled in the
second half of the 1990s.108 While the most obvious cause of this problem was
the psychological effect of the war, particularly among refugees, other problems
that were identified included widespread child abuse, poor living conditions
and low career prospects.109 Although the education system aimed to ‘encourage
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children and youth to adopt a healthy life style’, evidence suggested that smoking,
drug taking and under-age sex increased.110
The education system in Croatia was openly used as a political tool by the
new Croatian state. Continuing the organisational traits of the communist
system, the new curriculum was designed to inculcate a rigid set of values rather
than independent thought. Under the previous regime these were the values of
self-management socialism and ‘brotherhood and unity’, but the new values
were overtly conservative and nationalist, invoking what the Ministry described
as ‘homeland feelings’ and embedding a particular interpretation of the historic
statehood narrative. These new values were the values of Franjoism discussed in
Chapter 4. These processes could be seen in the three curricula considered here.
History was taught as a singular narrative in which Croatia preserved its ancient
statehood and was victimised by other nations. Manifestations of Croatian
fascism and atrocities committed by Croats were removed from textbooks or
explained away as understandable responses to systematic oppression. As with
the previous regime, pupils were not encouraged to think critically or to engage
in historical debate. Similarly, the literature curriculum gave the impression
that the Croats developed separately from the other Yugoslav nations and
shared a literary history with Europe. Not only were all non-Croatian writers
purged from the curriculum, but internationally renowned Croatian writers
whose work was not aligned to the Franjoist cause were removed as well. The
provisions for religious education were self-consciously aimed at reversing the
atheistic trends of communism. Thus the majority Catholic education, which
was provided not by the state but by the Church, aimed at conversion rather
than education and could not properly address secular issues of morality or
citizenship. In this way, Tuœman’s idea that Catholicism was an essential com-
ponent of Croatian identity was actively enforced though the education system.
The education system differed from all the previous studies here by the fact
that opposition was muted. The full power of the state was used to enforce a
particular dominant account of national identity. At the outset, there was little
disagreement about the need to reform the communist education system. The
government manipulated this general consensus more easily than the consensus
on the need for reform of the economy because it was able to regulate virtually
every area of the delivery and content of education. Not only did the state devise
the curriculum according to its own needs and ideas, it also published the
textbooks and regulated the appointment and activities of headteachers, who in
turn had a broad mandate to control individual teachers. Because the state
controlled the education system’s finances there was little room for deviation.
The rhetorical commitment to pluralism was abandoned in 1993, meaning that
alternative schools had to be entirely self-financing and received little or no
support from the state. Moreover, the government refused to co-operate with
organisations such as the OSI, fearing that this may lead to pluralisation and the
introduction of alternative ideas. Rather than creating a new generation of
Croatian nationalists who accepted the Franjoist account of national identity,
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however, the education reforms contributed to alienation. Many people who
worked in this area at the OSI and Institute of Social Research in Zagreb feared
that re-traditionalisation reduced the quality of school education and that the
new leviathan in education would produce a two-tiered society in the future.
On the one hand there would be good Catholic Croats, who read dubious
Croatian literature and could recount the centuries of Croatian suffering, while
believing that talk of Usta°a atrocities was ‘Yugo-nostalgic’. On the other hand,
there would be an army of unemployed and alienated youth.
 The Roman Catholic Church
According to Franjo Tuœman, the Croatian Catholic Church was the only
institution to consistently resist the communist authorities. Tuœman insisted
that by doing so, the Church was responsible for nurturing Croatian national
identity during the dark period of communist rule.111 Many people within the
Church itself shared this view of the relationship between Church and nation.
Friar Ilija ™ivkoviç, Secretary to the Croatian Bishops Conference and head of
the Croatian Catholic radio station, argued that through its very existence the
Church acted as a voice for the nation and helped to perpetuate Croatian
identity, for example by allowing the singing of the Croatian national anthem
during Church services.112 Likewise, Cardinal Kuhariç, head of the Croatian
Church until his death in 1996, argued that the Church should try to secure the
‘freedom to live and to develop its identity and sovereignty in all areas of life:
moral, spiritual, cultural (and) material, finding its expression in statehood’ for
‘its’ people.113 Thus it was often claimed that the Church and the nation directly
overlapped. To justify this claim, the HDZ government tried to co-opt Catho-
licism into Franjoism. Nationalists within the Church welcomed this co-option.
For example, in 1992 the Catholic journal Veritas published an article by Josip
Beljan which declared that ‘the cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag,
the Croatian bishop next to the Croatian Minister of State … This was truly
again a real war for the “honoured cross and golden liberty”, for the return of
Christ and liberty to Croatia. The Church is glad for the return of its people
from the twofold slavery – Serbian and communist.’114
However, there was considerable debate within the Church about its
relationship with the HDZ government and a good deal of unease about many
Franjoist policies, especially those perceived to be directed against national
minorities or offering cover for corruption and criminality. While the Church
leadership advocated tolerance and shied away from supporting the HDZ, many
priests – particularly in rural and war-affected parishes – continued to advocate
a combination of hard-line nationalism and conservative Catholicism that was
similar to the President’s views.
Before the formation of the first Yugoslavia there had been a considerable
degree of confrontation between the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox
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Church. The Serbs had rejected Josip Strossmayer’s ecumenical efforts (see
Chapter 3). Moreover, in the nineteenth century the privileges granted by the
Sabor to the Orthodox community in the Vojna Krajina caused a ‘permanent
irritation’ to the Catholic Church, which generally regarded the Orthodox Serbs
as ‘schismatic’.115 Subsequently, the Catholic perception of the whole Yugoslav
project was generally negative. According to a tract produced by the bishops’
conference:
For Catholics, the first Yugoslavia was an inauspicious period, marked by discrimin-
ation against the non-Serbian population. This led to hostilities during the Second
World War involving great bloodshed, with innocent victims of both sides, including
a large number of Catholic priests. The post-war communist regime was antagon-
istic toward the Catholic Church, nationalizing Church property and openly
persecuting members of the Church hierarchy … Bishops, priests and the faithful
were subjected to various humiliations and pressures.116
The same document noted that under communism ‘attempts to impose atheism
on all levels did not wane’.117 Ilija ™ivkoviç offered a similar point of view,
arguing that the Church was persecuted by the communists throughout the
forty-five years of its rule.118 While this is an accurate description of the initial
relationship between Church and state in socialist Yugoslavia, by the 1960s the
situation had changed considerably.119 Stella Alexander noted that in the 1960s
the Vatican adopted a conciliatory line in its diplomacy with the Yugoslavs. By
1966 ‘there was no doubt that better conditions were eventually secured for the
Catholic Church than the Bishops could have obtained in 1960’.120 Similarly,
Sabrina Ramet noted ‘unmistakable signs of a new atmosphere of Church–State
relations’ in the 1960s.121 One of the reasons for this was the regime’s partial
rehabilitation of Archbishop Stepinac after his death. Stepinac’s significance to
nationalists and Catholics in Croatia was reflected at his beatification. Tuœman
commented that the beatification was important for raising the international
profile of Croatian Catholics. He added, ‘Stepinac was a holy man and one of
the wisest Croats during World War II’.122 Any visitor to the cathedral in Zagreb
in 1999 would have duly noted the gargantuan portrait of Stepinac that adorned
the cathedral’s facade.
Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav dissident who had been Tito’s right-hand man
during the formative years of the communist regime, epitomised the new
openness in the 1960s and 1970s with regard to the Catholic Church when he
admitted that it was not Stepinac’s alleged associations with the Usta°a that had
led to his imprisonment but rather his steadfast refusal to break with the
Vatican and head an independent Yugoslav Catholic Church. According to
Djilas, ‘if he had only proclaimed [the creation of] a Croatian Church, separate
from Rome, we would have raised him to the clouds!’123 Thus although the
Yugoslav state continued to have misgivings about Catholic activities, there was
a discernible easing of tension between Church and state that was not acknow-
ledged by the Church.124
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Around the time of Croatia’s first elections in 1990, the Church found itself
in a difficult position. It had to defend both itself and its Croatian flock from
concerted attack from Belgrade. Efforts by the Croatian communists to con-
tinue appeasing the Serbian Orthodox Church were seen as a direct affront by
Croatian Catholics. For example, in 1989 the Croatian government paid for the
renovation of an Orthodox monastery in Knin, while refusing to given any
financial aid for similar schemes involving Catholic churches.125 In 1991 Croatian
Serb Orthodox bishops refused to condemn the Serbian attack on Croatia and its
accompanying ethnic cleansing. One bishop actually saluted the Serb action.126
The Church faced two principle issues at this time. On the one hand it was
incumbent on it to defend itself and the Croatian people against the hostile
chauvinist propaganda emanating from Belgrade, while on the other hand it
was taking an increased political role in defence of Croatia’s right to self-
determination. In 1989 Cardinal Kuhariç issued a warning about the ‘destruc-
tive behaviour of the Serbian leadership’, which he insisted was aimed at
abolishing the ‘natural and historical right’ Croatian right to sovereignty.127 The
Church attempted to address these issues in two ways. First, it highlighted the
poor human rights conditions in Kosovo and openly supported Kosovar
Albanian demands for greater autonomy.128 Second, and somewhat contro-
versially, the Church sought to respond directly to anti-Croatian propaganda,
much of which focused on Usta°a crimes in the Second World War. The weekly
Catholic newspaper, Glas Koncila (Catholic Voice) ran a series of articles in
March 1990 that used archival material to show the extent of collaboration
between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Nazi puppet regime in Serbia.129
Tuœman’s HDZ was the Church’s preferred party in the 1990 election.
According to Ilija ™ivkoviç, the tacit support that Cardinal Kuhariç offered to
the HDZ was based on his belief that the HDZ was a movement of the Croatian
people that would seek to improve democracy and lift the shackles of com-
munist rule, thus freeing the Church.130 Although it supported the creation of
the nationalist-based HDZ and many members of the clergy agitated in favour
of the party or sought election as HDZ representatives, the Church hierarchy
never openly supported the HDZ and often baulked at Franjoist rhetoric
regarding the relationship between Catholicism and nationalism. This early
support for the HDZ was not surprising, given the antagonistic relationship
between the Church and a Yugoslav state that had often accused it of ‘clerical-
fascism’.131 Both Powers and Ramet suggested that the Church’s enthusiasm for
the HDZ was based on instrumental concerns rather than ideological affiliation.
Upon independence, the Church moved swiftly to persuade the new govern-
ment to return Church property confiscated by the communists and to promote
religious education in state schools. Furthermore, as Ramet pointed out, although
Kuhariç voiced his opinions about political issues such as the proposed
confederalisation of Yugoslavia, ‘Church elders warned clergy not to become
involved in partisan politics’.132 In particular, there was a major cleavage about
the appropriate relationship between the nation and the Church. While Tuœman
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believed the Catholic Church to be a Croatian Church, the Vatican understood
itself as a global Church that was as concerned for non-Croats as it was for Croats.
The role of the Catholic Church in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and
Hercegovina attracted a great deal of attention. Paul Mojzes described the wars
as ‘ethnoreligious’ in character and was adamant that the Church contributed
to the spiral of violence by propagating ethnic Croatian exclusivism.133 He
concluded that ‘the Church leadership, together with Franjo Tudjman [sic],
made provocative and foolish moves. They pushed their agenda with no regard
of the consequences of their behaviour and certainly have to be seen as being
among the culprits for the war.’134 Similarly, Srdjan Vrcan, a Croatian socio-
logist, argued that the Catholic Church should be blamed for presenting the
political, social and national conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ‘as centuries-
long conflicts between essentially opposed human types, types of cultures and
civilisations’.135 Moreover, he argued that the Church was guilty of portraying
the Croats as ‘quasi-immaculate’ while portraying Serbs as ‘the incarnation of
evil’. These two positions are a little unfair. Clearly, some priests did articulate
such views, which had an open resonance with the language used by Tuœman.
However, although Kuhariç tacitly supported the HDZ in the run-up to the
1990 election, the Catholic leadership did not call on Catholics to vote for them.
Furthermore, the Catholic leadership criticised Croatian ethnic nationalism
and war atrocities committed by Croats, and Kuhariç steadfastly refused to
demonise the Serbs. Finally, on several occasions Catholic prelates denied that
the war could be legitimately described as a religious war.136
Whatever the role of the Church in supporting Tuœman and propagating
the war, there can be little doubt that the JNA and Serbian militias system-
atically targeted the Church once the war started. According to the Church, one
of the reasons for this was precisely because the Serbs did see the war as a
religious or holy war. This was because the Serbian Orthodox Church had stood
shoulder-to-shoulder with Milo°eviç. As Bo¥idar Javoroviç put it, the Orthodox
Church was guilty of ‘transforming religious ceremonies into great political and
national meetings that were completely compatible with Milo°eviç’s meetings
and populist movement’.137 Sabrina Ramet described the destruction of Catholic
churches in Croatia by Serbian forces as ‘nothing short of catastrophic’.138 As
early as March 1992, she noted, 117 Catholic sacral objects in the Franciscan
Province of Split had been destroyed or seriously damaged. By June 1994,
around 40 per cent of churches in occupied Croatia had been destroyed or
damaged and in 1995 the Church provided detailed evidence that 1,426
Catholic churches in Croatia had been badly damaged or destroyed.139 Ramet
goes on to contrast this with the fact that in October 1995 it was found that of
the 121 Serbian Orthodox churches that were in the so-called Krajina region
that was occupied by the Serbs between 1991 and 1995 before the war, only five
had been destroyed or badly damaged, ‘graphically revealing that the destruc-
tion of Catholic churches was the result of premeditated and systematic policy,
rather than the random outcome of battles and field action’.140 The attitude of
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the Church leadership to the war can be summed up by considering Kuhariç’s
response to Operation Storm, in which the Croatian Army reclaimed the so-
called Serbian Krajina. Immediately after the operation, Kuhariç concluded
that fleeing Serbs had left at the instigation of their own civil and ecclesiastical
leaders. He declared:
The fact is that Croatia liberated its territory so that 117,000 expelled Catholic
Croats could return. But it is also a fact that the Croatian government did not want
the Croatian citizens of Serb nationality to leave their homes. An appeal by the
president of the republic to the citizens of Serb nationality, guaranteeing them all
rights, freedoms and security and asking them not to leave their homes, was repeated
continually. However, I very much regret that people left despite all guarantees.141
By October 1995, however, once reports of looting, burning of houses and
murders committed by the Croatian Army had been made public, Kuhariç used
an open-air Mass for 3,500 soldiers and officers to condemn the killing of Serb
civilians and other crimes committed by Croatian forces.142
The Church orchestrated humanitarian assistance during the war. The
Croatian Caritas charity launched a series of major disaster-relief projects that
included housing projects for displaced people and the provision of food aid
and healthcare assistance. Caritas sponsored 13,000 children in the region and
offered financial assistance for the reconstruction of houses for returnees.143 In a
separate project, Catholics in the USA worked with their brethren in Croatia to
put together a team of cardiac surgeons who practised in Croatia during the war.144
The Catholic Church was placed in a difficult position by the war. As
representatives of an internationalist church, the leadership in Croatia hoped to
avoid supporting ethnic exclusivism, but this position became increasingly
problematic as the Church itself became a direct target for Serbian attack.
Furthermore, many among the clergy (particularly in rural areas) combined
conservative Catholicism with Franjoist nationalism. This alliance was mani-
fested in the anti-abortion campaign that was spearheaded by the Church and
received considerable backing from the HDZ. The Catholic Church began its
anti-abortion campaign in 1987, noting the decline of the birth rate in the
predominantly Catholic republics of Croatia and Slovenia as opposed to the
other Yugoslav republics. The bishops in Slovenia, for example, noted that the
increase of abortions provided evidence of a general ‘demoralisation’ in society.145
The campaign was taken up more rigorously by Tuœman in 1994 when he gave
the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction the task of promoting
demographic growth and called upon the government to halt the increasing
numbers of abortions in Croatia, steps that he claimed were necessary to avoid
‘the Croatian people facing extinction’.146 This campaign was supported by con-
servative women’s patriotic groups, which converged around the State Institute
for the Protection of Motherhood, Family and Children. These organisations
included the Croatian Population Movement and Hrvatska ™ena (Croatian
women). Such groups were supported by priests such as Don Anto Bakoviç.
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Bakoviç argued that ‘in terms of abortion we still live in Serbo-communism’.147
A founding member of the Croatian Population Movement, Bakoviç proposed
the stigmatisation of childless couples, the abolition of abortion, the prevention
of young women of child-bearing age from emigrating, and the promotion of
the concept of the four-child family.148 Here again, therefore, we see that
although there appeared to be unity of thought between conservative Catholics
and the HDZ, this did not produce the sort the alliance between the HDZ and
the Church for which Tuœman hoped.
The failure of the HDZ fully to co-opt Catholicism into its national narra-
tive was starkly demonstrated during the first papal visit to Croatia in 1994. The
Pope had originally planned to visit Belgrade and Sarajevo as well as Zagreb, but
the Serbian authorities refused to allow the visit to go ahead and the UN in
Bosnia and Hercegovina refused to guarantee the Pope’s security. As such, a
visit that was initially meant to be a peace mission to the Balkans became a papal
visit to Croatia.149 The Pope began by praising the controversial Stepinac and
spoke of the tragedy inflicted upon the cities of Vukovar, Dubrovnik and Zadar
by the besieging Serb forces. However, he also set himself and the Croatian
Catholic Church against the policies espoused by Tuœman and the HDZ, in
particular their support for the Bosnian Croats engaged in fighting the Bosnian
Muslims. The Pope warned the government against trying to use Catholicism
for its own narrowly nationalist ends. In perfect Croatian he warned against ‘the
risk of idolising a nation, a race, [or] a party, and justifying in their name hatred,
discrimination and violence’.150 He urged Croatian Catholics to refrain from acts
of vengeance, calling on them to ‘become apostles [of] a new concord between
peoples’.151 Finally, the Pope condemned the Serb aggression against Croatia but
offered the ‘kiss of peace’ to leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church.152
There can be little doubting the significance of this papal address, which was
given to an audience of up to one million people in Zagreb. The Pope openly
criticised the government and warned against the central tenet of HDZ nation-
alism: the positioning of the Croatian nation at the heart of politics. This was
reinforced by his oft-proclaimed desire to visit besieged Sarajevo and by his
promotion of Vinko Puljiç, head of the Church in Sarajevo, to the College of
Cardinals.153 Puljiç was an outspoken critic of the HDZ in Bosnia and Herce-
govina, who had denounced the formation of the so-called Croatian republic of
Herceg-Bosna, called for multicultural tolerance, and supported peace and co-
operation between Croats and Muslims throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina.
The Pope’s visit also acted as a catalyst for ecumenical activity in Croatia. In
December 1994 Serbian Orthodox services were performed in Zagreb for the
first time since the beginning of the war and in 1995 Zagreb Cathedral began
making regular use of the ‘ecumenical prayer’ during its services. In 1997
Cardinal Kuhariç’s successor, Archbishop Bo¥aniç, instigated regular ecumen-
ical meetings between himself and the head of the Orthodox Church in Croatia,
Metropolitan Jovan.154 The papal visit in 1994 therefore helped to expose the
distance between the Church and the HDZ. That distance increased after 1994,
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so much so that the Church began to criticise the government’s domestic
policies as well as its contribution to the Bosnian conflict.
The subsequent positions taken by the Church on social issues emphasised
the growing divide between the HDZ and the Catholic hierarchy. Immediately
after the papal visit, Cardinal Kuhariç stated that ‘if all those in authority had
listened to him [the Pope], each in his place … we would have a far better
reputation in the world, a clear conscience and clean hands. As it is, we have
only demeaned ourselves’.155 Jure Kristo suggested that this conflict was bound
to occur sooner or later because of the Church’s pronounced support for
democracy and human rights – beliefs not fully shared by the ruling party.
Kristo argued that as early as 1990 the most prominent Catholic publication,
Glas Koncila, was frequently educating its readership in how ‘democracy is the
highest degree of the Gospel’s application in social and state life’.156 While this
early pro-democracy stance can be largely attributed to the Church’s strategic
interest in seeing the demise of communism, Kristo noted that the Bishops
Commission also spoke in favour of pluralistic democracy and warned about
the danger of the ‘reappearance of fear-inducing methods’ utilised by the com-
munists. Furthermore, in a passage that constituted a direct challenge to the
basic assumptions of Franjoism, the Commission demanded that political parties
‘avoid assuming the exclusive right to interpret recent Croat history’.157
The extent of the conflict between the Church and the HDZ can be seen by
looking at the former’s response to Operation Storm in 1995, noted earlier. A
sermon given by Cardinal Kuhariç at the time challenged the Franjoist view of
the Serbian ‘other’. Kuhariç asked Croats to do as he did: ‘if the opponent burns
my house, I will guard his. If he demolishes my church, I will protect his. And if
he kills my father, I will safeguard the life of his father.’158 Following a confer-
ence on ‘the Church, democracy and general welfare in Croatia’ in 1995, the
director of the Croatian Catholic Information Agency, ™ivko Kustiç, declared
that ‘some Croatian nationalists had embraced a form of Nazism’. He con-
tinued, ‘in a bar in Zagreb I saw a sign reading “no admittance to Serbs”. This is
a stab into the heart of democracy … in Croatia there are even official
newspapers of neo-fascist and neo-Nazi parties with the following motto below
their names: “damned be Serbs, Muslims and Jews, wherever they are”.’156
Archbishop Josip Bo¥aniç, used his Christmas address to the nation in 1998
to denounce the ‘sinful practices’ of the government, focusing in particular on
corruption.160 A similar message was given at Tuœman’s funeral on 13 December
1999 when Bo¥aniç told an estimated 100,00 mourners that ‘he [Tuœman] will
enter history as one of the great creators. For all the good Tudjman [sic] did …
we express our deep gratitude and let god be his reward’, but continued ‘for
those things that were less worthy and sinful, let them be forgiven’.161 Thus the
Church hierarchy tried to distance itself from Franjoism.
Although the Church hierarchy moved against the HDZ government, the
Franjoist association of Church and party remained strong in many rural parishes.
The Church was deeply divided between a liberal-minded urban leadership and
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conservative-nationalist rural priests and followers who mobilised behind the
HDZ’s most conservative elements in movements such as the anti-abortion
campaign.162 The extent of the division within the Catholic Church in Croatia
can be seen in responses to the alleged appearance of an apparition of the Virgin
Mary in the Bosnian village of Meœugorje. The apparitions began at precisely
the time when the Bishopric of Mostar was attempting to assert its authority
over the Franciscans who ran many parishes in that area. The Virgin Mary
appeared to youngsters that were being taught by the Franciscans, forcing the
Catholic authorities to abandon their efforts to exert control over them. Sub-
sequently, the Catholic authorities in Zagreb and Sarajevo unsuccessfully
attempted to debunk the apparition claims. Meœugorje became a major site for
Christian pilgrimage and the Franciscans retained their status in both Bosnia
and Hercegovina and Croatia.163 This episode reveals that schisms within the
Catholic Church in former Yugoslavia were extensive and deeply felt – extend-
ing beyond the realm of nationalist politics into the metaphysical realm of faith
and Christian belief.
The Croatian Catholic Church played a vital role in redefining Croatian
national identity in the 1990s, but not necessarily the role prescribed for it by
the HDZ. During the communist period, the Catholic Church was a symbol of
Croatian national identity. It was perceived by nationalists and others as a
defining characteristic of national identity. Furthermore, the suffering of the
Church under a state that sought to crush it (or at least to force it to sever its
links with the Vatican) was seen as emblematic of the wider suffering of the
Croatian people. Stepinac’s ‘martyrdom’ fulfilled this function particularly
well. Because the Church had had its properties seized and activities curtailed by
Tito’s regime, it was a keen supporter of democratisation and saw the HDZ as
an anti-communist movement. However, it is important to note that while
conservative-minded priests openly advocated support for the HDZ and many
joined its ranks, the Church leadership never specifically identified itself with
Tuœman and indeed spoke out in favour of pluralism and against mono-ethnic
politics. The HDZ believed itself to be the party of the Church and Tuœman
accorded the Church a leading national role. However, the role of the Croatian
government in the Croat–Muslim war that erupted in 1993 caused the Church
hierarchy in Zagreb, in tandem with the Catholic Church in Sarajevo, to con-
demn violent manifestations of Croatian nationalism. This anti-government
stance was supported by the Pope’s visit to Zagreb in 1994. After 1994 the
Church went on to criticise Operation Storm, the government’s poor record on
human rights, and corruption. It even aired its views at Tuœman’s funeral.
Many writers on the Croat–Serb war insisted that religious affiliation was
crucial to this ‘ethnic war’. Paul Mojzes, for example, described the war as an
‘ethnoreligious war’. Similarly, Michael Ignatieff argued that ‘Croats’ explained
that ‘the root cause of the bloodshed in the Balkans is that they are “essentially”
Catholic … while Serbs are “essentially” Orthodox’.164 Other than being based
on the conceit that the war was essentially ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘political’ – a
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conceit ably exposed by David Campbell165 with regards to Bosnia – this reading
was based on a Franjoist understanding of the Church. When Ignatieff used the
word ‘Croat’ he meant Tuœman, the HDZ and its supporters. The leadership of
the Catholic Church in Croatia did not concur with Ignatieff’s view. While
supporting the idea of an independent Croatian state free from communism,
the Church actively spoke out against the abuses connected with a narrow
Franjoist understanding of national identity. What was particularly interesting
about the position taken by the Church leadership was that it frequently invoked
conceptions of national identity in order to rebuke the government. The HDZ
was accused of bringing shame upon the Croatian nation and by implication of
being anti-Croatian because of the policies that it developed to support its
narrative of national identity. As a global institution, the Church could not be a
national Church. There was therefore a major disjuncture between the
internationalist vision of the Catholic Church and the centrality of the Croatian
nation for the HDZ. This meant that, as with the Istrian regionalists, elements
within the Catholic Church articulated alternative visions of Croatian national
identity. However, splits within the Church meant that this was a far from
coherent or structured vision.
 The nation and social practice
The previous two chapters have identified six areas of social life where there
were daily contests about the meaning of Croatian national identity. These six
‘snapshots’ offer several insights into understandings of Croatian national
identity in the 1990s. We can discern five recurrent themes. These five themes,
which are discussed in greater length in the concluding chapter are: Franjoism
as a ‘nationalising nationalism’, re-traditionalisation and ruralisation, diverse
sources of opposition, diffuse grounds for opposition, and overlapping and
competing identities.
In Chapter 4, opposition to the Franjoist narrative of national identity was
identified as emerging from liberal or social democratic political roots and from
dissident academics often educated in the West. What these chapters have
shown, however, is that opposition arose from many sources and was em-
bedded in social practice. This opposition was not always coherent. Coherence
was increased when specific social groups were attacked by Franjoism and
organised themselves in response. This was particularly true of the Istrian
regionalists and the Bad Blue Boys. In most cases, though, opposition was
disparate, disorganised and incoherent. For example, linguists who were united
in their opposition to Franjoist language policies, such as Dubravko ‡kiljan and
Ivan Ivas, did not agree on the grounds of their opposition. Furthermore,
conceptions of national identity that ran contrary to Franjoism emerged from
vastly different roots. Istrian regionalists drew upon the European liberal
tradition, trades unionists drew upon social democratic traditions and occasion-
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ally on the principle of social equality that underpinned Titoist economics, and
the Bad Blue Boys drew upon their own brand of Croatian nationalism. While it
was possible to predict from the earlier chapters that the HDZ would come into
conflict with liberal internationalist organisations such as George Soros’ OSI,
the pattern of government narrative and liberal counter-narrative was not
followed across the six areas. While overtly liberal orientations could be dis-
cerned in the studies of regionalism and education, when we looked at football
and the Church counter-narratives emerged from other forms of nationalism
and Christian theology. These patterns of opposition were sharpened by the
responses of the different groups to the war. Thus the HDZ often attacked
liberals and regionalists for being unpatriotic and questioned their contribution
to the homeland war. It portrayed their national narratives as dangerous
deviations that could threaten the continued existence of independent Croatia.
This accusation was clearly more problematic when directed towards the Bad
Blue Boys and the Catholic Church than it was when directed against liberal
intellectuals, because both paid a heavy price in the war.
Although the HDZ utilised the full power of the state to mobilise its own
view of national identity, it failed to secure Tuœman’s dream of a unified and
homogenous Croatian polity. Not only was national identity continually re-
interpreted through social practice, there was not even agreement on what
Croatian nationalism should mean. Different groups and individuals used
different traditions at different times, sometimes combining a Franjoist under-
standing of Croatian state-right with a liberal understanding of what that state
should mean, as in the case of the Bad Blue Boys. All this is to suggest, as Paul
James does, that it is not possible to reduce processes of nation formation to a
single level of social abstraction or core instrumental element.
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Conclusion
Competing claims to national identity
In a seminal work published in 1999, Misha Glenny attempted to plot the Balkan
history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Glenny noted that in the
1830s Croatian nationalism began an oscillation between pan-Slavic, pro-
Austrian and anti-Serb orientations. He concluded that this cleavage was the
result of ‘the multiple cultural and civilisational influences that had influenced
the Croats over many centuries [which was] inevitably reflected in Croatian
political nationalism’.1 Glenny thus offered an instrumental account of Croatian
national identity, agreeing with Gellner that nationalism creates nations where
none exist.2 He interpreted Croatian national identity as the product of an
aggressive nationalism informed by the political interests of social elites. Many
other writers, including Ivo Banac, Marcus Tanner and Mirjana Gross, agreed
with Glenny about this.
The other prominent approach to Croatian national identity was unmodified
primordialism. The encyclopedic work of Francis Eterovich and Christopher
Spalatin, the nationalist histories of Ivo Periç and Simon Vladovich, and the
cultural histories of Eduard Kale all traced an unbroken line of Croatian history
into antiquity.3 Here, instrumentalist arguments are inverted: nationalist move-
ments are understood as reflecting national identity rather than vice-versa.
Moreover, they use a broader understanding of the nation whereby most
instances of group activity can provide evidence of the existence of a prior
national or ethnic identity. Furthermore, the meaning of the identity signified
by the word ‘Croat’ was thought to be continuous and essentially unchanging.
The ‘great divide’ in nationalism studies is therefore reproduced in studies
about Croatia. Attempts to understand Croatian national identity have tended
to articulate both modernism and primordialism in their most polemic forms.
Those who consider Croatian national identity from a modernist perspective
reproduce that approach in its most instrumental form. For example, David
Campbell suggested that we should treat issues of nationalism and national
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identity ‘as questions of history violently deployed in the present for contem-
porary political goals’.4 Campbell understood contemporary Croatian national
identity as a tool deployed by the HDZ to secure particular political goals. This
approach unwittingly colludes with one of the central myths of Franjoism: the
idea that Tuœman/HDZ and the Croatian nation were one and the same. To
argue that Croatian national identity was produced by political manipulation is
to reject the possibility of alternative understandings and practices of national
identity. It is to accept the Franjoist claim that the Croatian nation was a
homogenous community of people that shared the President’s beliefs.
On the other side of the ‘great divide’, primordialism was reproduced in its
most basic guise. For primordialists, Croats were united through history by a
shared statehood that dated back to the medieval kingdom. Simon Vladovich’s
historical narrative began by explaining the ‘Pre-Croat history’ of the ‘Croatian
lands’ and then went on to show how the territory became ‘Croatianised’ in
antiquity before revealing how that genealogy was maintained up to the present
day. These writers insisted that it is possible to trace a continuous line of history
between contemporary and ancient Croatia. For them, Croatian nationalism in
the 1990s had much in common with earlier nationalist movements. This view,
however, depends on a particular interpretation of history. The nationalist
movement in the nineteenth century and subsequent Illyrian movement were
mostly cultural and ecumenical movements, while the heart of Croatian politics
was in its relations with Austria and Hungary. The agreements of 1526 and 1102
were crucial to supporting the line of continuity between past and present that
was central to the historical statehood thesis. This view was reflected in the
preamble to the new state’s constitution, which traced a continuous line of
Croatian nation-statehood from the medieval kingdoms to the present day.
According to David McCrone, ‘[t]he time sequences are highlighted because
they suggest a seamless continuity, even at those historical conjunctures which
would seem to offer embarrassment, such as the fascist regime of the 1940s’.5
Furthermore, the meaning of Croatian identity was taken to be unproblematic.
There was little consideration of regional identity, for instance. The primordialist
writers failed to note that until relatively recently there were Croats, Slavonians,
Istrians and Dalmatians, with the Croats only being those who lived in the
Kajkavian dialect area around Zagreb.
Rather than seeing it as either modern or ancient, either continuous or
discontinuous, either homogenous or fragmented, the modern nation should
be conceptualised as a social formation that operates at different levels of
abstraction. National identity is framed in abstract terms, though in uniting a
community of strangers the nation also has resonance in the locale. This
resonance depends on the material aspects of the nation, principally the
perpetuation of kinship-like ties in social practice. My argument is not that one
level is more important than others but rather that national identity depends
upon the interaction and interdependence of each level of abstraction (abstract
frames, political entrepreneurs and social practice).
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Modernist and primordialist approaches to national identity are incom-
patible and general in their outlook. They reduce complex processes of social
formation to a few ‘salient’ factors. A modernist account of the formation of
Croatian national identity can be rejected because national sentiments were
evident a long time before industrialisation and modernisation. Moreover,
prior to 1990 (with the exception of 1941–45) the state tended to be mobilised
against the idea of Croatian national identity rather than fostering it in the way
envisaged by Gellner, Hobsbawm and others. On the other hand, primordial-
ism fails to account for regional diversity and assumes that expressions of
national identity had comparable political salience and material resonance over
time. The five themes discussed below offer an alternative way of thinking
about national identity.
First, they show the relationship between abstract and material manifesta-
tions of national identity. Different groups offer competing definitions of
national identity often to legitimise different political programmes. This is a
two-way process, however. Not only is there a ‘top-down’ process of political
entrepreneurs using abstract frames in order to legitimise particular acts by
recourse to notions of common identity and purpose, there is also a ‘bottom-
up’ process whereby interpretations of national identity that emerge from social
practice come to inform the abstract frames themselves. The failure to
appreciate this two-way process can be seen in primordialism’s inability to
account for radically different conceptions of what being Croatian means and
modernism’s inability to explain why the identity politics endorsed by various
governments and imperial rulers were all ultimately rejected.
Second, these five themes show that the nation can have many different
meanings in different times and places. Moreover, invocations of national
identity need not signify the same thing. Ljudevit Gaj’s ‘Croatia’ was very differ-
ent from that of Ante Starïeviç. More recently, Franjo Tuœman’s conception of
what Croatian national identity meant was very different to that of many
opposition parties and the dissident intellectuals. This was seen, for instance, in
the debate about the relationship between Bosnian Croats and Croatia proper.
Finally, these five themes draw our attention to the importance of social
practice. Although Anthony Smith recognised the significance of the subjective
beliefs that underpin national identity, neither modernism nor primordialism
adequately account for the importance of belief and memory in framing
understandings of national identity. The latter in particular find it difficult to
explain how, as a recent social construction, national identity came to take such
a hold on the political imagination. Sometimes a state-sponsored under-
standing of national identity was not believed by sections of the target group
because the understanding of the national experience being put forward was at
variance with dominant understandings within that group. This disjuncture
tended to result in either reinterpretations of national identity or the
formulation of alternative transnational, non-national or regional identities.
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Franjoism as a nationalising nationalism
Throughout the 1990s the HDZ government attempted to enforce a Franjoist
understanding of Croatian national identity. It propagated what Rogers
Brubaker labelled ‘nationalising nationalism’. For Brubaker, ‘nationalising
nationalisms involve claims made in the name of a “core nation” or nationality
defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as
a whole. The core nation is understood as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state,
which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation.’6 The HDZ departed
from Brubaker’s understanding of ‘nationalising nationalism’ inasmuch as it
believed that the citizenry and the nation were one and the same. Nevertheless,
it defined the Croatian state as the state of the Croatian nation and acted
accordingly. In the economic field, Franjoism produced a set of policies that
emphasised differences between Croatia’s ‘Western’ economic traditions and
‘Balkan’-style economies. A by-product of this, however, was the endemic
corruption encapsulated by ‘sweetheart loans’. Franjoism was most successful
in the field of education because the state controlled virtually all the resources in
that area. It was able to control carefully what was taught, who did the teaching
and what resources they used. Thus the Franjoist message was passed on to
Croatia’s youth through the education system. Similarly, the HDZ was able to
enforce its ideas about Croatian language by making its own form of language
the language of the state and the media.
Stuart Hall argued that control of the past acts as a powerful source of
legitimacy for those who attempt to create a new future for a particular group.7
Through Franjoism, the abstract frames of the historical statehood thesis were
reinterpreted through historical ‘truths’, images, symbols and rituals. However,
Stuart Hall was wrong to imply that there is only one ‘narrative’ of national
identity and history. Moreover, the instrumentalist assumption that the ‘invented
traditions’ produced by Franjoism had an overwhelming resonance is also
questionable. Articulating the past and co-opting contemporary social institu-
tions is not always enough to produce the national identities and hoped-for
political legitimisation. Perhaps the main reason for this is the pervasiveness of
memory. It is well worth joining Tom Nairn in citing Conor Cruise O’Brien on
this point:
There is for all of us a twilit zone of time, stretching back for a generation or two
before we were born, which never quite belongs to the rest of history. Our elders
have talked their memories into our memories until we come to possess some sense
of a continuity exceeding and traversing our own individual being. The degree in
which we possess that sense of continuity, and the form it takes – national, religious
or social – depends on our own imagination and on the personality, opinions and
garrulity of our elder relatives. Children if they are imaginative have the power of
incorporating into their own lives a significant span of time before their individual
births.8
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The perpetuation of individual memory in 1990s Croatia meant that the sharp
break from self-management socialism to nationalist conservatism was disin-
genuous to many. The Franjoist insistence that Yugoslavia impoverished Croatia
did not fit with many people’s perception of economic realities in the 1980s and
1990s. The argument that Dinamo was a communist and Serbian name did not
fit with Bad Blue Boys who could remember when Dinamo represented Croatia
and waving a Dinamo flag was a synonym for flying the Croatian flag. The
insistence that people must speak one way or another to be proper Croats also
floundered when people were required to change the way they spoke. Issues of
belief and memory have therefore been present throughout the last three
chapters. There was a stark disjuncture between Franjoist claims and experiences
of social practice. On the one hand, the state utilised mechanisms of normalisa-
tion to enforce its vision of national identity. However, the externalised
imaginings of the nation (which provided the focus for Chapters 3 and 4) gain
their resonance through processes of internalisation in social practice. Thus
‘official nationalisms’ cohabit ‘with alternative senses of community and struc-
tures of feeling’.9 In many instances in the 1990s, the national culture articulated
by the HDZ and the popular culture experienced in the urban centres of Croatia
were greatly at odds.
In its response to these challenges, Franjoism became disparate and con-
fused. Despite all the evidence of their patriotism and their sacrifices during the
‘Homeland War’ (the Croatian name for the Yugoslav wars of succession, 1991–
95), the Bad Blue Boys were derided as ‘Yugo-nostalgics’ and agents of foreign
governments by the government. The Church leadership constantly refused to
identify itself with the interests of one nation and began to use the moral
authority ascribed to it by Tuœman to openly attack the HDZ. Because of the
position that Franjoism awarded the Church, the HDZ was unable to counter
the Church’s accusations.
Re-traditionalisation and ruralisation
In the late 1980s Josip ™upanov introduced the concept of ‘re-traditionalisation’.
The concept traces the emergence of a neo-conservative revolution. This revo-
lution was predicated on the locale and sought to reorder human relationships
at the kinship or face-to-face level. It attempted to replicate ‘old’ societal tradi-
tions that had been subjugated by communism. According to ™upanov, sections
of Croatian society believed that ‘re-traditionalisation’ was made necessary by
the failure of the Yugoslav authorities to provide for the economic, social and
spiritual needs of the people. Although it became clear that ‘brotherhood-and-
unity’ and self-management socialism had failed, there was a distinct lack of
credible alternatives and thus a tendency towards retrospection.
Writers such as Branka Baranoviç and organisations such as the OSI insisted
that education reform was driven by the idea of ‘re-traditionalisation’. It was a
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reaction to modernity and an attempt to root Croatian national identity in the
pre-modern. Moreover, re-traditionalisation was directly related to Tuœman’s
interpretation of the historical statehood thesis. It was reflected particularly well
in the conservative and Catholic women’s groups that sprung up throughout
Croatia shortly after the collapse of communism. The re-traditionalisation
revolution also fed into the fascist Party of Rights (HSP) programme in the
1990s. Dobroslav Paraga, leader of the HSP, accused Tuœman of being a weak
leader and a bad Croat because of his former links with the League of
Communists: traditional Croats, we were told, never accepted communism or
Yugoslavism.
Another concept used by liberal intellectuals to describe social changes in
1990s Croatia was ‘ruralisation’.10 Ognjen Ïaldaroviç argued that this was a pro-
cess that turned Croatia’s urban centres into villages: parochial, anti-modern
and extremist.11 There was, he argued, a physical ruralisation of the cities.
During the war there was migration from villages into cities and in particular a
large migration of Bosnian Croats into Zagreb and Split. This migration pro-
duced social movements that sought to alter urban-cosmopolitan conceptions
of national identity within Croatia’s metropolitan centres. The presence of
larger numbers of rural Croats in urban centres tended to exacerbate extreme
ethnic nationalism. Rural Croats tended to support the nationalist agendas of
the HDZ, HSP and conservative Catholic groups.
Ruralisation provoked responses in the urban centres, such as the Bad Blue
Boys phenomena in Zagreb. According to Ïaldaroviç, at the heart of the Bad
Blue Boys’ opposition to the regime was a desire to preserve Zagreb’s regional
identity from what they saw as a challenge from rural migrants. This, Ïaldar-
oviç argued, meant attempting to preserve a liberal, European, cosmopolitan
way of life in the face of the re-traditionalising conservatism of rurality. Indeed,
Tom Nairn suggested that the Titoist project attempted to ‘impose the values of
the city’ on South Slavic culture.12 Ruralisation and re-traditionalisation there-
fore represented a rejection of Titoist urbanisation. They juxtaposed themselves
to urban cosmopolitanism as a ‘real’ Croatian way of life juxtaposing itself
against a way of life ‘invented’ by Tito’s communism. The urban youth who
rejected this ruralised form of national identity were portrayed as anything
from degenerates and delinquents to ‘Yugo-nostalgics’. The urban–rural divide
was a central feature in differing accounts of Croatian national identity. There
was an important cleavage, for instance, between the urban Church leadership
who refused to embrace the HDZ and the rural clergy who openly supported
the HDZ. The politics of ruralisation also crept into the language question with
the attempt to ban the use of foreign shop names in cities.
The concepts of re-traditionalisation and ruralisation offer useful insights
into the contests about the meaning of Croatian national identity in the 1990s.
On the one hand they provide a rationale for Franjoist rhetoric and the policies
it spawned, linked, as they were, to Tuœman’s interpretation of the historical
statehood thesis. However, they also show that the cleavages ran beyond the
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usually cited conflicts between the HDZ and the generally more liberal opposi-
tion. There were also rural–urban divides in national identity. This cleavage was
most acutely felt in relation to the Bosnian Croats, whose presence in Croatia’s
urban centres and policy elites aroused much dislike and suspicion.
Diverse sources of opposition
Opposition to Franjoism occurred in every place where there was a disjuncture
between the Franjoist view of Croatian national identity and conceptions of
identity that were internalised through social practice. The first and most
obvious disjunctures were the competing national narratives articulated by
political parties and dissident intellectuals. Opposition parties attacked
Franjoism from a variety of angles: rightist and neo-fascist, liberal, centrist and
socialist. The neo-fascists, for instance, accused the HDZ of misreading the true
nature of Croatian national identity. The bulk of organised opposition to
Franjoism, however, emerged from socialist and liberal political parties. It tended
to accept the historical statehood thesis that formed the core of the Franjoist
narrative. However, it used the frames the thesis provided to highlight the ways
that Croatian national identity was historically linked with Central Europe. It
accused Tuœman of Balkanising Croatia and called upon Croats to reclaim their
true Central European identity and vote for liberal democratic change.
The most radical public challenges to the Franjoist understanding of
national identity in the 1990s came from dissident intellectuals. Banac argued
that in trying to be all things to all Croats, Franjoism failed to achieve its central
goal and instead became distorted and incoherent.13 He offered a counter-
interpretation of the historical statehood thesis and suggested that concepts
such as citizenship and diversity be brought to the fore. He accused Franjoism
of offering a one-sided and decidedly limited account of Croatian political
traditions.
The previous two chapters identified several areas in which Franjoism failed
to have its narrative internalised in social practice. The opposition that this
spawned came from an unlikely and diverse variety of social practices. The case
that stood out was that of the Bad Blue Boys. Ardent nationalists, skinheads,
volunteers for the Croatian army, the Bad Blue Boys nevertheless helped turn
the national capital into an opposition power-base. Rejection of Franjoist
language policies was widespread. What was described as a new form of ‘super-
Croatian’ language, complete with neologisms and words not used since 1918,
was imposed on schools, bureaucracies and the media. This was reinforced with
the message that all good Croats should speak as the President did. Only a few
actually changed the way they spoke, although most Croats did begin to label
their language ‘Croatian’. Moreover, the school curriculum was challenged by
parents and organisations such as the OSI who wished to see a more balanced
and less atavistic approach to the teaching of history and literature.
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The groups and individuals that rejected Franjoism were very diverse.
Generally speaking there were four types. First, those that rejected Franjoism on
political grounds. These were generally either socialists or liberals who disputed
the centrality of nationalism or neo-fascists who believed that Franjoism repre-
sented a weak form of Croatian nationalism. Second, those who felt that they
had been adversely affected by an aspect of Franjoism. The main examples here
are the Bad Blue Boys and the Istrians. Third, those individuals who questioned
Franjoism on intellectual grounds. Finally, those individuals who silently re-
interpreted their own national identity through social practice and the work
they did, the language they spoke, the books they read and the company they kept.
Diverse grounds for opposition
The grounds for opposition were as diffuse as the sources. There were three
central themes upon which opposition to Franjoism was based. First, the dis-
juncture between the rhetoric of Franjoism and experiences of social practice.
Second, the internal incoherence of Franjoism itself. This meant that the third
theme, the national identity propagated by Tuœman and the HDZ, was per-
ceived by many to be exclusionary rather than inclusive.
There was often a disjuncture between what Franjoism said being Croatian
was how and how many people experienced being Croatian in social practice.
For instance, according to the state, in 1995 ‘the fundamental objectives of the
economy and policy of transition consists in re-establishing the ties with some
essential historical and civilisational trends that were broken by socialism’.14 For
many Croats, if the late 1990s economy reflected the ‘civilisational and historical’
Croatian economic tradition, Yugoslav economics seemed preferable. For many
people, having a Croatian nation-state meant unemployment and a fall in living
standards. For them, the economic habits learnt under a communist regime
had to be retained. Such disjunctures permeated all six areas of social practice
examined in Chapters 5 and 6.
The second key problem with Franjoism was its internal incoherence. By
the time of his death, Tuœman was widely seen as an erratic authoritarian. There
appeared to be little coherence to what he said or did. He decided that the EU
was plotting to re-establish Yugoslavia and to force Croatia into another Balkan
union. After the end of the war many critics had trouble distinguishing Tuœ-
man’s method of rule from that of Tito. Without a war to wage and a supreme
national emergency to guard against, Franjoism became incoherent. Some
observers suggested that this was because the Tuœman/HDZ project only had
one aim: the achievement and preservation of Croatian sovereignty. Once this
had been achieved, it became difficult to know precisely what Franjoism meant.
As if to provide answers, Tuœman became more conservative, more radically
‘Franjoist’ and more dogmatic.
Finally, Franjoism began to exclude more and more people as the 1990s
MUP_Bellamy_08_Ch7 9/3/03, 9:38178
179C
wore on. Many of Tuœman’s former constituents were alienated. Having been
told that Croatia would begin to develop ‘normal’ politics after the war, many
HDZ supporters found that nothing changed and that the President continued
to wield the emergency powers he had given himself during the war. This
prompted a widespread re-evaluation of national identity and a wholesale
rejection of the Franjoist narrative, leading to the heavy defeats endured by the
HDZ in the parliamentary and presidential elections of January 2000.
Overlapping and competing national identities
As the President of all Croats, Tuœman saw a people in his own mould. The
Franjoist project attempted to give abstract ideas of national identity a meaning
at less abstract levels. It failed because of the rhetorical and practical distance
between the Franjoist abstraction and popular perceptions of identity that were
embedded in social practice. Evidence of this contradiction was hidden during a
war that had an, albeit temporary, homogenising effect on national identity.
However, in post-war Croatia the contradictions of national identity were
apparent everywhere.
The most obvious articulation of overlapping identity was the multi-
national Istrian regional identity. Simultaneously, an Istrian could be Croatian,
Italian and Slovenian. Istrian ‘commonsense’ dictated that there was no contra-
diction in this identity. Istrians moulded a distinct identity out of ambiguity. As
a result, they had their patriotic credentials brought into question by being
unfavourably compared to the Bosnian Croats, for example.
The issue of overlapping identities was also evident in the study of the Roman
Catholic Church. Franjoism identified Croatia as the antemurale christianitatis.
According to the HDZ, Croatia was defined by its association with the Roman
Catholic Church. For centuries Croatia stood as the bulwark against Islamic
and Orthodox Christian expansion into Western Europe. Thus, when Croatia
went to war in 1991, ‘the cross of Christ [stood] next to the Croatian flag’.15
However, the Catholic Church views itself as a multinational and global institu-
tion. It would have been incongruous for the Vatican and the Church hierarchy
in Croatia to insist that the Croatian nation was special and should be placed at
the heart of the political programme at the expense of Bosnian and Serbian
Catholics. For Cardinal Kuhariç, the primary form of identity was religious
faith. This meant that whereas Tuœman was only the President of all Croats,
Kuhariç had a responsibility to all Catholics in his flock, regardless of their nation-
ality. Thus there was a contradiction at the intersection of religious identity and
national identity as defined by Franjoism.
Nations often have different stories to tell.16 There are many competing
accounts of national identity that emerge from different political and intellec-
tual perspectives and in the daily practices of national identity. National
identity is therefore a site of political contestation. Identities overlap with each
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other, with some being more important than others at different times. For
example, if two individuals are watching a Croatian football league match
between the two largest clubs in Croatia, the most important aspect of their
identity may be whether they are from Split, Zagreb, or neither. If those same
individuals are listening to a sermon in a Church, the most important question
may be whether they adhere to the Catholicism of the Vatican and Zagreb
hierarchy or whether they adhere to clericalist nationalism. When these two
individuals go shopping, their behaviour and habits may be differentiated by
the way that privatisation impacts upon them or whether or not one of them
was a member of the HDZ or had an account with a collapsed bank. Each of
these three scenarios can tell us something about the individual’s national
identity but the story may be overlapping and contradictory. For example, the
first individual may have been a well-to-do member of the HDZ. However, he/
she may have been a devout Catholic that followed the papal line on issues of
human rights and forgiveness. That same person may be from Split, speak a
regional dialect, and feel a deep sense of Dalmatian identity that often comes
into conflict with the Franjoist view of national identity. Such are the conflicts
of national identity within just one individual in only three areas of social life:
football, faith and shopping.
Questioning the nation
Primordialism and modernism tend to portray the nation as a completed pro-
ject. The nation as revealed here is somewhat different. Here, national identity
is seen as an on-going project, or rather the product of many simultaneous on-
going projects. Not only do specific national identities change through time,
national identity is itself inconsistent. Most foreign commentators assumed
that Croatian national identity was constructed by Franjoism in the 1990s. Most
viewed it as a recent construction that had devastating consequences on the
region. However, although nations are constituted at the most abstract level,
they derive their salience by being embedded in social practice. By itself, the
Franjoist claim that Croatia did not relinquish sovereignty to the Hungarians in
1102 was hardly likely to provoke action 890 years later. Indeed, standing by
themselves, the claims made in the historical statehood thesis have no meaning
in the contemporary context. The important question is how these ideas become
salient and how they invoke people to act in certain ways. Both primordialism
and modernism offer unsatisfactory answers to this question because they
overlook the fact that many different social groups and institutions try to give
salience to a particular view of national identity in order to invoke action in
support of (or against) a particular political programme. There is therefore an
on-going political struggle between different conceptions of national identity.
This struggle draws not only on the bureaucratic power of the state but also on
interpretations of cultural artefacts and ethnic legacies, non-state institutions
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that might also cross national boundaries, class and economic status, and
different experiences of place. Seeing national identity in this way makes it in-
congruous to view it as static and homogenous, or an end-result of prior social
formations. Instead, it must be seen as on-going and fluctuating. Sometimes,
between 1991 and 1993 for instance, the competition to provide national iden-
tity with meaning appeared to have been resolved. During this period it seemed
possible to discern Croatian national identity. It was a Franjoist, conservative
and Catholic identity that valourised particular periods of history and vilified
sections of society. However, even when the internal Franjoist project was
assisted by war and a constant threat to physical security, many people opposed
this vision of national identity. Urban liberals and Istrians did not view their
national identity in this way. For them, being Croatian had more to do with
having a western European world view informed by interconnectedness with
Italy and Austria than with a direct lineage to ancient kings.
Viewing national identity as an on-going project avoids teleological and
tautological explanations. As well as being a product of competition between
different institutions and groups, national identity is itself in constant com-
petition with other forms of collective and individual consciousness. National
identity is not always the most salient form of identity, even when the state is
using all its power to pioneer a nationalising crusade. At the individual level,
personal experience shapes identity. For example, an identity politics based on
not being Serbian has little resonance if an individual happens to be married to
a Serb or to have a Serbian work colleague. At another level, ideas about
national identity constantly compete with other ideas and social institutions.
This means that for some people, in some times and places, national identity
may hold less resonance than other identities. At a macro level, this became
apparent after 1995 where the immediacy of the threat to physical security
receded and other – non-national – interests came to the fore of the political
agenda. Quite rapidly, the symbols of millennial statehood used by Tuœman
became symbols of derision. By 2000 Franjoist national identity had lost its
ability to dictate people’s political preferences. Predominant understandings of
national identity began to emphasise economic, social and international issues,
such as the desire to integrate into Western Europe.
The nation is embedded within social practice. While most primordialist
and modernist writers agree with this view, they do not allow it to drive their
analysis. Primodialists emphasise the importance of individual subjectivity and
locate it in the transition from ethnie to nation. However, they do not extra-
polate from this the idea that the nation can have as many meanings as there are
subjects, nor do they address the contest between different accounts of national
identity. Modernists reveal how such national meanings were constructed in
modernity but fail to account for how those accounts of national identity come
to have such resonance with subjects, to the extent that they became the core
organisational principle for many modern societies while on other occasions
failing to have such resonance. Analysis of national identity construction in the
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modern era needs to focus on the contexts in which it takes place. National
identity is not constructed on a tabula rasa and neither is its construction a one-
way process.
There are many other forms of collective identity that operate somewhere
between the individual and the nation. Catholics or Istrians also have a collec-
tive consciousness and this consciousness has a relationship with both indivi-
dual subjectivity and national identity. While both these forms of collective
consciousness operated within ideas of Croatian national identity they also
reached out beyond national identity – Catholicism to the global Catholic
Church and Istrians to their Italian and Slovene neighbours. Conceptions of
national identity, therefore, are deeply embedded within a diverse array of
social settings and individual and collective consciousness.
What, then, do the five themes discerned through the studies on Croatian
national identity in the 1990s tell us about national identity in general? Any
study that uses Paul James’ ontology of ‘abstract communities’ must see the
nation in two ways: ubiquitous and complex. National identity is a form of
collective consciousness through which an individual comes to identify with a
disembodied group. It is therefore constituted by two relationships. On the one
hand, the disembodied group has to be identified. The individual has to know
what it is that it is attached to. It is this relationship that primordialism and
modernism tend to focus on. This is a relationship that locates the individual
within a nation. On the other hand, however, it is important to ask how the
nation becomes embodied in the individual through social practice. Traditional
approaches tend to assume that the latter will always accompany the former in a
way that is unproblematic. However, there is not always close collaboration
between the two relationships. The process of embodiment often alters understand-
ings of national identity, creating disputes about both its meaning and salience.
A new way of thinking about national identity is proposed here. This
approach draws upon both primordialist and modernist thought but moves
beyond them by viewing nation formation as an on-going project. From
primordialism, the approach adopted here views national identity as deriving
partly from subjective understandings of prior forms of identity and social
formation. From modernism, we must appreciate the role of ‘nationalising
nationalism’ and the significance of the socio-political and economic changes
that accompanied nation formation. This points the study of nations and
nationalism towards an analysis of the on-going competition between different
accounts of national identity, resistance to those accounts and to the central
role of national identity itself. This is the sort of ‘bottom-up’ analysis called for
but not practised by Eric Hobsbawm. It views nation formation as neither
natural, inevitable or complete. Instead, nation formation is an on-going pro-
cess in which the salience of national identity ebbs and flows with the different
meanings given to the nation and the social practices it induces.
Croatian national identity was an indeterminate site of political conflict.
The HDZ government failed to inculcate its own vision of national identity
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among the ‘national body’, despite being able to mobilise the full bureaucratic
power of the state and despite the undoubted homogenising effect of the 1991–
95 war. Alternative accounts of national identity flourished. This exposes the
weaknesses of primordialist and modernist accounts of national identity and
highlights two central points. The first is the two-way relationship between
abstract frames, social practices and experiences of national identity. This
relationship is further complicated by the interaction of national identity with
other forms of collective identity such as regional or religious identity, which
transcend state borders. The second is the idea that invocations of national
identity do not always invoke the same thing. Croatian national identity may
mean different things even in the same time and place. Calling it an ancient
artefact or a recent construction is unhelpful because such accounts do not
enable us to interpret the meaning and salience of national identity in a given
time or place. National identity became so resonant in 1990s Croatia because it
was embedded in social practice. Opposition to Franjoism sprang up wherever
there was a disjuncture between abstract ideas of national identity and the
actual experiences of national identity. Because of their ‘top-down’ focus,
problems of memory and belief do not figure largely in primordialism and
modernist accounts, which tend, as a result, to view national identities as fixed
and stable.
There is a need for new approaches to national identity that appreciate its
complexity and ubiquity and reject the traditional general theories that
characterised the ‘great divide’. Such approaches should take into account the
problems that nationalists are not always believed by their constituents, that
different groups within the nation may have different ideas about what the
nation means and that these ideas may emerge from multinational collectivities
such as the Catholic Church. New approaches should also take heed of Paul
James’ view that national identity is constituted at an intersection of different
layers of abstraction, as failure to do so will continue to limit the explanatory
power of ‘nationalism studies’.
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